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In two 1981 decisions the Supreme Court held that the 1972
amendments to the Clean Water Act1 preempted federal common-law
nuisance actions in the area of water pollution.2 The Court also con-
cluded that Congress did not authorize any implied private right of ac-
tion under the Act for either monetary or injunctive relief.' The two
decisions, Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea
Clammers Association" and City of Milwaukee v. Illinois,5 have elimi-
nated all opportunities for private persons to seek damages under fed-
eral law for injuries caused by activities regulated under the Act.
The 1981 decisions, however, did not address whether the enact-
ment of the Clean Water Act also preempted state common-law actions
for monetary or injunctive relief. The Act appears to preserve such ac-
tions in the provision denying any congressional attempt to "restrict
any right which any person . ..may have under any statute or com-
mon law."' The Milwaukee Court found, however, that this provision
was not dispositive on the question of the preemption of federal com-
mon law,7 and the provision draws no explicit distinction between fed-
eral and state common-law actions. Recently, the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit held that the Clean Water Act bars a state from
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1 Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), Pub. L. No. 92-500,
86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)).
' See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1, 11, 21-22 (1981); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317, 332 (1981).
1 See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1, 13-18 (1981).
4 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
5 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
6 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e).
7 See 451 U.S. at 328-29.
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applying its own common-law injunctive remedies to a source of pollu-
tants located in another state, despite Congress's apparent attempt to
preserve existing remedies.8 Two other courts subsequently reached the
opposite conclusion, rejecting the Seventh Circuit's analysis.9
This Article analyzes whether state common-law damage or in-
junctive remedies have been preempted by the enactment of federal
statutes not only in the area of water pollution, but also in the areas of
air pollution and hazardous waste disposal. Part I of the Article de-
scribes four significant federal statutes controlling the discharge of pol-
lutants, lists the possible forums for redressing individual harms caused
by activities regulated under these federal statutes, and explores four
different values that Congress and the courts have considered in decid-
ing whether to authorize the use of private remedies. Part II examines
the reasons for the limitations that have been imposed on the use of
federal private remedies for redressing harm caused by pollution. Part
II contends that although the Supreme Court properly held that Con-
gress did not authorize implied private rights of action under the Clean
Water Act, the Court's conclusion that the Act preempted federal com-
mon-law remedies was erroneous. In its 1981 decisions, the Court en-
gaged in a questionable analysis of congressional intent by misunder-
standing or ignoring the extent to which the preservation of federal
common-law remedies promotes the values identified in Part I.
Part III addresses whether the federal pollution control statutes
prohibit a state from applying its own common law to a source of pol-
lution located in that state and to a source located in another state. The
Article concludes that private actions under state common law have
survived the enactment of the federal statutes controlling air and water
pollution and hazardous waste disposal, except where Congress has ex-
plicitly preempted state common law. The Article contends that the Su-
preme Court's 1981 decisions concerning private remedies under fed-
eral law should not be extended to preempt state law private remedies,
since a state's application of its own common-law remedies to a pollu-
tion source located within its own borders promotes the values identi-
fied in Part I. Preemption is also inappropriate and inconsistent with
congressional intent when a state applies its common law to a pollution
source located in another state. Although the application of state com-
I See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403, 410-11 (7th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 980 (1985).
' See Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264, 269 (D. Vt. 1985);
State v. Champion Int'l Corp., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1338 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1985). The Champion case involved an attempt to abate interstate pollution, while the
plaintiffs in Ouellette sought both injunctive relief and damages.
[Vol. 134:121
FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND POLLUTION
mon law in this context may be inconsistent with the two procedural
values discussed in Part I, accommodation and legitimacy, it promotes
the two substantive values, individual liberty and efficiency. Values of a
substantive nature, especially if they are of constitutional derivation,
should prevail over procedurally oriented values in determining the
availability of private remedies. In an interstate pollution dispute, the
substantive values dictate the preservation of state common-law
remedies.
I. THE CHOICE OF REMEDIAL ALTERNATIVES
A. The Nature of Remedial Alternatives
1. Three Illustrative Problems
The federal legislative effort to control the discharge of pollutants
reflects a continuing attempt to balance an industrial society's need to
consume natural resources and dispose of waste materials with its de-
sire to protect personal health, safety, and property.1 ° The federal pol-
lution control statutes reflect legislative determinations concerning the
manner in which and the extent to which industry should be forced to
reduce, or at least internalize, costs and harms that would otherwise be
imposed on others.11 Where the nature or degree of harm caused by
industrial pollution is uncertain, the statutes govern the allocation of
risk between polluters and those exposed to their discharges.12
10 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (mandating achievement of limitations on
the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters by applying "the best available tech-
nology economically achievable" for a category or class of "point sources," while mak-
ing "reasonable further progress toward the national goal of eliminating the discharge
of all pollutants"); 42 U.S.C. § 7470(3) (1982) (One goal of the "prevention of signifi-
cant deterioration" provisions of the Clean Air Act is "to insure that economic growth
will occur in a manner consistent with the preservation of existing clean air re-
sources."); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(3) (1982) (The National Environmental Policy Act
charges the federal government with a continuing responsibility to use all practicable
means of attaining "the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without
degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable or unintended
consequences.").
" For a seminal article analyzing the nature of external costs and the use of bar-
gains in the free market to internalize those costs, see Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
12 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(4) (Effluent standards controlling the discharge
of toxic pollutants "shall be at that level which the Administrator [of the federal Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA)] determines provides an ample margin of safety.");
42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (1982) (instructing the Administrator of the EPA to estab-
lish national emission standards for controlling hazardous air pollutants that will pro-
vide "an ample margin of safety to protect the public health"). For a discussion of the
substantive and procedural issues raised by the need to regulate in the face of scientific
uncertainty, see generally McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Ad-
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The following three examples illustrate the kinds of decisions that
must be made concerning how to allocate the risks of harm caused by
industries performing economically and socially useful functions:
Example 1. Company A operates an aluminum plant that emits
nearly 3,000 pounds per day of fluoride gases, fumes, and particulate
matter through a smokestack. B has lived about a mile from the plant
for the past few years and has complained of diarrhea, indigestion, back
pain, coughing, shortness of breath, and difficulty sleeping."3
Example 2. Company A mines a low-grade iron ore called taconite
and processes the ore into pellets. Each day the company discharges
about 67,000 tons of waste, known as tailings, into a large, nearby lake.
The tailings contain a mineral that in morphology and chemistry is
similar to asbestos, a known carcinogen. The lake is B's source of
drinking water. 4
Example 3. Company A owns property used as an industrial land-
fill. Over the past several years, a variety of chemical and metallic
wastes, including arsenic, vinyl chloride, benzene, lead, and cadmium,
have been dumped in the landfill. These wastes are all highly toxic
materials, and many are known to cause cancer, birth defects, and cell
mutations. The landfill is now leaking, and the resulting leakage has
contaminated a nearby underground aquifer. B is one of many persons
who drilled wells into the aquifer as their source of water for drinking
and bathing.
15
Each of these three examples can be modified by assuming that
company A discharges its wastes into the air, land, or water of state A,
while B experiences the effects of the company's discharges in state B.
Faced with these situations, Congress has endeavored to reconcile
the conflicting uses of the air, water, and land resources involved. The
legislature actually must make at least two kinds of choices. First, it
must decide what criteria to apply in resolving conflicts. Do some uses
merit more protection against the risk of externally imposed harm than
others? Should some uses be granted greater freedom to impose risks
ministrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA
and OSHA, 67 GEo. L.J. 729 (1979) (arguing that the EPA and OSHA should re-
solve technical questions surrounding proposed regulation of carcinogenic chemicals "on
the basis of result-oriented policies contained in their governing statutes" and that both
agencies should continue efforts to streamline the decisionmaking processes employed to
resolve cancer-related scientific issues).
"3 These facts are taken from Reynolds Metals Co. v. Yturbide, 258 F.2d 321
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 840 (1958).
14 This example is based on a variation of the facts presented in Reserve Mining
Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir. 1974).
15 These facts are derived from United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J.
1981), affd, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982).
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and harms on others? If so, why and to what extent? Second, Congress
must specify the forum for deciding which uses merit legal protection
and the procedures to be employed in resolving particular conflicts in
resource use. Should all such decisions be made by a centralized federal
administrative agency, or should disputes be resolved on an ad hoc basis
by federal or state courts? Congress addressed these issues when it en-
acted four statutory programs for controlling air and water pollution
and the disposal of hazardous wastes.
2. Federal Statutory Pollution Control Mechanisms
Congress has enacted a series of statutes designed to control pollu-
tant discharges that may present risks to the public health and safety or
to private property. In order to address problems such as those sug-
gested in the first example above, the Clean Air Act16 authorizes the
federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to promulgate ambi-
ent air quality standards that limit concentrations of various air pollu-
tants to levels required to protect the public health and welfare.1 7 The
Act delegates to the states the responsibility for adopting and imple-
menting plans to achieve the national standards by, for example, en-
forcing emission limitations on the operation of stationary sources of air
pollutants.1" The EPA has the power to enforce the provisions of the
Act by issuing administrative orders that specify a timetable for compli-
ance and by initiating civil actions for injunctive relief and civil penal-
ties.1 The statute also imposes criminal penalties, including fines and
imprisonment, for certain willful violations of the Act. 0 Finally, Con-
gress has authorized private citizens to commence civil actions to enjoin
persons violating emission limitations issued under the statute.21
The Clean Water Act is the principal federal statute designed to
prevent harms like those caused by the taconite tailings in the second
example. The core of the Act is contained in section 301(a),22 which
prohibits the discharge of any pollutant from "point sources" into navi-
16 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (1982).
17 See id. § 7409. The process for setting the national standards is described in
Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1136-37 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1042 (1980).
1 See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a). Formulation of state implementation plans is dis-
cussed in Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 249, 250 & n.1 (1976). The Act also
authorizes the EPA to promulgate national standards of performance, which establish
emission limitations for new stationary sources, see 42 U.S.C. § 7411, and emission
standards for moving sources, such as motor vehicles, see id. §§ 7521-7551.
1" See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)-(b).
20 See id. § 7413(c).
21 See id. § 7604(a).
22 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
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gable waters except in compliance with regulations and under permits
issued by the EPA or the states.23 The statute gives the EPA the duty
to formulate effluent limitations that restrict the amounts or concentra-
tions of pollutants discharged.2 The EPA typically issues these limita-
tions in the form of regulations applicable to a category or class of point
sources.25 The limitations are transformed into obligations of particular
point source dischargers through permits issued by the EPA or an ap-
propriate state agency.26 Discharges from point sources must be within
the applicable effluent limitations by the dates specified in the Act.27
The enforcement mechanisms provided in the Clean Water Act are
similar to those contained in the Clean Air Act.28
Congressional efforts to prevent problems like those raised by the
third example above have resulted in two statutes, the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act (RCRA),29 and the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).30
RCRA authorizes the EPA to formulate criteria for identifying hazard-
ous wastes and to list those hazardous wastes that will be regulated."1
The agency must also adopt regulations that protect human health and
the environment by controlling the activities of persons who generate,
transport, treat, store, or dispose of listed hazardous wastes. 2 Opera-
"' See id. §§ 1311(a), 1342. A "point source" is "any discernible, confined and
discrete conveyance," such as a pipe, channel, tunnel, or container, "from which pollu-
tants are or may be discharged." Id. § 1362(14). The term "navigable waters" is de-
fined as "the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas," id. § 1362(7),
and has been interpreted to include "all the waters within the geographic confines of
the United States," United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204, 1209 (7th Cir. 1979) (citing
United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1324 (6th Cir. 1974)).
24 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(e), 1314, 1362(11). These effluent limitations apply to
existing point source dischargers.
25 See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 126-36
(1977). Like the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act mandates the establishment of a
separate set of effluent limitations for newly constructed sources. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1316(b)(1)(B).
2" See EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S.
200, 205 (1976) (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1365 (Supp. IV 1970) (current versions at
33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1365 (1982))).
.7See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b).
28 See id. §§ 1319, 1365.
29 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6902-6987 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985). The Solid Waste Dis-
posal Act ("RCRA") was most recently amended by Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3224
(1984).
30 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982).
31 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 6921 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985).
82 These regulations govern activities such as recordkeeping; labeling; use of ap-
propriate containers; use of a manifest system for tracking the movement of hazardous
wastes from "cradle to grave" (from generation to disposal); treatment, disposal, and
storage of wastes; location, design, and construction of waste treatment, disposal, and
storage facilities; and methods of operation of these facilities. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6922-
6924 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985).
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tors of hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities must
obtain a permit issued either by the EPA or by the state in which the
facility is located under a permit program approved by the EPA. s The
EPA can enforce the regulations promulgated under the statute by issu-
ing administrative orders, initiating civil suits for injunctive relief and
civil penalties payable to the government, and seeking criminal
sanctions.
3 4
CERCLA, also known as the Superfund statute, differs from the
other three statutes; it is not designed to control pollution from ongoing
industrial operations. Rather, the statute is meant to facilitate the
cleanup of inactive hazardous waste disposal sites that are releasing, or
threatening to release, hazardous substances into the environment. The
Act establishes a Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund in the
United States Treasury,3 5 the receipts of which are derived from taxes
on crude oil and imported refined petroleum products 6 and from gen-
eral appropriations.3 7 The President is authorized to use money from
the Fund to remove or remedy releases and threatened releases,3 8 and
to seek reimbursement of costs incurred in the cleanup from persons
who caused such costs to be incurred. 9 Private parties who incur costs
in responding to a release, or threatened release, can recover those costs,
under certain conditions, either from those responsible for causing the
problem or from the Superfund. 0
3. Remedial Alternatives
In formulating any pollution control program, Congress must
make a series of decisions concerning the appropriate mix of public and
private enforcement. First, the legislature must decide whether to pre-
clude all private enforcement initiatives and rely exclusively upon the
government's authority to enforce the statute. Second, if Congress con-
cludes that some private remedies are appropriate, it must also decide
whether such remedies should be available only where the regulated
entity is violating the statute, only where the regulated entity is com-
33 Id. §§ 6925-6926.
Id. § 6928.
35 See 42 U.S.C. § 9631.
" See id. § 9631(b)(1)(A) (authorizing the use of funds received under 26 U.S.C.
§§ 4611, 4661 (1982)).
37 See 42 U.S.C. § 9631(b)(2). The Superfund was initially authorized at a level
of $1.6 billion.
Id. § 9604.
8 Id. § 9607. These persons may also be liable for damages for injury to govern-
ment-owned or controlled natural resources. See id. §§ 9607(a)(1-4)(C), 9601(16).
40 See id. §§ 9607(a)(1-4)(B), 9611-9612.
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plying with-the statute but is nevertheless causing harm to the individ-
ual, or in both situations.41 Third, the legislature must define the avail-
able remedies and the procedures for pursuing those remedies. For
example, Congress could authorize a person injured by pollution to
seek relief solely through agency administrative processes.42 Alterna-
tively, Congress could expressly authorize private judicial remedies.4
Under still another scenario, Congress could relegate individuals to
common-law actions for monetary or injunctive relief.44 Finally, Con-
gress could prevent the injured individual from taking any independent
action against the polluter.
When Congress enacted the four pollution control statutes dis-
cussed above,45 it included in each a variety of techniques for statutory
enforcement. 46 It failed, however, to make clear in all cases the appro-
priate role of the injured individual in the enforcement process. As-
sume, for example, that in one of the three examples above, 47 B can
prove that company A's activities, which are regulated under one of the
federal statutes, have caused or are causing harm to B's person or prop-
"' See Michelman, Pollution as a Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Cala-
bresi's Costs (Book Review), 80 YALE L.J. 647, 676-77 (1971) (arguing that private
nuisance actions might be a useful complement to public environmental controls when
activities that comply with regulatory controls cause harm to neighbors, but that sub-
jecting activities that violate environmental regulations to private nuisance actions
would engender a "wasteful overlap").
42 Of the four statutes, only CERCLA establishes an administrative compensation
scheme. That scheme is of limited scope, however. It authorizes individuals to seek
reimbursement from the Superfund for the cost of cleaning up hazardous waste sites.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9611-9612. Individuals may not recover under CERCLA, either
from the Fund or in litigation against private persons, for personal injury or damage to
property. Under the other three statutes, private individuals can seek to prevent the
imposition of future harm by participating in permit issuance proceedings, see, e.g., 33
U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3), by participating in the process of formulating a state implementa-
tion plan, see 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1), or by reporting alleged violations to the
government.
"s The Clean Air and Water Acts and RCRA authorize private individuals to sue
in federal district court for injunctive relief. See infra notes 88-100 and accompanying
text. These statutes, however, do not permit the courts to award compensatory relief.
See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. A private person can seek recovery of
cleanup costs from responsible parties under CERCLA. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1-
4)(B).
4 The Supreme Court's decision in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304
(1981), discussed in Part II of this Article, involved the availability of federal common-
law remedies. See infra text accompanying notes 199-277. Part III of this Article ana-
lyzes the availability of relief under state common law. See infra text accompanying
notes 278-523.
"' Congress, of course, has adopted a wide range of statutes to control pollution.
This Article is confined to an analysis of preemption issues arising under the Clean Air
and Water Acts, RCRA, and CERCLA. The conclusions reached in this Article, how-
ever, may also apply to other federal pollution control statutes.
46 See supra text accompanying notes 17-21, 28, 32-34 & 37-40.
47 See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
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erty. According to the Supreme Court, Congress has preempted B's
right to use federal common law to enjoin company A's activities or to
recover compensation for the damage caused by company A's activities
under the federal statutes.48 The four statutes provide no express right
to recover damages, and the courts have refused to find that the statutes
implicitly confer such a right.4 Thus, the only avenues for seeking
monetary redress for B's injuries are those provided by state law. If the
courts interpret the four statutes to preempt state as well as federal
common-law remedies, the injured individual will be left without any
forum for seeking compensation.
B. The Values Served by Remedial Alternatives
In enacting statutory schemes for the control of pollution, Con-
gress, explicitly or implicitly, makes a series of value judgments. Other
values are reflected in the constitutional provisions allocating power
among the three branches of government and vesting certain rights in
private individuals. If Congress fails to make clear its choices concern-
ing the range of available statutory remedial mechanisms, the courts
may be able to infer congressional intent by examining the extent to
which the availability of a particular public or private remedy is consis-
tent with these underlying statutory and constitutional value
preferences.
This Article analyzes a series of cases in which the courts have
ruled on the availability of private remedial mechanisms for pollution
control. An attempt to derive a coherent body of legal doctrine to ex-
plain these cases could proceed on at least two levels. At the first level,
the analysis would be based solely upon the express language of the
opinions themselves. As Professor George Fletcher has argued, how-
ever, it is often hard to maintain faith that at this level "all the cases in
a particular field of law coalesce[ ] in a consistent and coherent set of
rules." 50 As the analysis below indicates, the Supreme Court's conclu-
sion that the Clean Water Act preempted the federal common law of
nuisance and a circuit court's subsequent holding that state common-
law nuisance actions have also been preempted in interstate pollution
's See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981).
4' See infra notes 120-39 and accompanying text.
50 Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal Thought, 90 YALE L.J. 970, 995 (1981); see also
Sneed, The Art of Statutory Interpretation, 62 TEx. L. REv. 665, 665-66 (1983) (ar-
guing that it is possible to reconcile apparently conflicting cases interpreting statutes if
one accepts that "transcendent concerns substantially influence and sometimes domi-
nate the manner in which statutes are interpreted").
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disputes are difficult to justify at this textual level.5"
Professor Bruce Ackerman recently pointed to "an increasing
sense" that a legal analysis confined to the "particularities" of judicial
or statutory texts does "not exhaust the relevant legal conversation."5
The text of a judicial opinion, like that of a statutory or constitutional
provision, is open to interpretation.53 No one interpretation of a case is
definitive. What is involved in legal analysis, contends Professor Fred-
erick Schauer, is not "the uniquely correct interpretation, but only an
interpretation justified by the text.""M Professor Ackerman is among
those encouraging "a new kind of legal dialogue"55 and "a more con-
ceptual form of analysis" by legal scholars.56 Similarly, Professor
Fletcher suggests that legal analysis should move from the first, textual
level to a second level, which involves the use of "a method for decoding
the multiple messages of the case law. The method starts on the as-
sumption that conflicting ways of thinking about the law, conflicting
conceptions of Right, might coexist. This deeper conflict of principles
and methods accounts for the surface inconsistency in the case law."
'57
This Article analyzes the cases concerning private remedial mech-
anisms at both the textual and conceptual levels. It accepts Professor
Richard Stewart's contention that certain bodies of law "bespeak a
common social value" or set of values.5" It adopts Professor Stewart's
suggestion that "[i]f we take seriously the possibility of a legal system
giving expression to such basic values, then an inquiry into these values
and their institutional realization is justified."'5 9
This Article asserts that it is possible to isolate at least four values
that are reflected either in the provisions of the federal pollution control
51 See infra text accompanying notes 227-32, 366-67 & 405-06.
52 B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 42 (1984).
53 Cf. Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA L. REv. 797,
831-32 (1982) ("The Constitution has been written in a language, and a user of lan-
guage must be taken to know and intend that the language is open to interpreta-
tion .... [T]he law cannot be certain, in large part because language itself is not
certain.").
5 Id. at 829.
15 B. ACKERMAN, supra note 52, at 72 (arguing that theorists must move beyond
realism by laying the foundation for "a new kind of legal dialogue that seeks to expli-
cate the complex character of the struggle for social justice in a liberal activist state").
Id. at 5.
5 Fletcher, supra note 50, at 996-97.
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1669, 1671 (1975); see also B. ACKERMAN, supra note 52, at 20 (supporting
legal analysis that moves beyond traditional legal realism by "relat[ing] individual con-
flicts to the systematic structural tensions of social life"); Sneed, supra note 50, at 685
("The very task of judging is to bring to bear on particular problems one's experience
and reflective considerations of competing values.").
59 Stewart, supra note 58, at 1671.
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legislation or in the Constitution. These values are legitimacy, individ-
ual liberty, accommodation, and efficiency.6" In some of the cases dis-
cussed in the Article, the courts' reliance on the four values is explicit.61
In other cases, the reliance is implicit and provides a justifiable expla-
nation of the text of the court's opinion.62 Finally, in a number of cases
the courts' failure to analyze the four values properly produced an in-
correct result.63
This Article contends that the courts should explicitly analyze the
four values in determining the availability of private remedial mecha-
nisms for pollution control.64 The following section provides a brief in-
"0 These four values are not necessarily the only ones affected by the choice of
private remedial mechanisms. They are, however, values that frequently surface in ju-
dicial and academic analyses of the availability of private remedial options to persons
injured by pollution. See, e.g., Sneed, supra note 50, at 666 ("Transcendent values"
relied on by courts in interpreting statutes include "(1) the separation of powers be-
tween the branches of government; (2) the federal character of our government; (3) the
%individual rights guaranteed by federal and state constitutions; and (4) the efficiency of
government at all levels.").
The cases explored in this Article do not discuss economic efficiency, although the
courts have attributed to Congress a desire to achieve efficiency in statutory enforce-
ment. See, e.g., infra note 143 and accompanying text. Economic efficiency is neverthe-
less discussed in this Article because it might provide a justification for future legisla-
tive or judicial decisions, and because of its prominence in recent debates over the
formulation of environmental policy. See, e.g., F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A.
TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND PoLIcY 24-38 (1984) (collecting
cases and other authorities) (discussing economists' views that increasing overall social
utility in the use of natural resources requires consideration of'the costs, including ex-
ternal costs, of different control mechanisms).
61 See infra notes 146, 234 and accompanying text (relating to legitimacy); infra
notes 140-42 and accompanying text (relating to individual liberty); infra text accom-
panying notes 108-09, 190-92 & 457-60 (relating to accommodation); c. Sneed, supra
note 50, at 678 n.62 ("Concerns for judicial economy and respect for state courts, two
transcendent values that animate all statutory interpretation, are explicit in decisions
interpreting [42 U.S.C. § 19831," a statute whose language is "deceptively simple" and
whose legislative history is "ambiguous on many issues.").
6 See infra text accompanying notes 238 & 240-41 (relating to legitimacy); infra
text accompanying notes 186-89, 243 & 247-48 (relating to individual liberty); infra
text accompanying notes 143 & 147 (relating to efficiency); see also Sneed, supra note
50, at 688 (stating that in many cases involving statutory interpretation "most of the
travail and uncertainty that might have attended the making of the decision is unre-
vealed" on the face of the opinion).
6' See infra text accompanying notes 110-12 (relating to legitimacy); infra text
accompanying notes 114-16, 242, 246, 249-52 & 436-56 (relating to individual liberty);
infra text accompanying notes 253-54 (relating to accommodation).
" See infra text accompanying notes 387-99, 423-68 & 501-23; see also Sneed,
supra note 50, at 672 (asserting that in interpreting ambiguous statutory provisions
courts "generally should animate their work with their understanding of the Framers'
constitutional vision"); id. at 665 ("[Tjranscendent concerns substantially influence
and sometimes dominate the manner in which statutes are interpreted. These concerns
derive mainly from the Constitution and to a lesser degree from judicial attention to the
goal of governmental efficiency."); id. at 669 ("The forces of federalism on statutory
interpretation [are] ...strong in preemption cases."); id. at 684 (contending that it is
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troductory description of these values. Parts II and III of the Article
explore their role in cases concerning private remedial mechanisms for
pollution control.
1. Legitimacy
For purposes of this Article, a decision to regulate private con-
duct 5 is "legitimate" if those affected by the decision accept the deci-
sionmaking process even if they do not agree with the merits of the
decision. A regulatory decision characterized by legitimacy has a rela-
tively high degree of credibility. Persons required to conform their con-
duct or expectations to a particular statutory, administrative, or judicial
decision are more likely to perceive the decision as legitimate if the
decisionmaking process has one or more of the following characteristics.
First, legitimacy is enhanced if the decisionmaker is politically account-
able. For example, a regulatory decision reached by an elected public
official, or even a bureaucrat subject to various legislative oversight
mechanisms, may provoke less hostility from the regulated entity than
would a similar decision reached by a federal judge who is largely ex-
empt from such mechanisms, and whose views are not necessarily rep-
resentative of community values. 6 Second, public participation in the
decisionmaking process will increase the legitimacy of a particular deci-
sion."' Third, when a decisionmaker is perceived to be well informed,
legitimate for courts to rely on "transcendent concerns" in interpreting unclear statutes
because these concerns "are based upon constitutional considerations and the nature of
judicial decisionmaking").
6 Private conduct can be regulated not only by legislative or administrative action,
but also by a court decree in a common-law tort action such as nuisance.
66 See Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARv. L.
REv. 1195, 1209, 1218, 1225-26 (1982); Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private En-
forcement of Federal Law, 49 U. CHi. L. REV. 394, 418 (1982); see also Pierce, Regu-
lation, Deregulation, Federalism, and Administrative Law: Agency Power to Preempt
State Regulation, 46 U. Prrr. L. REV. 607, 664 (1985) (stating that the political and
constitutional legitimacy of federal agencies is "well established," even though they are
not as politically accountable as Congress).
Some, however, have expressed concerns regarding the legitimacy of administrative
rulings promulgated by regulatory agencies. See, e.g., Process Gas Consumers Group v.
Consumers Energy Council, 453 U.S. 1216 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (invalidating
the legislative veto merely guarantees that "the independent agencies, once created, for
all practical purposes are a fourth branch of the government not subject to the direct
control of either Congress or the Executive Branch"); see also PRESiDENT'S COMM. ON
ADMIN. MANAGEMENT, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRA-
TIVE MANAGEMENT 40 (1937) (attacking independent agencies as a "headless fourth
branch of government").
6 See Pierce, supra note 66, at 664; Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of
Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy,
86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1231 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice].
For an argument that the "interest representation" model of administrative law ulti-
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her decisions will be more credible."" Fourth, the perception that a reg-
ulatory decision is fair, in that similarly situated persons have been and
will be subject to the same requirements, will enhance the legitimacy of
the decision. Finally, a system in which regulatory decisions, and the
consequences of noncompliance with those decisions, are certain and
predictable will be more acceptable to regulated persons and to the
community at large than a system lacking these attributes.
2. Individual Liberty
This Article makes no attempt to provide an all-encompassing def-
inition of individual liberty. Rather, the analysis reflects the proposition
that individual liberty will be enhanced by a system that provides free-
dom from arbitrary governmental interference and maximizes self-de-
termination,"9 while at the same time protecting the basic personal in-
tegrity of the individual from harms imposed by others.
The framers of the Constitution established our tripartite system
of government based on the conviction that the separation of federal
governmental authority into three separate branches was necessary to
prevent any one arm of the government from unduly intruding upon
personal freedom.7 0 Similarly, the federal system of government pro-
mately fails as a general structure of legitimation, see generally Stewart, supra note 58,
at 1760-90, 1802-13 (urging that the current interest representation system involves
major difficulties in implementation, financing, and the ability to formulate general
rules of decision).
68 Cf Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality, 52
IowA L. REV. 186, 199 (1966) (asserting that judges may lack technical and scientific
expertise to make informed decisions in pollution control cases).
6 Cf Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice, supra note 67, at 1230-32 (contending that
"important values of local self-determination in the selection of environmental policies
and the deployment of local government resources" must be balanced against justifica-
tions for federally mandated environmental controls).
'70 See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 949-51
(1983). The Chadha Court quoted from James Wilson's statements at the Constitu-
tional Convention:
"Despotism comes on mankind in different shapes. Sometimes in an Exec-
utive, sometimes in a military, one. Is there danger of a Legislative despot-
ism? Theory & practice both proclaim it. If the Legislative authority be
not restrained, there can be neither liberty nor stability; and it can only be
restrained by dividing it within itself, into distinct and independent
branches. In a single house there is no check, but the inadequate one, of
the virtue and good sense of those who compose it."
Id. at 949 (quoting 1 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, at 254 (1911)); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 356 (A. Hamilton or J.
Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961) (arguing that the separateness and distinctness of the
three branches are essential to the preservation of liberty: "Ambition must be made to
counteract ambition. . . . The constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices
in such a manner that each may be a check on the other . . ").
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motes individual liberty by allowing for noncentralized decisionmaking.
As Professor Stewart has noted, a federal system
encourages self-determination by fragmenting governmental
power into local units of a scale conducive to active partici-
pation in or vicarious identification with the process of pub-
lic choice. This stimulus to individual and collective educa-
tion and self-development is enriched by the wide range of
social, cultural and physical environments which noncentral-
ized decisionmaking encourages1
The protection of the integrity of state political processes and the prin-
ciple of separation of powers, therefore, promote individual liberty.
Although the courts have not recognized a federal constitutional
right to a decent environment,72 governmental protection against private
intrusions upon an individual's health, safety, and property arguably
enhances individual liberty and is thus consistent with the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments .7 A regulatory decision
that assists the individual in halting, or at least receiving compensation
for, such intrusions, therefore, may also promote individual liberty.
74
3. Accommodation
A third value that Congress may seek to promote in the enactment
of pollution control programs-one which the framers of the Constitu-
71 Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice, supra note 67, at 1210-11 (footnotes omitted);
see also Pierce, supra note 66, at 645-46 (citing Gray, Regulation and Federalism, I
YALE REG. J. 93 (1983)) (suggesting that one advantage of state and local regulation
over federal regulation is that the state and local regulators are more likely to be able to
respond promptly to local needs). For an argument that a diminished role for the Su-
preme Court in issues involving interstate commerce and the federal preemption of state
law will encourage political responsibility at the national and state levels and permit
responsiveness to a fuller range of interests in the allocation of natural resources, see
Tarlock, National Power, State Resource Sovereignty and Federalism in the 1980's:
Scaling America's Magic Mountain, 32 U. KAN. L. REv. 111 (1983).
72 See, e.g., Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532, 535 (S.D. Tex.
1972); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 728, 739 (E.D.
Ark. 1971). See generally T. SCHOENBAUM, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW 236-37
(1985) (citing cases in which plaintiffs have asked the court to recognize a constitu-
tional right to a decent environment).
73 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation."); see also infra notes 329-48 and accompanying
text (contending that congressional abolition of all common-law actions for compensa-
tory relief would raise serious due process concerns).
74 Cf 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c) (1982) ("The Congress recognizes that each person
should enjoy a healthful environment . ... "); W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW § 2.1, at 2 (Supp. 1984) (discussing writers who argue that nui-
sance law protects against intrusion upon "some version of unique human rights").
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tion sought to achieve by creating a federal system of government-is
the accommodation of conflicting interests. The desire of more than one
entity to use the same natural resource may give rise to at least three
different kinds of conflicts: conflicts between the interests of two or
more states, conflicts between state and federal interests, and conflicts
between the interests of regulated industrial entities and those of per-
sons adversely affected by pollutant discharges. First, two different
states may disagree on the appropriate use of a particular resource. For
example, state A may designate a body of water as the appropriate
receptacle for the effluents of an industrial discharger located in that
state. State B, located downstream on the same body of water, may
object that the company's discharges reduce the value of the water to
state B residents for drinking or recreational purposes. 5 Second, a
state's decision to permit a certain level of pollution by its industries
may conflict with a federal environmental standard or damage a re-
source important to national environmental interests, such as a national
park, or to economic interests, such as a navigable waterway used in
interstate commerce.76 Finally, many of the provisions of the federal
pollution control statutes reflect an effort to balance the interests of in-
dustry in avoiding costly pollution control requirements and the desire
to protect the health of persons exposed to industrial emissions." Th
desirability of a particular private remedy might depend on its capacity
for smoothly accommodating the potentially conflicting interests of the
states, the national government, consumers, and industry. The accom-
modation of the conflicting interests of those affected by the federal pol-
lution control laws enhances the likelihood that those entities will coop-
erate in seeking to achieve the substantive goals reflected in those laws.
4. Efficiency
A legislature designing a regulatory system of pollution control is
also motivated by efficiency concerns, both in the use of natural re-
sources and in the use of governmental resources to enforce the regula-
tory obligations. An economically efficient allocation of resources is one
that maximizes the total value of production as measured by consumers'
7 See Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice, supra note 67, at 1215 ("[Slpillover impacts
of decisions in one jurisdiction on well-being in other jurisdictions generate conflicts
and welfare losses not easily remedied under a decentralized regime.").
76 See id. at 1212 (explaining that "any individual state . . . may rationally de-
cline unilaterally to adopt high environmental standards . . . for fear that the resulting
environmental gains will be more than offset by the movement of capital to other areas
with lower standards"). In such a situation, all states may be better off if federal stan-
dards are imposed.
77 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
1985]
136 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
willingness to pay for various commodities produced by a given re-
source allocation.78 Efficiency may be threatened if industry is free to
discharge pollutants without liability for resulting harms. For example,
if company A in the second illustrative example above 9 is free to dis-
charge its tailings into the lake without incurring liability for the harm
caused by the discharges, the company is able to
shift part of the cost of producing [its] good[s] to [B and the
other users of the lake], who in effect [partially] subsidize
[company A's] cost of production by absorbing the [harm]
without charge. Thus, the ultimate price charged [and paid]
for [company A's] good[s] may be understated because it does
not [accurately] reflect all of the [costs] of production."0
This distorted price signal may result in greater demand for and pro-
duction of the company's goods than would be the case if the costs of
harm to the environment were imposed on the company and reflected
in the price of its goods. Absent an accurate representation of the true
opportunity cost of producing company A's goods, the company's prices
will not insure that resources will gravitate to their most valued use."
If they do not, the market will fail to operate efficiently. This kind of
misallocation of resources, or market failure, may be avoided by per-
mitting B to bring a private action against the company for compensa-
tory damages. An award of damages will tend to promote a more effi-
cient level of production by taxing company A for the costs it imposes
on others.8 2 In establishing a pollution control program, the legislature
also may want to achieve efficiency in enforcement by maximizing the
degree of compliance achieved as a result of a given outlay of enforce-
" See R. STEWART & J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 112 (Supp.
1982). An economically efficient allocation of resources can also be defined as one that
results in a given level of output at the least cost. It has been suggested that in seeking
to achieve an efficient allocation of natural resources, one should attempt to minimize
the sum of four different types of costs associated with the use of those resources: (1)
damage costs occurring as a result of pollution; (2) abatement costs occurring as a result
of pollution; (3) avoidance costs incurred in preventing or minimizing the adverse ef-
fects of pollution once it has occurred; and (4) transaction costs involved in allocating
resources, including the costs of selecting and applying liability rules. See id. at 145; Cf.
Michelman, supra note 41, at 650-51 (discussing Calabresi's definition of primary,
secondary, and tertiary costs).
7 See supra text accompanying note 14.
s F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A. TARLOCK, supra note 60, at 31.
8 See I. VAN LIER, ACID RAIN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 56-58 (1981).
sa Cf. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 66, at 1297 (Private actions awarding com-
pensatory damages "tend automatically to promote a more efficient level of compliance
[with regulatory norms] by taxing defendants for the costs they impose upon others.")
(footnote omitted).
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ment expenditures.8 3
C. Value Achievement as a Means of Selecting Remedial
Alternatives
Parts II and III of this Article discuss a series of remedial alterna-
tives under both federal and state law for redressing harms caused by
activities regulated under the four major federal pollution control stat-
utes. Some courts have concluded that Congress failed to indicate
clearly whether these remedial alternatives are available to private per-
sons. In the absence of explicit legislative guidance, the courts have had
to search for implicit congressional intent in determining the availabil-
ity of private remedies. In some cases, the courts appear to have divined
this intent by considering whether the values identified above would be
promoted by preserving or precluding resort to a particular remedy."
Based on this analysis, the courts have held that Congress intended to
bar implied statutory private rights of action, federal common-law ac-
tions, and state common-law actions for redressing harms caused by
interstate pollution.
This Article contends that in some of these cases the courts' analy-
sis of congressional intent was mistaken or incomplete. The following
chart indicates that of the five remedial alternatives discussed in this
Article, only one-implied statutory private rights of action-fails to
83 See Sneed, supra note 50, at 665 & n.3 (contending that courts interpret stat-
utes in a manner likely to promote "governmental efficiency," which concerns the
achievement of governmental objectives "without undue costs or administrative bur-
dens"); id. at 670-71 n.28; id. at 676 ("A recurring concern in statutory interpretation
cases that is not directly rooted in specific provisions of the Constitution is the protec-
tion of efficiency in government."); see also supra note 78 (discussing transaction costs).
8 Cf Sneed, supra note 50, at 667-68 (stating that a "vital aspect of the 'art' of
[statutory] interpretation" has been the influence of "a transcendent concern for the
separation of powers between the three branches of the federal government," a concern
that is "rooted in the Constitution"); id. at 672 ("Interpretation of statutes is influenced
plainly and appropriately by the letter and spirit of the Bill of Rights . . ").
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promote any of the four values:














Rights of NO NO NO
Action
Federal








Law NO (?) YES NO (?) YES
(Interstate)
Contrary to the Supreme Court's analysis in its 1981 decisions,85 the
availability of federal common-law actions would promote all four of
these values. Moreover, the holdings in the Court's 1981 decisions, re-
gardless of their merits, should not be extended to preempt state com-
mon-law actions for intrastate pollution, because these actions are
strongly supported by three of the four values and are not inconsistent
with the remaining value.
State common-law actions for interstate pollution are also sup-
ported by a consideration of the four values. Although these actions
85 See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clanuners Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1, 11, 21-22 (1981); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 1, 13-18 (1981).
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may be inconsistent with the values of legitimacy and accommodation,
their preservation promotes the remaining two values, individual liberty
and efficiency. The latter two values are substantive in nature and
should be given priority by the courts. They reflect society's determina-
tions of the extent to which industry should be forced to internalize the
costs resulting from pollution and of the appropriate allocation of the
risk of pollution-caused harm."' The values of legitimacy and accom-
modation, on the other hand, are primarily procedural in nature. They
assist in determining who should make the decisions concerning appro-
priate levels of risk allocation and cost internalization and which proce-
dures should be followed for making those decisions. These values for
the most part are employed to choose the most effective means of
achieving the substantive goals. The process-oriented values should,
therefore, yield to the substantive values where the two sets of values
conflict. The choice between procedural and substantive values should
be especially clear where the latter are of constitutional derivation. In
the case of an interstate pollution dispute, several components of the
individual liberty value may reflect a constitutional mandate that a
state and its citizens be afforded the means of protecting themselves
against and seeking redress for harms originating from outside that
state.
87
II. FEDERAL PRIVATE REMEDIES
A. Express Statutory Remedies
1. Recovery of Compensatory Damages
Three of the four federal pollution control statutes addressed in
this Article contain provisions authorizing private citizens 8 to bring
suit in federal district court against persons alleged to be in violation of
certain substantive statutory requirements, such as limitations on emis-
SB See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
817 See infra notes 147, 452-56 and accompanying text (contending that, in situa-
tions where the values conflict, priority should be afforded to those derived from the
Constitution, such as individual liberty).
" The citizen suit provisions in the Clean Air Act and RCRA authorize "any
person" to bring suit. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 6972(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1985); 42
U.S.C. § 7604(a). The Clean Water Act authorizes suits by "any citizen," 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(a), which is defined as "a person or persons having an interest which is or may
be adversely affected." Id. § 1365(g). The Supreme Court has construed this provision
to mean "all persons possessing standing under [the] Court's decision in Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)." Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea
Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 16 (1981) (citing S. RaP. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
146 (1972)).
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sions of air pollutants or on discharges of pollutants into navigable wa-
ters.8" The citizen suit provisions of these three acts do not, however,
explicitly authorize the recovery of compensatory or other damages by
private plaintiffs, and the courts have refused to construe the statutes to
permit such an award.90 A private party can seek damages under
89 The citizen suit provisions of these and other federal pollution control statutes
are quite similar in their structure and language. Many were patterned after the citizen
suit provisions included in the Clean Air Act in 1970. See Miller, Private Enforcement
of Federal Pollution Control Laws (pt. 1), 13 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,309, 10,311 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Miller, Private Enforcement (pt. 1)] ("There has been a tendency
to literally 'lift' [the citizen suit provision] from the Clean Air Act and transpose it with
only [minor] changes into other environmental statutes."). The Clean Air and Water
Acts limit the substantive violations that can be the appropriate subject of a citizen suit.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(0; 42 U.S.C. § 7604(0. RCRA's citizen suit provision simply
authorizes suit against "any person . . . who is alleged to be in violation of any per-
mit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, or order which has become effective
pursuant to this [Act]." 42 U.S.C.A. § 6972(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1985).
A detailed analysis of the various federal citizen suit provisions is beyond the scope
of this Article. For a thorough discussion of these provisions, see generally Fadil, Citi-
zen Suits Against Polluters: Picking Up the Pace, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 23 (1985)
(discussing factors responsible for the degree of citizen enforcement and the rise of citi-
zen suits under the Clean Water Act); Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollu-
tion Control Laws (pts. 1-3), 13 ENvTL. L. REP. 10,309 (1983), 14 ENVTL. L. REP.
10,063, 10,407 (1984); Schwartz & Hackett, Citizen Suits Against Private Industry
Under the Clean Water Act, 17 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 327 (1985) (discussing claims,
defenses, and remedies under the Clean Water Act). See also F. ANDERSON, D.
MANDELKER & A. TARLOCK, supra note 60, at 445-47 (discussing standing require-
ments); J. BONINE & T. MCGARITY, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
987-92 (1984). The citizen suit provisions also authorize private persons to sue the
Administrator of the EPA for an alleged failure to perform nondiscretionary acts. See
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2); 42 U.S.C.A. § 6972(a)(2) (West 1983 & Supp. 1985); 42
U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2). This Article addresses the rights of private persons against pol-
luters who have allegedly injured them, rather than their rights against the government
for failing to implement or for improperly implementing the pollution control statutes.
For an analysis of the use of citizen suit provisions to force agency action, see J.
BONINE & T. McGARITY, supra, at 869-99.
90 See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n,
453 U.S. 1, 12, 17 n.27, 18 (1981) (concluding that the legislative history of the Clean
Water Act reveals a congressional intent to limit private remedies to those expressly
provided); City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008, 1014-
15 (7th Cir. 1979) (The Clean Water Act does not authorize private actions for dam-
ages.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980); Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy
Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1390, 1391 (D.R.I. 1984); Fairview Township v.
EPA, 593 F. Supp. 1311, 1315 (M.D. Pa. 1984) ("Monetary damages are not availa-
ble under the Clean Water Act.") (citations omitted); see also S. REP. No. 1196, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 36-39, 64-65 (1970) (The Clean Air Act's citizen suit provision does
not provide for damage actions; if, however, damages can be shown, remedies under
other laws are still available.); J. BONINE & T. McGARITY, supra note 89, at 989-90
(collecting cases); Miller, Private Enforcement (pt. 1), supra note 89, at 10,321; Com-
ment, The Dilemma of the Downstream State: The Untimely Demise of Federal Com-
mon Law Nuisance, 11 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 295, 394 (1984). But cf. 30 U.S.C.
§ 1270(0 (1982) (providing a cause of action for damages to person or property arising
from violations of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977). The
Clean Water Act does authorize the assessment of civil penalties in a citizen suit. See
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CERCLA, but recovery is limited to reimbursement of certain costs
incurred as a result of a release or threatened release of hazardous sub-
stances from a facility.91 Recoveries for personal injuries or damage to
private property are not available.
2. Injunctive Relief
The citizen suit provisions of the Clean Air and Water Acts and
RCRA authorize the courts to enjoin allegedly unlawful polluting ac-
tivities. 2 A plaintiff who proves an ongoing statutory violation, how-
ever, is not automatically entitled to injunctive relief. In Weinberger v.
Romero-Barcelo,93 the Supreme Court held that because an injunction
is an equitable remedy a plaintiff under the citizen suit provision of the
Clean Water Act94 is not entitled to injunctive relief as a matter of
course upon proof of a statutory violation.
95
According to the Court in Romero-Barcelo, an injunction should
be issued only where it " 'is essential in order effectually to protect
property rights against injuries otherwise irremediable.' "96 Tradition-
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a). Such penalties are payable to the federal government, not to the
private plaintiff. See Miller, Private Enforcement (pt. 2), supra note 89, at 10,079.
91 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1-4)(B).
92 For example, the Clean Water Act vests the federal district courts with the
authority "to enforce an effluent standard or limitation." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a). For a
description of the types of injunctive relief that are appropriate under the citizen suit
provisions, see Miller, Private Enforcement (pt. 2), supra note 89, at 10,075-79. See
generally Farber, Equitable Discretion, Legal Duties, and Environmental Injunc-
tions, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 513 (1984) (classifying different types of injunctions, such
as enforcement injunctions and compliance injunctions); Plater, Statutory Violations
and Equitable Discretion, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 524 (1982) (discussing the effects of
statutes on equitable discretion).
93 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
33 U.S.C. § 1365.
95 See 456 U.S. at 311-20; see also id. at 321-22 (Powell, J., concurring) (finding
"no indication that Congress intended to limit the court's equitable discretion"). In
Romero-Barcelo the Governor of Puerto Rico and residents of the island sued the
United States Navy to enjoin the Navy from continuing its weapons training activities
off the coast of Puerto Rico. These activities caused ordnance to fall into the sea when
Navy pilots inadvertently missed land-based targets. Id. at 307. The Clean Water Act
prohibits the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters without a permit, see 33
U.S.C. § 1311(a), and defines the term "pollutant" to include munitions. See id.
§ 1362(6). Because the Navy was discharging ordnance without a permit from the
EPA, the district court found that the Navy was violating the Act. See 456 U.S. at 307-
08 (citation and footnote omitted). The court ordered the Navy to seek a permit from
the EPA, but it refused to enjoin the training activities pending the EPA's consideration
of the permit application. See id. at 309-10. The Court of Appeals reversed and in-
structed the district court to order the Navy to cease the violation until it received a
permit. See id. at 310 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court reversed.
456 U.S. at 312 (quoting Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453, 456 (1919)).
The Court stated that plaintiffs have "repeatedly" been required to demonstrate irrepa-
rable injury and the inadequacy of legal remedies before receiving injunctive relief in
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ally, the federal courts have compared the harms that would be suffered
by the defendant and plaintiff if injunctive relief were granted or re-
fused. 7 The courts also consider the effect on the public interest of
issuing an injunction. 98 The Court in Romero-Barcelo concluded that,
unless Congress clearly manifests its intention to control the exercise of
the district court's discretion, a court is not obligated to issue an injunc-
tion for every statutory violation.99 The Court then reviewed the lan-
guage, structure, and legislative history of the Clean Water Act and
determined that the fact that "the scheme as a whole contemplates the
exercise of discretion and balancing of equities militates against the
conclusion that Congress intended to deny courts their traditional equi-
table discretion in enforcing the statute." 00
federal court. See id. at 312 (citing Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 61
(1975); Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88 (1974); Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. West-
over, 359 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1959); Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944)).
1 See Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 312 (citing Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
414, 440 (1944)). Among the factors considered by the federal courts in pollution cases
are the technical and financial feasibility of compliance, the existence (or lack thereof)
of a threat to public health, and the ability of the court to manage the remedy sought.
See Miller, Private Enforcement (pt. 2), supra note 89, at 10,077 (collecting cases).
98 See Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 312.
See id. at 313 (citing Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398
(1946)). The district court in Romero-Barcelo found that the Navy's discharges had not
harmed the quality of the waters off the coast of Puerto Rico. See Romero-Barcelo, 456
U.S. at 307. The Supreme Court also stated that "the [Navy's] discharge of ordnance
had not polluted the waters." Id. at 315.
Arguably, this fact should not have been considered in determining whether the
Navy's violation should have been enjoined. The principal pollution control mechanism
in the Clean Water Act is a series of technology-based effluent limitations, which are to
be applied uniformly to a class or category of dischargers based on the degree of efflu-
ent reduction that those dischargers are technically or economically capable of achiev-
ing. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b), 1314(b) (calling for effluent limitations for certain
point sources "which shall require the best practicable control technology currently
available as defined by the Administrator pursuant to section 1314(b)"). In establishing
these effluent limitations, the EPA is not authorized to consider the assimilative capac-
ity of the receiving waters. Indeed, in establishing the effluent limitation mechanism in
the 1972 amendments to the Clean Water Act, Congress clearly rejected as unworkable
previous federal attempts at water pollution control based on the impact of discharges
on receiving water. See Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 642 F.2d 323, 327-28 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1053 (1981); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011,
1041-44 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see also F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A. TARLOCK,
supra note 60, at 342 ("In 1972 Congress concluded that the water quality approach
was not working.").
100 Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 316. The Court noted that the Act's scheme of
phased compliance "suggests that this is a statute in which Congress envisioned, rather
than curtailed, the exercise of discretion." Id. But cf. Farber, supra note 92, at 524-27
(A more insightful reading of Romero-Barcelo reveals that the district court's "discre-
tion is limited to choosing between [relief that insures] immediate compliance and [that
which insures] prompt compliance."); Miller, Private Enforcement (pt. 2), supra note
89, at 10,078 ("The question is not whether violations of the statute should be enjoined,
but how they should be enjoined. Injunctive relief should be available almost automati-
cally to remedy statutory violations, but the precise nature of the remedy should reflect
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Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion, contended that Congress
had confined "the discretion of the federal judiciary much more nar-
rowly than the [majority's] opinion suggest[edl."'O' Absent an "excep-
tional situation," which did not include this case, Congress imposed a
"general rule of immediate cessation" of all discharges violating the
statute. 10 2 According to Justice Stevens, the majority's reading of the
Clean Water Act was inconsistent with congressional intent and failed
to give appropriate recognition to the public interest in halting ongoing
statutory violations.10 3 Justice Stevens noted that "there [was] nothing
in the [Clean Water Act] or [its] legislative history to suggest that Con-
gress invited the federal courts to second-guess" Congress's decision to
require permits for the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters.1"
The implications of the Court's decision in Romero-Barcelo for
future citizen suits seeking injunctive relief are not clear. First, it has
been argued that, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the dis-
charges of pollutants by a federal facility without a permit did not vio-
late the Clean Water Act. 0 5 Second, even assuming a statutory viola-
tion, the decision may reflect only the courts' discretionary authority to
choose among various options for achieving rapid compliance with the
statute; it may not authorize the courts to permit violations to continue
indefinitely.' 08 Third, the national security considerations involved in
the Navy's testing program may have made the courts particularly re-
luctant to issue an injunction.10 7 The case could thus be narrowly lim-
the equities of the case."); Plater, supra note 92, at 593 ("The Court's holding appears
to have been limited to the assertion of a discretion to permit noncompliance while
defendants seek to end their violations, not a discretion to permit statutory noncompli-
ance.") (footnote omitted).
101 Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 322 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102 Id.
103 See id. at 324-30. The majority argued that, "'[i]n exercising their sound [eq-
uitable] discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the public conse-
quences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.'" Id. at 312 (quoting
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941)).
104 See id. at 333 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
10' See Farber, supra note 92, at 522-23 (contending that although the federal
government is required to obtain a permit under the Clean Water Act, discharges by
federal facilities lacking a permit are not unlawful); Plater, supra note 92, at 594 n.327
("[T]he lack of a permit did not necessarily constitute statutory noncompliance."). But
see 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a)(2)(A) (Each entity associated with the federal government that
is engaged in discharging pollutants must comply with any requirement respecting per-
mits "to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity.").
106 See Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 315 ("[The district court] temporarily, not
permanently, allowed the Navy to continue its activities without a permit.").
107 See Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646, 707-08 (D.P.R. 1979), rev'd sub
nom. Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 643 F.2d 835 (1st Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Wein-
berger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982); cf. Weinberger v. Catholic Action, 454
U.S. 139 (1981) (holding that the government need not prepare an environmental im-
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ited to its facts.
The rationale behind the Court's decision, and the values and
objectives the majority and dissenting justices sought to promote in Ro-
mero-Barcelo, are clearer. The majority opinion's emphasis on the
broad equitable powers of trial court judges reflects a belief that it is
appropriate, absent a clear congressional prohibition,10 8 for the courts
to seek a practical accommodation of the interests of the two parties to
the dispute, without imposing undue hardship on either party.
10 9
Justice Stevens, on the other hand, implicitly recognized that the
majority's decision could detract from the legitimacy of the statutory
scheme of water pollution control. The Court's opinion vested control
of the decision to abate statutory violations in the federal courts, rather
than in the better-informed agency charged with implementing the
Clean Water Act, the EPA. 1 The decision also detracted from the
legitimacy of the federal pollution control program by creating the pos-
sibilities of inconsistent enforcement, which would give rise to a percep-
tion of unfairness,111 and of uncertainty as to the consequences of statu-
pact statement under section 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982), with respect to a nuclear weapons facility because of the
possibility of releasing classified information).
'18 See 456 U.S. at 313. According to the majority:
"[T]he comprehensiveness of this equitable jurisdiction is not to be denied
or limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative command. Unless
a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference,
restricts the court's jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction
is to be recognized and applied."
Id. at 313 (quoting Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946)).
10I See, e.g., id. at 312 ("Where plaintiff and defendant present competing claims
of injury, the traditional function of equity has been to arrive at a 'nice adjustment and
reconciliation' between the competing claims . . . .") (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles,
321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944)); id. at 316 (The Clean Water Act "contemplates the exer-
cise of discretion and balancing of equities."); id. at 320 ("The exercise of equitable
discretion, which must include the ability to deny as well as grant injunctive relief, can
fully protect the range of public interests at issue."); see also Furrow, Governing Sci-
ence: Public Risks and Private Remedies, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1403, 1436-37 (1983):
The equitable powers available to a judge superintending complex
public actions provide the possibility of flexible remedies . . . . These
powers . . . draw upon a tradition in tort law which recognizes the value
of conditional injunctions and flexible supervisory controls over hazardous
activities, upon an emerging consensus on the range of powers available to
the trial judge, and upon a recognition that a process of negotiation is
occurring.
'10 See Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 324, 325 & nn.4-5, 333-34 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
"I' See id. at 330 n.11 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Important national goals would
be frustrated by a regime of discretion that 'produce[d] different results for breaches of
duty in situations that cannot be differentiated in policy.' ") (quoting Morgane v. State
Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 405 (1970), quoted in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975)) (footnotes omitted).
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tory violations. 112 Finally, whereas the EPA is subject to executive and
legislative overview, the federal courts are not politically accountable as
decisionmakers and do not necessarily represent the prevailing commu-
nity views."i Furthermore, Justice Stevens charged, the majority had
granted "an open-ended license to federal judges to carve gaping holes
in a reticulated statutory scheme designed by -Congress to protect pre-
cious natural resources." 14 The Court's opinion demonstrated "[a] dis-
regard of the respective roles of the three branches of government," 1 5
and an undercutting of respect for "the proper allocation of lawmaking
responsibilities in our Government. 116 Justice Stevens objected to the
decision, therefore, because it flew in the face of the separation of pow-
ers doctrine,"1 one of the foremost guarantees of individual liberty
under our system of government.
If the Romero-Barcelo opinion is given a broad reading, authoriz-
ing federal district courts to refuse to enjoin ongoing statutory viola-
tions,11 ' then Justice Stevens' dissent is compelling. The dissenting Jus-
I12 See supra text accompanying note 68.
"x See Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 333-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
14 Id. at 323. Justice Stevens concluded that "[t]he discretion exercised by the
District Court in this case was wholly at odds with the intent of Congress in enacting
[the Clean Water Act]." Id. at 324.
115 Id. at 333.
"I Id. at 335 (footnote omitted).
117 See Plater, supra note 92, at 588-92 (Judicial refusal to enforce valid statutes
against a particular defendant "invades the core function of the legislature.").
118 The courts' equitable discretion to deny injunctive relief is narrower in certain
suits brought by the government than it is under the citizen suit provisions. For exam-
ple, the Administrator of the EPA is authorized by the Clean Air and Water Acts,
RCRA, and CERCLA to seek a court order immediately restraining activities present-
ing an imminent hazard to health or the environment. See 42 U.S.C. § 7603(a); 33
U.S.C. § 1364(a); 42 U.S.C.A. § 6973(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1985); 42 U.S.C.
§ 9606(a). The courts have demonstrated a much greater willingness to issue abate-
ment orders at the EPA's request under these imminent hazard provisions, which re-
flect a "rule of immediate cessation," Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 317, than the Su-
preme Court thought appropriate under the citizen suit provisions. The imminent
hazard provision of RCRA requires only that the EPA convince the court that certain
activities "may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the
environment." 42 U.S.C.A. § 6973(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
Several courts have held that the EPA need not prove either the lack of an adequate
remedy at law or the threat of irreparable injury as a prerequisite for injunctive relief
under the imminent hazard provisions. These provisions exhibit "an express statutory
command giving the EPA an injunctive remedy. Congress chose to enhance the courts'
traditional equitable powers in order to protect the public and the environment."
United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 168 (4th Cir. 1984) (citing United
States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 211 (3d Cir. 1982)). As the Third Circuit has noted:
By enacting the endangerment provisions of [the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act and the Safe Drinking Water Act] Congress ...[has]
enhanced the courts' traditional equitable powers by authorizing the issu-
ance of injunctions when there is but a risk of harm, a more lenient stan-
dard than the traditional requirement of threatened irreparable harm.
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tice's views become even more persuasive in light of the Court's
decision one year earlier in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois. 9 In holding
that federal common-law nuisance actions had been preempted by the
enactment of the Clean Water Act, the majority relied on the same
arguments concerning the need to promote legitimacy and protect the
separation of governmental powers advanced by Justice Stevens in Ro-
mero-Barcelo; the Milwaukee court, however, used these concerns to
narrow the range of private remedies under federal law. There appears
to be no reason not to implement those same values in a case, like Ro-
mero-Barcelo, where they support the enlargement of private statutory
remedies.
B. Implied Statutory Remedies
Although the citizen suit provisions do not authorize the recovery
of damages, private plaintiffs have sought monetary relief1 20 on the the-
ory that the courts should find an implied private cause of action to
enforce the pollution control statute at issue and to remedy harm
caused by a violation of that statute.121 The Supreme Court held in
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers As-
sociation 22 that no such implied right of action exists under either the
United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 211 (3d Cir. 1982) (citation omitted).
119 451 U.S. 304 (1981). For a detailed discussion of this case, see infra text
accompanying notes 199-277.
120 Litigants have also sought injunctive relief on an implied private right of ac-
tion theory where they have failed to comply with certain procedural requirements of
the citizen suit provisions. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1) (The plaintiff must pro-
vide 60 days prior "notice of the alleged violation to the [EPA], . . . the State in which
the alleged violation occurs, . . . and to any alleged violator."); Middlesex County
Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 6 (1981) (The plaintiffs
brought suit alleging jurisdiction independent of the citizen suit provision after failing
to comply with the notice requirement.); Reeger v. Mill Serv., Inc., 593 F. Supp. 360,
363 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (The plaintiffs sought to bring suit under the Civil Rights Acts
as an alternative to the citizen suit provisions of the Clean Air Act and RCRA.).
Plaintiffs alleging the existence of an implied private right of action for damages
or injunctive relief have not relied, for the most part, on the citizen suit provision as a
basis for the court's jurisdiction. Instead, they have relied upon the general federal
question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). See, e.g., National Sea Clammers, 453 U.S.
at 7.
121 In recent years, the Supreme Court has repeatedly addressed the "seemingly
simple question," "[w]hen should a person injured by a violation of federal law be
allowed to recover his damages in a federal court?" Middlesex County Sewerage Auth.
v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 22 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Recent cases in which the Court has faced this question include
California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981); Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu,
450 U.S. 754 (1981); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11
(1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); and Cannon v. Univer-
sity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
.22 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
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Clean Water Act' 23 or the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuar-
ies Act of 1972.124
Although the Supreme Court had previously formulated a four-
part test for determining whether a court should infer a private right of
action from a federal statute,125 the Court found it unnecessary to apply
all four parts of the test in National Sea Clammers, claiming that
"[t]he key to the inquiry is the intent of the Legislature.' 2 6 The Clean
Water Act and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act
contain "unusually elaborate enforcement provisions,' 21 7 including the
EPA's authority to compel future compliance through the issuance of
an administrative compliance order or through a civil action in federal
district court, as well as the government's authority to seek civil or
criminal fines and imprisonment for criminal violations. 128 In addition,
the two acts authorize private suits for injunctive relief, provided the
alleged violation is covered by the applicable citizen suit provision and
the plaintiff complies with all of the procedural prerequisites for citizen
suits. 129 Based on the varied and comprehensive nature of these reme-
dial options, the Court concluded that Congress did not intend to au-
thorize additional remedies for private enforcement of those statutes.'
The Court rejected the argument advanced by the Court of Ap-
peals in favor of implying a private right of action. The Court of Ap-
peals argued that the citizen suit provisions were intended to create a
limited cause of action for "private attorneys general"-non-injured
members of the public suing to promote the general welfare rather than
123 Accord Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Gas.
(BNA) 1393, 1394 (D.R.I. 1984); Love v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conserva-
tion, 529 F. Supp. 832, 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
124 See 453 U.S. at 11, 13-18, 21 (discussing the Clean Water Act and the Marine
Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1401-1445 (1982)); see
also California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981) (refusing to find an implied private
right of action to enforce section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of
1899, 33 U.S.C. § 402 (1982)).
123 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The four inquiries were first, whether the
plaintiff is one of the class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted ("does the
statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?"); second, whether there is "any
indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to
deny one"; third, whether an implied private remedy is consistent with the purposes of
the statutory scheme; and fourth, whether the cause of action is in an area "tradition-
ally relegated to state law, . . . so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of
action based solely on federal law." Id. at 78.
126 453 U.S. at 13; see also id. at 17-18.
127 Id. at 13.
118 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319.
129 See id. §§ 1365, 1415.
120 See National Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 14. The plaintiffs in National Sea
Clammers sought both injunctive relief and damages. See id. at 5.
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to redress their own injuries.'' An injured private party, the Court of
Appeals concluded, had an alternate basis for suit, namely, general fed-
eral question jurisdiction,' 32 coupled with the citizen suit provision of
the Clean Water Act, which saves or preserves rights "under any stat-
ute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or
limitation."'31 3 The Supreme Court responded that the Court of Ap-
peals' distinction between non-injured and injured plaintiffs was inva-
lid, since non-injured plaintiffs lack standing to sue, and, therefore, the
statutory citizen suit provisions apply only to injured plaintiffs. Accord-
ingly, there was no basis for inferring an additional right of action for
this same group of plaintiffs.3 In response to the Court of Appeals'
reliance on the "savings clause" of the, Clean Water Act's citizen suit
provision, the Court reasoned that although the savings clause preserves
additional rights under "any statute," Congress did not mean to include
the Clean Water Act itself within that phrase. Thus, the savings clause
preserves only substantive rights arising under statutes other than the
Clean Water Act.'
3 5
11" National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222, 1226-27
(3d Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea
Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 15 (1981).
232 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
"' The savings clause in the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision provides in
full that "[niothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of
persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any efflu-
ent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief against the Ad-
ministrator or a State agency)." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e). The citizen suit provision of the
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act is similar. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1415(g)(5).
134 See National Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 16.
a See id. at 15-16. The Court supported its argument by citing the Senate Re-
port on the 1972 amendments to the Clean Water Act, which stated that the savings
clause "'would specifically preserve any rights or remedies under any other law.'" Id.
at 16 n.26 (quoting S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1971), reprinted in 1972
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3668, 3746) (emphasis added).
The Court proceeded to hold, however, that "any other law" did not include 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), which authorizes private persons to sue to redress the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or federal law
by the actions of state officials in their official capacities. See National Sea Clammers,
453 U.S. at 19-21. The Court concluded that Congress did not intend to preserve a
private right of action where the substantive violation alleged was a violation of the
Clean Water Act, even if the remedy for that violation arose under another statute,
such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See National Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 20 n.31. The
savings clauses applies, in other words, only where both the substantive right and the
legal remedy arise under statutes other than the Clean Water Act.
The Court's analysis is not fully persuasive. The provisions of the 1971 Senate
Report relied on by the Court indicate that Congress intended to "preserve any rights
or remedies under any other law." S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1971),
reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3668, 3746 (emphasis added).
Thus, Congress arguably meant to preserve remedies created under statutes other than
the Clean Water Act (including 42 U.S.C. § 1983), even if the substantive violation
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The implications of the Court's decision in National Sea Clam-
mers are much clearer than those stemming from the Romero-Barcelo
decision. Because the Clean Air Act and RCRA contain the same array
of governmental and private enforcement options as the Clean Water
Act, it is almost certain that the Court would refuse to find an implied
private right of action to enforce those two statutes."3 6 Although the
remedial alternatives under CERCLA are not as extensive as those
provided by the other three statutes, the existence of an express statu-
tory provision authorizing private judicial and administrative remedies
for the reimbursement of costs incurred in responding to releases of
hazardous substances... probably indicates Congress's intent to limit
private actions to those specified in the statute.' 3 The recognition of
additional private rights of action might permit private plaintiffs to
avoid the express conditions and limitations imposed on private cost
recoveries included in CERCLA."8
alleged is a Clean Water Act violation. Moreover, the savings clause preserves not only
the right under "any statute" to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limita-
tion, but also the right "to seek any other relief." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e). This phrase
appears to encompass a suit against a state official for violation of federal law under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, even if the Court's narrow construction of the term "any statute"-that
is, as preserving only the right to redress violations of statutes other than the Clean
Water Act-is correct. The Court's holding on the section 1983 issue gives no effect
whatever to the final clause of the savings provision. Courts should avoid interpreta-
tions that render portions of the statutory language meaningless. See, e.g., Pinole Point
Properties, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283, 289-90 (N.D. Cal. 1984)
(rejecting the defendant's statutory interpretation of CERCLA, because "statutes
should be read to avoid surplusage"). Nevertheless, the lower courts have applied the
reasoning of National Sea Clammers to private actions alleging violations of other fed-
eral pollution control statutes. See, e.g., Garcia v. Cecos Int'l, Inc., 761 F.2d 76, 82-83
(1st Cir. 1985). For suggestions that private plaintiffs may still be able to employ civil
rights causes of action to redress violations of some federal pollution control statutes, see
J. BONINE & T. McGARITY, supra note 89, at 986. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 66, at
427-28 (arguing that the presumption against preemption of section 1983 should not
apply when Congress has expressly created independent private causes of action).
'38 See Reeger v. Mill Serv., Inc., 593 F. Supp. 360, 361-63 (W.D. Pa. 1984);
Miller, Private Enforcement (pt. 2), supra note 89, at 10,322; Trauberman, Common
Law Nuisance in Hazardous Waste Litigation: Has it Survived Milwaukee 11?, 13
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,043, 10,045 (1983). The result would almost certainly be the same
under the Clean Air Act, since the Court relied on the legislative history of that Act's
citizen suit provision-on which the Clean Water Act provision was modeled-to sup-
port its holding in National Sea Clammers. See 453 U.S. at 17 n.27.
137 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(1-4)(B), 9611-9612.
138 There would appear to be no basis for recognizing an implied private statutory
remedy under CERCLA for personal injury or property damage, although common-
law remedies for such injuries may still be available. See infra notes 495-523 and ac-
companying text.
... For example, private cost recovery against a responsible party in federal court
is appropriate only for "costs of response incurred . . . consistent with the national
contingency plan." 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(B), 9611(a)(2). The national contingency
plan, issued by the EPA, provides guidance on the appropriate methods of hazardous
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The Court's decision in National Sea Clammers is also more con-
sistent with the values of legitimacy, individual liberty, and efficiency
than the decision in Romero-Barcelo. For example, the opinion in Na-
tional Sea Clammers reflects a greater concern for adherence to the
separation of powers doctrine. The Court expressed its reluctance, ab-
sent strong evidence of a contrary congressional intent, to read into the
statute remedies not expressly provided by the legislature.1 4 ° If Con-
gress makes it clear "that implied private actions are not contemplated,




The Court's decision can be viewed, then, as an attempt to enhance
individual liberty by insuring that no one branch of the federal govern-
ment oversteps the bounds of its constitutional authority.
14
1
The majority opinion also appears to reflect the conviction that
Congress adopted the package of remedial options that it felt would
produce the most efficient implementation of the statute's objectives.
The Court may have feared that recognizing supplemental remedies not
sanctioned by Congress would result in excessive (and unproductive) or
duplicative (and wasteful) enforcement efforts. 43
Although the Court in National Sea Clammers did not justify its
holding by an express reference to the value of legitimacy, its decision,
waste site cleanup. See id. § 9605.
'40 See National Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 14-15.
141 Id. at 18. The dissenting Justices, however, seem to have the better argument
concerning the disposition of the issue concerning 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), see supra
note 135, at least in terms of adherence to the explicit terms of the statute. See 453 U.S.
at 27-31; cf. supra note 135 (arguing that the Court misinterpreted the savings clause
of the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act).
142 Cf Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 66, at 1207 ("[P]rivate rights of action
may usurp the agency's responsibility for regulatory implementation, decrease legisla-
tive control over the nature and amount of enforcement activity, and force courts to
determine in the first instance the meaning of a regulatory statute."); id. at 1221 ("By
enlisting new enforcement resources, courts that create private remedies substantially
affect the content of regulatory policy-a task properly reserved for the political
branches."); id. at 1317 (describing the "formalist thesis" that courts improperly invade
congressional authority to determine the substance and implementation of administra-
tive programs when they create remedies not provided in the statute itself).
"13 See National Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 14-15, 21; F. ANDERSON, D.
MANDELKER & A. TARLOCK, supra note 60, at 446, 659. See generally Landes &
Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1975) (Private enforce-
ment of law results in overenforcement where substantial investment in apprehension
and conviction of offenders is necessary.). Centralized governmental enforcement is not
necessarily more efficient, however, than a system permitting supplemental citizen en-
forcement. See W. RODGERS, supra note 74, at 76 (1977) (listing the following as
justifications for citizen enforcement: private enforcement is less costly than public en-
forcement; private enforcers are in a better position to weigh the costs and benefits of a
particular initiative; total resources devoted to enforcement are augmented; and compe-
tition from the private sector sharpens the response of public officials); Stewart & Sun-
stein, supra note 66, at 1215 ("Private rights of action ...do not divert limited
agency resources from other violations that may be more important.").
[Vol. 134:121
FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND POLLUTION
nevertheless, promotes the legitimacy of the Clean Water Act's enforce-
ment program in several ways. Agency enforcement initiatives, unlike
private citizen enforcement, are subject to congressional oversight mech-
anisms such as the appropriations process. Accordingly, the legislature
can take steps to ensure that the agency does not enforce the statute in a
manner contrary to congressional intent."' Some perceive administra-
tive agencies as possessing greater factfinding and policymaking compe-
tence than the courts in technically and scientifically complex areas
such as pollution control.145 Finally, a prohibition on implied rights of
action may result in a more coordinated and consistent enforcement
program than would otherwise be the case. 40 In light of its tendency to
promote legitimacy, individual liberty, and efficiency, the Court's im-
plied right of action holding in National Sea Clammers is consistent
with the values implicitly reflected in the Constitution and in congres-
sional attempts to control pollution.
1 47
144 See R. STEWART & J. KRIER, supra note 78, at 106; Stewart & Sunstein,
supra note 66, at 418; Sunstein, supra note 66, at 1209, 1227-28, 1290-91, 1291
n.404. Congress could amend the citizen suit provisions to counter unintended private
enforcement efforts, but this kind of legislative action may be more difficult to accom-
plish than some of the more informal techniques for legislative oversight of administra-
tive action, such as committee hearings.
"' The majority of the Court in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304
(1981), noted that the complex nature of water pollution control makes it a particularly
appropriate area for the exercise of administrative expertise. See id. at 325. For an
examination of the appropriateness of agency action in areas involving complex scien-
tific or technical matters, see R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW AND PROCEDURE § 6.4.12, at 272; Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 66, at 1208-
09, 1218, 1293; Sunstein, supra note 66, at 416-17. But cf. Furrow, supra note 109, at
1422-23 (Public participation in policymaking concerning scientifically complex issues
can increase the information available to decisionmakers.). To the extent that a bar on
citizen enforcement reduces public participation in the advancement of statutory objec-
tives, such a bar may reduce the legitimacy of the statutory program. Cf Stewart &
Sunstein, supra note 66, at 1294 (arguing that a private right of enforcement may be
justifiable as a means of asserting public values).
140 See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 66, at 1292-93 (noting that private rights
of action may "impair an agency's ability to harmonize potentially conflicting statutory
provisions and to negotiate with regulated firms and other affected interests in order to
establish a workable and consistent regulatory system") (footnotes omitted); see also
Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 317 (6th Cir. 1985) (explaining that the
notice requirements for citizen suits under RCRA serve to give the EPA the opportu-
nity "to develop uniform interpretations of complex environmental standards" by limit-
ing the number of private lawsuits).
"I If, however, the Court's holding promotes one value while impairing another,
it is necessary to determine which of the values the legislature deemed more important.
See, e.g., Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 66, at 1216 (referring to a "maximum en-
forcement approach," under which "the values of political control, specialization, and
centralization are considered less important than maximizing private participation in
the enforcement process"); id. at 1226-27 (implied rights of action can be defended as a
means of overcoming agency failure to implement a regulatory program because of the
"capture" of the agency by regulated entities). Even if a particular interpretation of an
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C. Federal Common-Law Remedies
1. The Application of Federal Common Law in Environmental
Litigation Before Milwaukee I
Early in the twentieth century, the Supreme Court relied on fed-
eral common law in environmental litigation for two purposes: to pro-
tect one state's natural resources from invasion by another state, and to
avoid or resolve disputes between the states. 4" One early example of a
case in which these two purposes coalesced is Missouri v. Illinois.'49
Missouri, in its petition to the Supreme Court, 50 alleged that the Sani-
tary District of Chicago threatened to discharge sewage into a ditch
running to the Des Plaines and Mississippi Rivers, resulting in the
pollution of water used by Missouri residents.15 ' Missouri requested
that the Court enjoin the Sanitary District's discharges as a nuisance.'5 2
ambiguous statute promotes values normally favored by the legislature, a court should
be reluctant to choose that interpretation if it results in a conflict with the values of the
Constitution. See supra text accompanying note 87. Despite its arguable legitimacy, for
example, the prohibition on implied rights of action for compensatory relief can be
attacked as inconsistent with one of the components of individual liberty, because it fails
to protect personal health and property rights from the imposition of harm by third
persons. This defect, however, should not be dispositive if the statute preserves com-
mon-law remedies for personal injury and property damage. A statutory scheme that
eliminates these remedies while providing no statutory substitute, on the other hand, is
highly vulnerable to an attack as inconsistent with the value of individual liberty and
violative of the due process clause. See infra notes 329-48 and accompanying text.
"" In 1938 the Supreme Court decided Erie R.R. v. Tom'pkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), holding that "[t]here is no federal general common law" in diversity cases. Id.
at 78. The Court subsequently acknowledged that, despite its decision in Erie, "there
are enclaves of federal judge-made law which bind the states." Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964). One commentator has listed the follow-
ing areas in which the Supreme Court has recognized the propriety of invoking this
"specialized" body of common law: issues involving disputes between states over inter-
state resources or protection of a state's sovereign rights; issues related to the operations
of federal statutory law or to the furtherance of federal policy; issues arising under
maritime law; and issues of international law. See Comment, supra note 90, at 314-15
& nn.89-98. The development of federal common law is therefore appropriate where it
is necessary to protect "uniquely federal interests," see Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (Federal courts have the power to formulate
federal common law in two limited categories: those in which a federal rule of decision
is necessary to protect federal interests, and those in which Congress has given the
courts the power to develop substantive law.), or where the need for a uniform rule of
decision is apparent. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105 n.6 (1972);
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 398, 427 n.25.
149 180 U.S. 208 (1901) (demurrer overruled), 200 U.S. 496 (1906) (decision on
the merits dismissing Missouri's suit without prejudice).
150 Missouri invoked the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: "In all
Cases . . . in which a State shall be [a] Party, the supreme Court shall have original
jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
1 Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. at 212-13.
152 Id. at 215. A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right
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The Court refused to sustain Illinois' demurrer, holding that the fed-
eral government had a duty to provide Missouri with a remedy to pro-
tect the health and comfort of its citizens.153 This duty was fulfilled
through the constitutional provision authorizing the Supreme Court to
take jurisdiction over the dispute. 15  The Missouri decision thus sup-
ports the proposition that the federal government cannot leave a state
without any means of protecting its residents against harm by outsiders.
Several years later, in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,155 the
Court affirmed the notion that the federal government is required to
provide a means of resolving disputes in which one state or its citizens
allegedly harm the natural resources of another. The Court found that
each state, in its quasi-sovereign capacity, has an interest in the protec-
tion of natural resources within its domain,15 and that "such demands
must be recognized" when the grounds alleged by a state are proven. 57
These cases reflect the Court's willingness to invoke a judicially
created federal rule of decision when basic interests of federalism are at
stake.1 58 When the resources of one state are threatened by pollutant
emissions from a source located in another state, a federal resolution
must be made available to protect the interests of one state from en-
croaching on those of another. Such an encroachment threatens the in-
common to the general public, such as an interference with the public health, safety,
peace, comfort, or convenience. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979).
153 See Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. at 241.
'5 See id.
155 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
156 See id. at 237.
157 See id. The Court continued:
When the States by their union made the forcible abatement of outside
nuisances impossible to each, they did not thereby agree to submit to
whatever might be done. They did not renounce the possibility of making
reasonable demands on the ground of their still remaining quasi-sovereign
interests; and the alternative to force is a suit in this court.
Id. (citing Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901)).
158 Between the Supreme Court's decision in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406
U.S. 91 (1972) (Milwaukee 1), and its decision in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451
U.S. 304 (1981) (Milwaukee II), the lower courts relied on these federalism concerns to
support the application of federal common law to interstate pollution disputes. See, e.g.,
City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008, 1017-18 (7th
Cir. 1979) (permitting a municipal corporation to sue in federal court for damages
arising from interstate waterway pollution), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980);
Stream Pollution Control Bd. v. United States Steel Corp., 512 F.2d 1036, 1039-41
(7th Cir. 1975) (granting federal jurisdiction on a complaint based on federal common
law by a state Stream Pollution Control Board seeking to abate river pollution); cf.
Committee for the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006, 1008-09 (4th Cir.
1976) (Absent allegations of harm extending beyond the boundaries of the state in
which the source is located, complaint invoking the federal common law fails to state a
claim on which relief can be granted.). The Supreme Court decisions in the 1972 and
1981 Milwaukee cases are discussed infra notes 175-285 and accompanying text.
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tegrity of the invaded state's sovereignty, and thereby threatens individ-
ual liberty by diminishing the capacity of the invaded state's citizens for
self-determination. 15 A federal resolution is also required to prevent
conflict between the states and to promote the peaceful accommodation
of disputes.60
Throughout the first half of the century, the Court, in exercising
its original jurisdiction, periodically resorted to federal common law to
resolve disputes between states over the conflicting use of natural re-
sources.1 0 1 In 1971, however, the Court seemed to signal a departure
from this practice, at least where one state sued the citizens of another
state rather than the second state itself. In Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemical
Corp.,"'2 Ohio sought to invoke the Court's original jurisdiction to
abate an alleged public nuisance caused by two corporations located in
Michigan."'3 The defendants dumped mercury into streams that led
into Lake Erie, allegedly damaging the fish, wildlife, and vegetation of
Lake Erie and harming Ohio citizens.1 ' Although the Court conceded
that it had jurisdiction over the controversy, 65 it declined to exercise it
on the grounds that the case did not involve any "important problems
of federal law" '66 and that the Court, structured to perform as an ap-
pellate tribunal, was ill-equipped to play the role of factfinder during a
trial.1
67
159 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
160 See Fort, The Necessary Demise of Federal Common Law Nuisance, 12 Loy.
U. CIi. L.J. 131, 138-39 (1981); Comment, supra note 90, at 319. Some writers have
asserted that the application of federal common law to resolve such interstate disputes is
constitutionally compelled. See, e.g., Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term
-Foreward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1, 13-14 (1975). The
propriety of applying state common law to an interstate pollution dispute is considered
infra notes 400-82 and accompanying text.
11 See, e.g., Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); New Jersey v. City of
New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923);
New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46
(1907).
162 401 U.S. 493 (1971).
s A third corporate defendant did business in Ontario, Canada. Id. at 494.
'" Id. at 495.
11' See id. at 495-96 (citing New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473
(1931), enforced, 284 U.S. 585 (1931), modified, 290 U.S. 237 (1933), construed, 296
U.S. 259 (1935); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921); Georgia v. Tennessee
Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); and Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901), 200
U.S. 496 (1906) (decision on the merits), as cases in which the Supreme Court exer-
cised jurisdiction over interstate nuisance disputes).
166 Wyandotte, 401 U.S. at 504.
167 See id. at 498. The Court denied that it had any "special competence in deal-
ing with the numerous conflicts between States and nonresident individuals that raise
no serious issues of federal law." Id. The Court characterized its past attempts at set-
tling disputes regarding interstate air and water pollution as "anything but smooth."
Id. at 501. These attempts illustrated "the sense of futility that has accompanied this
[Vol. 134:121
FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND POLLUTION
The Court noted that its refusal to hear the case left the plaintiff
without a federal judicial forum. Ohio could not sue in federal district
court based on federal question jurisdiction""8 because, "[s]o far as it
appears from the . . . record, an action such as this, if otherwise cog-
nizable in federal district court, would have to be adjudicated under
state law." 6 9
Shortly before the Court issued its decision in Wyandotte, the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in Texas v. Pankey,170 had
come to the opposite conclusion concerning a state's ability to sue in
federal district court. Texas sued eight New Mexico ranchers in federal
district court, seeking to enjoin them from using a pesticide to kill range
caterpillars.7 Texas alleged that the pesticides were washed into the
Canadian River system, impairing the water supplies of eleven Texas
municipalities.1 72 The circuit court reversed the district court's dismis-
sal, holding that the controversy arose under the laws of the United
States and was therefore cognizable under the federal question stat-
ute." The court found that Texas had a right under federal common
law to prevent the improper impairment of its environment from
sources outside the state. 74 This result reflected the view enunciated
throughout the first half of the century that without the ability to pro-
tect its resources from external harms, the very sovereignty of the state
is threatened. Invoking the aid of the federal courts was one way for
the state to achieve such protection.
2. Milwaukee I and Its Progeny
Less than a year after the decision in Wyandotte, the Court ac-
Court's attempts to . . . [deal] with the complex technical and political matters that
inhere in all disputes of the kind at hand." Id. at 502.
as See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
Wyandotte, 401 U.S. at 498 n.3 (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938)). The plaintiff could not proceed under diversity jurisdiction either, since 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (1982) does not cover cases in which a state is a party. See 401 U.S. at
498 n.3.
170 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971).
171 Id. at 237.
172 Id. at 238.
173 See id. at 242.
"74 See id. at 240 (citing Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907)).
The court noted that the Supreme Court in Tennessee Copper had not discussed explic-
itly the source of a state's quasi-sovereign ecological rights, which was "only natural"
since "the need for and existence of federal common law had not yet been recognized."
Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d at 240. Nevertheless, "the[se] right[s] apparently [were]
regarded as having existence in the common law and as being entitled to remedy within
common law principles." Id. The Supreme Court had also recognized in Tennessee
Copper that the state's right of protection against pollution from outside sources was a
"right of protection by a federal court." Id.
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cepted much of the Tenth Circuit's reasoning and overruled the Wyan-
dotte decision in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee I).175 Illinois
sought to invoke the Court's original jurisdiction to enjoin an alleged
public nuisance caused by the defendants' discharge of sewage into bor-
dering Lake Michigan.17 ' Although the Court declined to exercise its
original jurisdiction over the case, it found that Illinois could sue in
federal district court. 17 7 Relying on Texas v. Pankey, the Court con-
cluded that the federal question statute 17  covered claims founded upon
federal common law as well as those of a statutory origin. 179 Due to the
enactment of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 80 "federal, not
state law controls the pollution of interstate or navigable waters." 81
The remedies provided in federal statutes, however, are not necessarily
the only federal remedies available. Where federal rights are concerned,
federal courts sometimes fill gaps in federal statutory schemes." 2 The
Court stated that, "[w]hen we deal with air and water in their ambient
or interstate aspects, there is a federal common law."" 8 According to
the Court, applying federal common law to abate a public nuisance in
interstate or navigable waters was not inconsistent with the Federal
175 406 U.S. 91 (1972). The background of the Milwaukee I litigation is described
in detail in Comment, supra note 90, at 301-11. The Court purported simply to distin-
guish Wyandotte, stating that the result in that case "was based on the preoccupation of
that litigation with public nuisance under Ohio law, not the federal common law which
we now hold is ample basis for federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)." Mil-
waukee I, 406 at 102 n.3. Nine years later, however, the Court admitted that the 1972
Milwaukee decision had overruled the Court's statement in Wyandotte that Ohio's suit,
if otherwise cognizable in federal district court, would have to be adjudicated under
state law. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 327 n.19 (1981).
178 The defendants included four Wisconsin cities, the Sewerage Commission of
the City of Milwaukee, and the Metropolitan Sewerage Commission of the County of
Milwaukee. See 406 U.S. at 93.
177 See id. at 108.
178 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
17, See Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 98-101.
180 The Court's decision was issued prior to the enactment of the Federal Pollu-
tion Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816. The decision
in Milwaukee I was therefore based upon a consideration of the Water Pollution Con-
trol Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (current version at 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251-1376 (1982)).
181 406 U.S. at 102 (footnote omitted).
182 See id. at 103.
188 Id. (footnote omitted); see also id. at 107 n.9 (stating that federal common law
is needed to provide a uniform standard in cases involving the improper impairment of
a state's environmental rights by sources outside its domain); Stream Pollution Control
Bd. v. United States Steel Corp., 512 F.2d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 1975) (interpreting
Milwaukee I as "authoriz[ing] the federal courts to fashion a federal common law of
nuisance to resolve controversies involving the impairment of the environmental inter-
ests of one state by sources outside its domain").
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Water Pollution Control Act.'" The Court added, however, that
new federal laws and new federal regulations may in time
pre-empt the field of federal common law of nuisance. But
until that comes to pass, federal courts will be empowered to
appraise the equities of the suits alleging creation of a public
nuisance by water pollution. 85
The Court based its decision in Milwaukee I on several of the
components of the values of individual liberty and accommodation. Pro-
tecting state sovereignty promotes individual liberty by facilitating self-
determination and citizen participation in government.'86 Quoting from
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., the Court in Milwaukee I recog-
nized each state's "'quasi-sovereign interests'" in protecting its natural
resources from impairment by nuisances caused by sources outside the
state. 8 7 "[A] State with high water-quality standards may well ask that
its strict standards be honored and that it not be compelled to lower
itself to the more degrading standards of a neighbor."' 88 By asking the
federal courts to apply federal common-law rules to abate external
sources of harm, states are able to protect their interests.'89
Resort to a body of federal common law in these circumstances
also advances the related value of the accommodation of conflicting
state interests. The Court recognized that as concern about the protec-
tion of natural resources grows, "'more conflicting disputes, increasing
assertions and proliferating contentions'" between states "'would seem
to be inevitable.' ""' By permitting the initiation of suits under the
federal common law, the Court encourages the resolution of such dis-
putes by "peaceful means."'' Accordingly, the Court declared that the
184 Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 104.
185 Id. at 107. The Court of Appeals in Texas v. Pankey made a similar statement
concerning the possibility that the enactment of a comprehensive federal statute could
affect the scope of the availability of federal common law. See 441 F.2d at 241.
186 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
187 See 406 U.S. at 104 (quoting Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. at
237). The Court referred twice to "'the ecological rights of a State in the improper
impairment of [its resources] from sources outside the State's own territory.'" Id. at
100 (quoting Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d at 240); see also Milwaukee 1, 406 U.S. at
108 n.9 (quoting Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d at 241, for the proposition that a uniform
standard is needed to deal with "'the environmental rights of a State against improper
impairment by sources outside its domain' "). The Court also quoted an earlier decision
recognizing a state's " 'interest as quasi-sovereign in the comfort, health and prosperity
of its [residents].'" Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 106 n.8 (quoting North Dakota v. Min-
nesota, 263 U.S. 365, 374 (1923)).
188 Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 107.
189 See id. at 107-08.
190 Id. at 107 n.9 (quoting Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d at 241).
11 Id. at 107.
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development of federal common law is appropriate "where the contro-
versy touches basic interests of federalism.
'192
Finally, the use of federal common law in Milwaukee I provided a
means for reconciling potential conflicts between federal and state inter-
ests.19 3 Contrary to its earlier position in Wyandotte, the Court in Mil-
waukee I recognized a federal interest in controlling the pollution of
interstate or navigable waters.' More generally, the Court noted Con-
gress's increasing concern, over a period of seventy years,' 95 with pro-
tecting the quality of the environment.' Because of the "overriding
federal interest in the need for a uniform rule of decision," 97 the Court
held that the controversy between Illinois and Milwaukee should be
resolved by applying federal common law.'98
192 Id. at 105 n.6 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
421-27 (1964)); accord D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315
U.S. 447 (1942); C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 249 (2d ed. 1970). The
Court's reference to the protection of "basic interests of federalism" echoes similar sen-
timents expressed in the earlier interstate pollution and resource allocation cases initi-
ated by one state against another under the Court's original jurisdiction. See supra
notes 148-61 and accompanying text; see also Note, Federal Common Law and Water
Pollution: Statutory Preemption or Preservation?, 49 FORDHAM L. REv. 500, 524-27
(1981) (discussing the protection of quasi-sovereign state interests in interstate disputes
by federal common law).
193 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
14 See 406 U.S. at 102. Nine years after the Court's decision in Milwaukee I,
Justice Blackmun explained that the Milwaukee I Court had "recounted the history of
federal interstate water quality legislation and suggested that the abiding federal inter-
est in the purity of interstate waters justified application of federal common law." City
of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 337 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
195 In 1899, Congress enacted the Rivers and Harbors Act, 30 Stat. 1121 (1899)
(codified in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.) to control obstructions in, and discharges of
refuse matter into, navigable waters. In 1969, Congress passed the National Environ-
mental Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1969) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-4347 (1982)), which, among other things, requires agencies of the federal gov-
ernment to prepare environmental impact statements in connection with major federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C) (1982).
19 See Milwaukee 1, 406 U.S. at 101-02. The Tenth Circuit in Texas v. Pankey
also found that the use of federal common law must be recognized "as a basis for
dealing in uniform standard with the environmental rights of a State against improper
impairment by sources outside its domain." 441 F.2d at 241.
'M Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 105 n.6.
198 Following the Court's decision in Milwaukee I, the lower federal courts fre-
quently resorted to the federal common law of nuisance to resolve environmental dis-
putes, although they had difficulty defining the precise scope of that law. They dis-
agreed, for example, on the need for the plaintiff to demonstrate interstate effects of
pollution. Compare Ancarrow v. City of Richmond, 600 F.2d 443, 445 (4th Cir.) (Fed-
eral common law should not extend beyond interstate controversies in which a plaintiff
seeks relief against an extraterritorial polluter.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979) and
Committee for the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006, 1008-09 (4th Cir.
1976) (Absent a clash of two states' interests, state law is adequate to resolve a contro-
versy between two or more of that state's own citizens.) with Illinois v. Outboard
Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623, 628 (7th Cir. 1980) (Federal common law applies to "all
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3. Milwaukee II
Although the courts struggled after Milwaukee I to define the
scope of the federal common law of nuisance, many of the questions
raised by Milwaukee I became academic, at least in the area of water
pollution control, in 1981, when the Supreme Court issued its decision
in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II).199 After the Court's
decision in Milwaukee I, Illinois refiled its complaint in federal district
court, again seeking abatement under federal common law of the al-
leged public nuisance created by Milwaukee's sewage discharges into
federal waters, even tributaries of intrastate navigable waters .... Federal concern is
not just in navigability but in the purity and quality of the waters."), vacated and
remanded, 453 U.S. 917 (1981).
The post-Milwaukee I decisions also disagreed on the question of who could bring
an action under the federal common law of nuisance. Some courts and commentators,
relying on the rationale that federal common law was needed to protect the conflicting
interests of two or more states in the use of the same resource, took the view that only a
state or one of its municipalities can invoke this body of law. See, e.g., Committee for
Jones Falls, 539 F.2d at 1009; United States v. Lindsay, 357 F. Supp. 784, 794
(E.D.N.Y. 1973). This view, however, failed to take into account those situations in
which federal common law is needed-regardless of whether a state invaded by pollu-
tion chooses to assert its "quasi-sovereign" interests-to protect the federal interest in
the need for a uniform rule of decision. If the federal interest is sufficiently compelling,
the use of federal common law is arguably appropriate, regardless of the identity of the
party bringing suit. See Committee for Jones Falls, 539 F.2d at 1013-14; Note, Um-
brella Equities: Use of the Federal Common Law of Nuisance to Catch the Fall of
Acid Rain, 21 URB. L. ANN. 143, 163 (1981). But see Jackson v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1985) (refusing to apply a federal common law of
asbestos product liability where the dispute did not involve the rights and duties of
states as discrete political entities).
In contexts other than environmental disputes, the Supreme Court has authorized
the use of federal common law in suits brought by private parties, provided the case
demands the protection of a unique federal interest. See, e.g., Textile Workers v. Lin-
coln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957) (Federal courts can fashion a body of federal
common law for the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.). Based on a simi-
lar analysis, several courts have permitted even private plaintiffs to bring a federal
common-law nuisance action involving interstate waters because of the overriding fed-
eral interest in uniformity. See, e.g., National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New
York, 616 F.2d 1222, 1233 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Middle-
sex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clanmers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981);
Byram River v. Village of Port Chester, 394 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The Su-
preme Court considers this issue to be unsettled. See National Sea Clammers, 453 U.S.
at 11 n.17, 21. The final controversy over the scope of federal common law in environ-
mental and resource allocation disputes is whether the prevailing plaintiff is limited to
equitable relief or can also seek damages. The Supreme Court considers this to be an
open question as well. See id.
199 451 U.S. 304 (1981). The scope of the federal common law of nuisance would
become significant again if Congress explicitly authorized its use in certain water pollu-
tion contexts. Several bills that would have that effect have been introduced, but none
have been enacted yet. See, e.g., H.R. 6577, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). The implica-
tions of the Supreme Court's decision in Milwaukee II for other environmental statutes
are discussed infra at notes 255-77 and accompanying text.
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Lake Michigan. 00 The district court concluded that Illinois had proved
the existence of a nuisance under the federal common law, and ordered
the defendants to eliminate overflows from sewers20' that resulted in
sewage discharges directly into Lake Michigan or into tributaries lead-
ing into the lake. 20 2 The court also imposed effluent limitations on
treated sewage discharges from two waste water treatment plants oper-
ated by the defendants. 208 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit agreed that Illinois had proven the existence of a federal common-
law nuisance, but it modified some of the effluent standards set by the
district court.20 The appellate court held that the federal common law
of nuisance had not been preempted by the enactment of the 1972
amendments to the Clean Water Act 20 5 five months after Illinois filed
its action in federal district court,206 and that compliance with a dis-
charge permit issued under the Act 20 7 was not a defense to a federal
common-law action.208
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that no federal common-law
remedy was available to Illinois in this case.209 The Court began its
analysis by asserting that normally it is Congress, not the federal
courts, that adopts the applicable law and policy in an area in which
the federal government has the power to act.210 The federal courts are
free to adopt a federal rule of decision only in those "'few and re-
stricted' " instances in which Congress has failed to act.21 Once Con-
gress addresses a question previously governed by federal common law,
"the need for such an unusual exercise of lawmaking by federal courts
disappears. 212 Thus, in determining whether an identifiable body of
federal common law applies to a particular question, the issue is not
whether Congress has affirmatively proscribed the use of that law, but
simply "whether the legislative scheme 'spoke directly to [the] ques-
200 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 310.
201 Id. at 311.
202 Id. at 308-09.
203 Id. at 311-12.
211 See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 176-77 (7th Cir. 1979),
rev'd, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
'0' Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972).
200 See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 310.
207 The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit
program is authorized by section 402 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342. Per-
mits are issued either by the EPA or by a state agency to which the EPA has delegated
permit authority. See id. § 1342(b).
211 See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 163 (7th Cir. 1979), rev'd,
451 U.S. 304 (1981).
219 See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 332.
211 See id. at 312-13.
211 See id. at 313 (quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963)).
212 Id. at 314.
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tion.' ,,218 Applying this test, the Court concluded that when Congress
enacted the 1972 amendments to the Clean Water Act,21 it "occupied
the field through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory pro-
gram supervised by an expert administrative agency. "215
The Court found that "the problem of effluent limitations has
been thoroughly addressed through the administrative scheme estab-
lished by Congress." '216 As a result, federal courts were precluded from
using the federal common law to impose on dischargers effluent limita-
tions more stringent than those established by the EPA under the stat-
ute.217 The statutory scheme lacked any "interstices" to be filled by
federal common law.218 Moreover, the Court felt that the use of federal
common law would be "peculiarly inappropriate in areas as complex as
water pollution control."2"' The Court stated that any judicial ap-
proach applying federal common law inevitably would be "'sporadic'"
and "'ad hoc,'" a result inconsistent with Congress's intent in enacting
the 1972 amendments.
220
The Court's opinion, by Justice Rehnquist, rejected Illinois' con-
tention that the statute itself preserved the state's right to invoke the
federal common law of nuisance to abate Milwaukee's discharges. In
particular, Illinois relied on the "savings clause" of the citizen suit pro-
visions of the Act, which states that "[n]othing in this section shall re-
strict any right which any person may have under any statute or com-
213 Id. at 315 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625
(1978)); see also id. at 324 ("The question is whether the field has been occupied, not
whether it has been occupied in a particular manner.") (footnote omitted).
214 The amendments were enacted several months after the Court's decision in
Milwaukee L See supra text accompanying notes 205-06.
215 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 317.
216 Id. at 320.
217 See id.
218 Id. at 323.
211 Id. at 325. According to the majority, resolution of the technical problems in-
volved in this area would be "particularly -unsuited to the approach inevitable under a
regime of federal common law." Id. The Court suggested that it would be inconsistent
with the statute's delegation of authority to an expert administrative agency, the EPA,
"if federal courts were in effect to 'write their own ticket'" by imposing requirements
on a point source discharger under the federal common law that were more stringent
than those included in the permit issued to the discharger pursuant to the Clean Water
Act. Id. at 326. But see Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982), in
which, precisely one year after its decision in Milwaukee II, the Court concluded that
the statutory scheme embodied in the Clean Water Act "contemplates the exercise of
discretion and balancing of equities" by federal district courts in private citizen suits to
enforce the statute. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 316.
220 See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 325 (quoting S. RE-P. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 95 (1971)). But see Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 320 (1982)
(The Clean Water Act "permits the District Court to order that relief it considers
necessary to secure prompt compliance with the Act. That relief can include, but is not
limited to, an order of immediate cessation.").
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mon law."22' The Court responded first that it was "unlikely" that
Congress intended the reference to common law in the "savings clause"
to include "the limited federal common law as opposed to the more
routine state common law."22 Second, even assuming that Congress in-
tended to refer to federal as well as state common law, the Court con-
strued the savings clause to mean only that nothing "in this sec-
tion"-that is, the citizen suit provisions of the statute?22 -preempted
the federal common law of nuisance. The majority opinion concluded,
however, that the rest of the statute was intended to have such a pre-
emptive effect.
224
Similarly, the Court rejected the claim that section 510 of the stat-
ute expressly preserved Illinois' federal common-law action. Section
510 authorizes states to adopt or enforce standards for the control of
pollutants, provided that those standards are no less stringent than the
standards prescribed under the Clean Water Act. 25 Citing no support
for its analysis in the legislative history or elsewhere, the Court found
that although this provision permitted the states to apply their own,
more stringent state standards to in-state dischargers, Congress did not
intend to allow states to employ federal common law to apply these
2MI 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e). The "savings clause" applies to the "right . . . to seek
enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including
relief against the Administrator or a State agency)." Id.
"" Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 329. Although the Court attempted to support this
conclusory assertion by references to the legislative history, Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the majority, acknowledged that nothing in the portions of the legislative history to
which he referred "suggests any intent concerning the continued validity of federal
common law." Id. at 332 (emphasis added). Justice Blackmun's dissent contends, on
the other hand, that the legislative history indicates "that Congress was specifically
aware of the presence of federal common law, and intended that it would survive pas-
sage of the 1972 Amendments." Id. at 343 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
222 33 U.S.C. § 1365.
224 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 328-29.
225 Section 510 of the Act provides in part as follows:
Except as expressly provided in this . . . [Act], nothing in this . . .
[Act] shall (1) preclude or deny the right of any State or political subdivi-
sion thereof . . . to adopt or enforce (A) any standard or limitation re-
specting discharges of pollutants, or (B) any requirement respecting con-
trol or abatement of pollution; except that if an effluent limitation or other
limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or stan-
dard of performance is in effect under this . . . [Act], such State or politi-
cal subdivision . . . may not adopt or enforce any effluent limitation, or
other limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or
standard of performance which is less stringent than the effluent limita-
tion, or other limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment stan-
dard, or standard of performance under this . . . [Act]; or (2) be con-
strued as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of
the States with respect to the waters (including boundary waters) of such
States.
33 U.S.C. § 1370.
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more stringent standards to out-of-state dischargers.22
In a strongly worded dissent,227 Justice Blackmun characterized
the majority's reading of the statute as "extremely strained" and "at
odds with the manifest intent of Congress to permit more stringent
remedies under both federal and state law."228 In response to the ma-
jority's assertion that it was unlikely that Congress intended the savings
clauses of the citizen suit provision to encompass federal common law,
Justice Blackmun pointed out that the clause "makes no distinction be-
tween the common law of individual States and the federal common
law. '229 The dissenting opinion labeled the Court's conclusion-that
although the savings clause did not preempt federal common law, the
rest of the Clean Water Act did-an unjustified "license to supplant all
legal remedies outside the Act itself.
230
The interpretation of the statute reflected in the dissenting opinion
is more convincing than that in Justice Rehnquist's opinion. If Con-
gress intended the enactment of the 1972 amendments as a whole to
preempt federal common law, it is difficult to understand why it did
not make an affirmative statement to that effect. It is hard to imagine a
more cryptic way of expressing an intent to preempt federal common
law than to expect the intent to be derived by negative implication from
a statement that nothing in the very section creating a new statutory
private remedy has preemptive effect. The savings clause of the citizen
suit provision, moreover, draws no distinction between federal and state
common law.231 Justice Rehnquist failed to unearth anything in the
legislative history to demonstrate that Congress intended to limit sup-
plemental common-law remedies to those derived from state law. The
majority's suggestion that section 510, although not expressly so lim-
ited, only authorizes the states to enforce more stringent standards
against in-state dischargers under state law is also based on unsup-
ported speculation.23 2
Moving beyond narrow issues of statutory interpretation, one must
also question the Court's decision in Milwaukee II in terms of the ex-
tent to which it promotes the implicit statutory and constitutional val-
226 See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 328.
227 Justice Blackmun was joined in his dissenting opinion by Justices Marshall
and Stevens. See id. at 332-54.
2.. Id. at 342 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
229 Id. at 343.
230 Id. at 342.
2"1 See supra text accompanying notes 221 & 229.
22 See Farber, supra note 92, at 520 ("[Nlothing in the statute indicates an inten-
tion to preempt the federal common law. The Court's holding therefore seems to have
been based on the desire to avoid an independent policymaking role for the courts in an
area where Congress had acted.").
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ues of legitimacy, individual liberty, accommodation, and efficiency.
The majority's opinion appears to reflect the conviction that the pre-
emption of federal common law is supported by the first three of these
values.23s It is not difficult to argue, however, that the Court's decision
is, in fact, inconsistent with each of these three values.
The Court's opinion reflects the belief that its holding will pro-
mote the-legitimacy of the federal effort to control water pollution by
fostering greater political accountability, more informed decisionmak-
ing, and increased certainty concerning the obligations of dischargers
subject to the Clean Water Act. According to Justice Rehnquist, rules
of conduct, such as limitations on water pollutant discharges, should
generally be formulated by "the people through their elected represent-
atives in Congress," rather than "by the federal judiciary, purposefully
insulated from democratic pressures."' 23 ' Congress, on the other hand,
frequently leaves gaps in the legislation it enacts. "[P]articipation by
the federal courts," Justice Blackmun asserted in dissent, "is often de-
sirable, and indeed necessary, if federal policies developed by Congress
are to be fully effectuated. '23 5 Furthermore, if the Court's interpreta-
tion of those provisions of the Clean Water Act that apparently pre-
serve all common-law remedies is indeed a distortion of congressional
intent,2"' then the holding in Milwaukee II represents the judiciary's
refusal to implement duly enacted legislation, thereby frustrating politi-
cal accountability. As Justice Blackmun pointed out, the Supreme
Court "is no more free to disregard expressions of legislative desire to
preserve federal common law than it is to overlook congressional intent
to curtail it."
'2 7
The majority's contention that its decision will promote informed
decisionmaking, fairness, and certainty are only slightly more convinc-
Although Justice Rehnquist did not make the argument expressly, the preemp-
tion of federal common-law actions may improve the efficiency of the Clean Water
Act's implementation. Under this view, it would be a waste of resources to permit a
person who fails to convince the EPA that a discharger's effluence must be limited to a
certain level to make those same arguments a second time in federal court. See W.
RODGERS, supra note 74, at 42; see also R. STEWART & J. KRIER, supra note 78, at
199 ("[J]udicial efforts to dictate an efficient outcome in each case threaten[ ] very high
transactions costs .... "). But see Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 345 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting) ("Congress never intended that failure to participate in the § 402 administra-
tive process would serve as a jurisdictional bar."). On the other hand, the preservation
of federal common-law remedies may promote economic efficiency by forcing polluters
to internalize their costs. See infra notes 395-96 and accompanying text.
234 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 313.
23. Id. at 334 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
236 See supra notes 231-32 and accompanying text.
237 451 U.S. at 339 n.8 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Isbrandtsen Co. v.
Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952), for the proposition that unless congressional intent
is clear, statutes should not be construed in derogation of the common law).
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ing. Justice Rehnquist's opinion deems the use of federal common law
"peculiarly inappropriate in areas as complex as water pollution con-
trol," in part because of the "arcane subject matter" and technical
problems involved.2"8 But the Court expressed no such doubts about
judicial competence exactly one year later when, in the Romero-Barcelo
decision, it attributed to Congress an intent to vest broad discretion in
the federal district courts to fashion relief that they consider necessary
to secure prompt compliance with the Clean Water Act.239 The major-
ity accurately characterized a system of pollution control based on fed-
eral common-law actions as "'sporadic'" and "'ad hoc.' "240 It also
correctly noted that certainty suffers if a discharger who complies with
a Clean Water Act permit issued by the EPA or a state can be forced
subsequently to comply with more stringent, judicially imposed effluent
limitations.241 If Congress decides that the value of certainty should
yield to the courts' ability to advance the important federal interest in
water pollution control on a case-by-case basis, however, the courts are
not free to subvert that decision.2 2
Justice Rehnquist's opinion asserts that, once Congress has ad-
dressed a problem, the Court's "'commitment to the separation of pow-
ers is too fundamental' to continue to rely on federal common law 'by
judicially decreeing what accords with common sense and the public
weal.' ,,113 According to Justice Rehnquist, the district court in Mil-
waukee II was not free to resort to federal common law as the basis for
applying more stringent effluent limitations on the city merely because
the court disagreed with the regulatory approach taken by the agency
charged by Congress with the responsibility to issue permits. 4 The
statute, however, expressly authorizes the federal courts to continue
resolving interstate pollution disputes by reference to common-law
238 Id. at 325.
239 See Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 316, 320. Justice Rehnquist, the author of
the majority opinion in Milwaukee II, joined Justice White's majority opinion in Ro-
mero-Barcelo. Furthermore, state courts have dealt with similar scientific and technical
issues for years in common-law nuisance actions. It is difficult to see why federal judges
are less capable of understanding such issues than their state court counterparts. See
Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 349 & n.25 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
240 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 325 (quoting S. RaP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
95 (1971)).
241 See id. at 326.
242 See id. at 339 n.8 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
243 Id. at 315 (quoting Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195
(1978)). The Court also noted that its ruling was compelled by "the usual and impor-
tant concerns of an appropriate division of functions between the Congress and the
federal judiciary." Id. at 313.
2, See id. at 323.
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principles.2 45 The Court's refusal to do so constitutes an infringement
on legislative authority that is inconsistent with separation of powers
principles.
2 46
The Court also indicated that its decision would protect the integ-
rity of state sovereignty. Justice Rehnquist contended that since the
states are represented in Congress, the states are more capable of pro-
tecting their interests when Congress is the source of federal law than
when federal courts develop common law to respond to a dispute.2 47 In
addition, Rehnquist asserted that the Clean Water Act provides "ample
opportunity for a State affected by decisions of a neighboring State's
permit-granting agency to seek redress" through participation in the
permit-issuing process.
2 48
It is not clear, however, that the Clean Water Act provides ade-
quate means for a state to protect its resources from impairment by
another state or its citizens.249 Suppose, for example, that Milwaukee is
complying with all federally issued effluent limitations as well as any
additional limitations issued by Wisconsin. The Clean Water Act may
provide no basis for Illinois to seek an abatement of Milwaukee's dis-
charges through the application of Illinois' more stringent effluent limi-
tations, even if those discharges are causing harm to Illinois residents or
245 See supra notes 225-30 and accompanying text.
248 See 451 U.S. at 338-41 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
247 See id. at 317 n.9.
"' Id. at 325-26; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3) (requiring state permit pro-
grams to ensure that a state whose waters may be affected by the issuance of a permit
receives notice of each permit application and an opportunity to participate in a public
hearing).
249 The Court's conclusion that the 1972 legislation deals "comprehensively" with
the problem of water pollution control, see 451 U.S. at 317, is subject to debate. Com-
pare Fort, supra note 160, at 146-56 (describing "the comprehensive scheme Congress
created to regulate" air and water pollution and hazardous waste disposal) with Com-
ment, supra note 90, at 334 (describing "the inability of the EPA to implement the
[Clean Water Act] so as to be truly comprehensive"); id. at 363-64 (focusing on a
state's inability to enforce its own, more stringent pollution control standards against
assault from extraterritorial sources) and Note, Non-Statutory Pollution Remedies in
the Wake of City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 35 RUTGERs L. REv. 595, 603-08 (1983)
(contending that the 1972 legislation does not effectively address "the central issue" in
Milwaukee II, since the statute "provides no definite enforcement mechanism to assure
that [an emitting] state's discharges do not cause a violation" of the receiving state's
standards where the latter are more stringent than the minimum federal standards
promulgated under the federal act). See also Note, supra note 192, at 530-31 (The
Clean Water Act, after the 1977 amendments, like the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act after the 1972 amendments, "fails to provide a means of protecting a state's
quasi-sovereign interests in interstate water from pollution permitted in a neighboring
state."). But see 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2) (Federal agencies, including the EPA, issuing
permits for discharges into navigable waters must "condition such . . . permit[s] in
such manner as may be necessary to insure compliance with applicable water quality
requirements. If the imposition of conditions cannot insure such compliance such
agency shall not issue such . . . permit[s].").
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resources.2 50 The preemption of federal common-law remedies may
leave Illinois unable to protect its "right to be free from unreasonable
interference with its natural environment and resources when the inter-
ference stems from another State or its citizens.""' This significant in-
fringement on Illinois' sovereignty is inconsistent with the pursuit of
individual liberty, a substantive value more important than procedural
values such as legitimacy and accommodation. 5 2
Finally, as the Court pointed out in Milwaukee I, a state's resort
to federal common-law remedies against an out-of-state polluter may
very well promote the accommodation of conflicting state interests by
providing a federal rule and forum to resolve the dispute. " 3 Federal
common law can also resolve potential conflicts between federal and
state interests by protecting the federal interests in a minimum level of




4. The Implications of Milwaukee II
Whether federal common law in the areas of air pollution and
hazardous waste disposal survives after Milwaukee II is uncertain. 255
250 See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 353 n.32 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[I]f a
polluting State is not violating its own approved standards, a neighboring State with
higher standards then has no recourse under [the Clean Water Act]. It is in precisely
this context that the Court recognized the significance of federal common law.") (citing
Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 107-08); see also infra text accompanying notes 445-48 (not-
ing that the Act may fail to protect an injured state having more stringent standards
from a source outside the state that meets the minimum federal requirements). But see
33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2) (providing that "[w]henever such a discharge may affect ...
the quality of the waters of any other State," and "the other State determines that such
discharge will affect the quality of its waters so as to violate any water quality require-
ments in such State," the EPA shall hold a hearing and condition the issuance of a
permit on "compliance with applicable water quality requirements").
251 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 335 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237-39 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S.
496, 520, 526 (1906)).
252 See supra notes 71, 149-54 and accompanying text. This infringement on Illi-
nois' sovereignty would be avoided if Illinois could apply its own, more stringent stan-
dards against Milwaukee in a state common-law action. See infra text accompanying
notes 436-56.
253 See supra text accompanying notes 190-92.
2'4 See supra text accompanying notes 193-98.
255 Any doubts about the scope of the Court's decision in Milwaukee II in the area
of water pollution were dispelled several months after Milwaukee H was decided. The
Court held in National Sea Clammers that "the federal common law of nuisance in the
area of water pollution is entirely pre-empted by the more comprehensive scope of the
[Federal Water Pollution Control Act], which was completely revised soon after the
decision in [Milwaukee I]." 453 U.S. at 22 (citing Milwaukee IH). Federal common law
in the area of ocean pollution was also preempted, by the enactment of the Marine
Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445 (1982). See Na-
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The analysis in Milwaukee II indicates that courts will start with the
assumption that federal law emanates from Congress, not the federal
courts.2" If Congress, in adopting a statutory scheme, has "spoken di-
rectly to" a question, the courts will not be willing to apply federal
common law absent a clear congressional intent to preserve federal
common-law remedies.2 The Clean Water Act prohibits every point
source discharge into navigable waters unless covered by a permit is-
sued by the EPA or a state with an approved permit program. 5 " The
Court in Milwaukee II relied on this broad prohibition to characterize
the Act as "an all-encompassing program of water pollution regula-
tion,"259 which left no room for supplemental federal common-law
rules.2
60
Several subsequent lower court decisions have employed a similar
rationale to conclude that federal pollution control legislation has "oc-
cupied the fields" of maritime tort law2 1 and air pollution control. 262
tional Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 11.
256 See 451 U.S. at 317.
257 See id. at 315.
2 5 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
259 451 U.S. at 318.
260 See id. at 319. The Court also noted that "the problem of effluent limitations
has been thoroughly addressed through the administrative scheme established by Con-
gress." Id. at 320. But see Stafford, The Supreme Court, Federal Common Law, and
Congressional Efforts to Protect Health and the Environment, 14 ENVTL. L. REP.
10,103, 10,104 (1984) ("The supposition that the Clean Water Act is, in fact, a com-
prehensive scheme of regulation is troubling.").
261 See, e.g., Conner v. Aerovox, Inc., 730 F.2d 835, 842 (1st Cir. 1984); In re
Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327, 335-39 (2d Cir. 1981). One court has extended the
holdings in Milwaukee 1I and National Sea Clammers to federal common-law remedies
for nuisances resulting from discharges of pollutants into navigable waters that oc-
curred before the adoption of the 1972 amendments to the Clean Water Act. See Illi-
nois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 680 F.2d 473, 478 (7th Cir. 1982).
282 See, e.g., Reeger v. Mill Serv., Inc., 593 F. Supp. 360, 363 (W.D. Pa. 1984)
("We find the regulatory scheme under the federal Clean Air Act to be similar to that
of the acts considered in [National] Sea Clammers, and therefore apply the same prin-
ciples of preemption."); United States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699, 701-02
(D.N.J. 1982) (holding that, even though the Clean Air Act, unlike the Clean Water
Act, does not regulate all stationary emission sources of pollutants, the Clean Air Act
preempts the federal common law of nuisance because "Congress has addressed the
problem of air pollution" through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory pro-
gram); see also New England Legal Found. v. Costle, 666 F.2d 30, 32 (2d Cir. 1981)
(The EPA's approval of a variance from New York's state implementation plan, per-
mitting a company to burn high sulfur fuel, precludes a court from finding that such
burning constitutes a federal common-law nuisance.). But cf. id. at 32 (refusing to
address "the broad question of whether the Clean Air Act totally preempts federal
common law nuisance actions based on the emission of chemical pollutants into the
air"). The Costle court, like the court in Kin-Bue, noted that the Clean Air Act does
not require the EPA or the states to control emissions from every stationary source, but
only from those sources threatening the national ambient air quality standards. See id.
at 32 n.2.
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Several courts have also held that, based on the comprehensive nature
of the statutory programs established by RCRA and CERCLA, Con-
gress has occupied the field of hazardous waste disposal, thereby pre-
empting federal common law.26
Justice Blackmun, in his dissent in Milwaukee II, feared that an
"automatic displacement" approach would result from the majority's
conclusion that federal common law is preempted as soon as Congress
"addresses a question previously governed" by that law.2"" These fears
have been justified in at least one case, in which a federal district court
held that the enactment of the Clean Water Act preempted federal
common-law rules for non-point sources of pollution.265 The Clean
Water Act's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permit program, on which the Court relied in Milwau-
kee 11,266 applies only to discharges of pollutants from point sources
into navigable waters.267 The Act's coverage of non-point sources of
pollution, such as agricultural field or construction site runoff, is far
less extensive.2 8 Because Congress has failed to authorize, and because
the EPA has not implemented, a truly comprehensive program of
non-point source control, a finding that federal common-law remedies
have been preempted is harder to justify with non-point sources than it
is in the point source context.
If the courts are willing to look more closely at the scope of partic-
ular statutory programs, they may conclude that discrete areas of fed-
eral common law have survived despite the enactment of related pollu-
tion control statutes. For example, there is evidence that acid rain
deposition is at least in part a long-range phenomenon in which emis-
sions of sulfur dioxide or oxides of nitrogen in one state result in acidic
deposition in another state.26 The Clean Air Act's principal mecha-
261 See, e.g., Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1147-48
(E.D. Pa. 1982); United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1069 (D.N.J. 1981), affd,
688 F.2d 205 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Hinds, Liability Under Federal Law for Haz-
ardous Waste Injuries, 6 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 10-12 (1982) (contending that the
comprehensive character of RCRA and CERCLA dictates the conclusion that the fed-
eral common law of nuisance for hazardous wastes has been preempted).
2" See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 334 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
265 See United States v. Olin, 11 ENVTL. L. REP. 21,026, 21,026 (N.D. Ala.
1981). Non-point sources of pollution do not emit pollutants from a discrete pipe,
channel, or conduit. Cf. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (defining point source). Non-point
sources include agricultural fields, mining activities, and construction sites. See id.
§ 1314(0.
288 See supra text accompanying note 248.
287 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342(a)(1).
268 See F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELEER & A. TARLOCK, supra note 60, at 356-64;
J. BONINE & T. MCGARITY, supra note 89, at 436-38; T. SCHOENBAUM, supra note
72, at 740-42.
6I See Note, supra note 198, at 145-50.
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nism for controlling interstate pollution is contained in section 126 of
the Act, which authorizes a state to petition the EPA for a finding that
the emissions of a major stationary source in another state are interfer-
ing with the receiving state's efforts to attain or maintain the national
ambient air quality standards. 2 70 The EPA has concluded, however,
that the section 126 petition procedures apply only to pollutants for
which the EPA has established national ambient air quality -stan-
dards. 171 These standards have been promulgated for sulfur dioxide
and oxides of nitrogen, but not for acid deposition, which is caused
when these two pollutants combine with materials in the atmosphere to
form sulfuric or nitric acid. Since the Clean Air Act's special provisions
for controlling interstate pollution do not apply to acid deposition, Con-
gress arguably has not "spoken directly"2 72 to the problem of acid rain
transport and deposition. Thus, even if federal common law has been
preempted in the general area of air pollution,2 73 federal common-law
remedies still should be available to abate acid deposition.2'
Similarly, the federal courts should be able to formulate federal
common-law rules, despite the creation of a statutory pollution control
program, if Congress authorizes the courts to fill gaps in or supplement
the statutory program. Some courts, for example, have concluded that
Congress intended the federal courts to develop federal common-law
principles in construing and applying certain provisions of CER-
CLA.217 5 These courts have resorted to a new body of judicially devel-
oped principles 27 ' to determine who is responsible for reimbursing the
government for costs incurred in responding to releases of hazardous
substances from abandoned or inactive waste disposal facilities.
27 7
270 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(E), 7426 (1982). The national ambient air qual-
ity standards, promulgated by the EPA for pollutants such as sulfur dioxide, oxides of
nitrogen, and particulate matter, must be achieved by the states within time periods set
forth in the Act. See id. §§ 7409, 7410(a)(2)(A).
271 See 49 Fed. Reg. 48,152 (1984) (final determination concerning interstate pol-
lution abatement).
2172 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 315.
273 See supra note 262.
274 See Bleiweiss, Environmental Regulation and the Federal Common Law of
Nuisance: A Proposed Standard of Preemption, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 41, 67-68
(1983); Comment, supra note 90, at 402-05; Note, supra note 198, at 165-78.
275 See, e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (S.D.
Ohio 1983) ("[Tjhe inevitable incompleteness presented by all legislation means that
interstitial federal lawmaking is a basic responsibility of the federal courts.").
178 This body of law, which fills gaps left by Congress when it enacted CERCLA,
has been referred to as "statutory common law." See J. BONNE & T. McGARrrv,
supra note 89, at 1008, 1025, 1038.
277 See, e.g., United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59, 62-63
(W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F.
Supp. 823, 839-46 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F.
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Thus, although the use of federal common law in suits involving harm
caused by pollution has been narrowly confined by the decision in Mil-
waukee II, there remain areas in which the courts should not hesitate
to resort to federal common law.
III. STATE COMMON-LAW REMEDIES
The federal statutes controlling the discharge of air and water pol-
lutants and the disposal of hazardous wastes contain citizen suit provi-
sions authorizing private persons to bring suits to enjoin statutory viola-
tions. These citizen suit provisions, however, do not create any, right of
compensation for individuals harmed by pollutant discharges i'egulated
under the statutes. The courts, guided by the Supreme Court's analysis
in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clam-
mers,278 have been unwilling to imply such a private right of action.279
Supp. 1249, 1252-55 (S.D. Ill. 1984); United States v. Stringfellow, 20 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1905, 1911-12 (C.D. Cal. 1984); United States v. South Carolina Recycling &
Disposal, Inc., 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1753, 1756-60 (D.S.C. 1984); United States
v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1337-39 (E.D. Pa. 1983); United States v. Chem-Dyne
Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 806-08 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
Some courts have also concluded that the provisions of RCRA and CERCLA au-
thorizing the federal district courts to abate situations causing an imminent and sub-
stantial endangerment to public health or welfare, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6973 (West 1983 &
Supp. 1985); 42 U.S.C. § 9606, are a codification of federal common law. In United
States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984), for example, the court
discussed the imminent hazard provision of RCRA in the following terms:
Congress's intent, then, was to establish a standard of liability by incorpo-
rating and expanding upon the common law. . . . [T]he former common
law of nuisance, as applied to situations in which a risk of harm from
solid or hazardous wastes exists, shall include new terms and concepts
which shall be developed in a liberal, not a restrictive, manner.
Id. at 167; see also Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1433-35 (S.D. Ohio
1984); S. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5019, 5023. The Senate Report on RCRA states:
Section 7003 [current version at 42 U.S.C.A. § 6973 (West 1983 & Supp.
1985)], therefore, incorporates the legal theories used for centuries to as-
sess liability for creating a public nuisance (including intentional tort, neg-
ligenc[e] and strict liability) and to determine appropriate remedies in
common law history attached to terms such as "imminent" and "substan-
tial," as well as more recent legislative history. However, section 7003
should not be construed solely with respect to the common law. Some
terms and concepts, such as persons 'contributing to' disposal resulting in
a substantial endangerment, are meant to be more liberal than their com-
mon law counterparts.
Id. Not all courts agree that the imminent hazard provisions of RCRA and CERCLA
have a substantive content that reflects a codification of common-law principles. See,
e.g., United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv., 496 F. Supp. 1127, 1133-34 (D. Conn.
1980); United States v. Midwest Solvent Recovery, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 138, 143-44
(N.D. Ind. 1980).
278 454 U.S. 1 (1981).
279 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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Even assuming that the federal common law of nuisance encompasses a
private plaintiff's effort to seek monetary relief,280 the Court's decision
in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee H1)281 has foreclosed that
avenue in the water pollution context, and probably in many air pollu-
tion and hazardous waste disposal controversies as well,2 2 on the
ground that the enactment of comprehensive legislative schemes for pol-
lution control has preempted federal common-law actions.2"8 Appar-
ently, individuals seeking compensation for harm to their health or
property caused by pollution are limited to whatever remedies have
been provided by state law.
This section addresses whether state common-law compensatory or
injunctive remedies have been preempted by the enactment of the Clean
Air and Water Acts, RCRA, and CERCLA.284 The analysis indicates
that although Congress has the authority under the commerce clause
285
to preempt state common-law remedies for harm caused by pollution, it
has not intended to do so in most instances.
This part of the Article is divided into six sections. The first two
sections analyze Congress's authority to preempt state common-law
remedies and the general principles applied by the courts in preemption
cases. The third section considers whether the Clean Air and Water
Acts have preempted the application of state common-law remedies
when the person injured and the polluter causing the injury are located
in the same state. The fourth section considers the preemption question
in the context of a polluter located in one state who causes harm to a
person located in another state. The fifth section contains a separate
analysis of the preemptive effect of RCRA and CERCLA. The final
section proposes that Congress either reauthorize the use of federal
common law to resolve interstate pollution controversies or create a fed-
eral statutory private right of action for damages resulting from inter-
state pollution. The legislature could then expressly preclude the appli-
cation of state common-law remedies to interstate disputes, and thus
avoid the potential difficulties created by the application of different
280 The divergent views of the federal courts on the scope of the federal common
law of nuisance are discussed supra note 198.
281 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
282 But see supra notes 269-77 and accompanying text.
'" See supra notes 255-65 and accompanying text.
'84 The analysis of congressional authority and intent to preempt state statutory
remedies does not differ significantly from this section's analysis of state common-law
remedies. For example, the savings clause of the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provi-
sion denies any intent to restrict any person's right to seek relief "under any statute or
common law." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e).
285 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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standards of liability to polluters.
A. Congressional Preemption Authority
1. Commerce Clause Authority
In determining whether Congress has preempted a certain body of
state law, it is necessary to engage in a two-step analysis. The first
question is whether Congress has the constitutional power to preempt
state law. Assuming that Congress is authorized to act, the second in-
quiry is whether it intended to displace state law when it enacted a
particular statute.2"6 If Congress is authorized to preempt state law and
intended to do so, the states are precluded from exercising legislative or
judicial power in the preempted field."' 7
The scope of Congress's authority to displace state common-law
remedies for pollution-induced harm is related to its authority to regu-
late various sources of pollutants.2 8 Although the Supreme Court has
never held that the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, RCRA, or
CERCLA are within Congress's constitutional authority,8" there is lit-
tle doubt that these statutes are within the ambit of Congress's com-
merce clause powers.290
288 See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983) ("It is well established that within constitutional
limits Congress may pre-empt state authority by so stating in express terms."); see also
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrr=rrONAL LAW § 6-23, at 376 (1978) ("So long as Con-
gress acts within an area delegated to it, the preemption of conflicting state or local
action . . . flow[s] directly from the substantive source of the congressional action cou-
pled with the supremacy clause . . ").
287 The displacement of state law is based on the supremacy clause of the Consti-
tution, which provides in part that the "Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Consti-
tution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CoNsr. art. VI; see
also Note, Environmental Control: Higher State Standards and the Question of Pre-
emption, 55 CORNEIL L. REv. 846, 851 (1970) (The effect of the supremacy clause "is
to give Congress the power to impede the state's exercise of concurrent power by means
of legislation, otherwise constitutional, that displaces state laws."). See generally Pierce,
supra note 66 (discussing agency power to preempt state regulation).
28 An award of compensatory damages can be viewed as a form of regulation of
the defendant polluter. "[R]egulation can be as effectively exerted through an award of
damages as through some form of preventive relief." San Diego Bldg. Trades Council
v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959).
289 See McCastle v. Rollins Envtl. Serv., 514 F. Supp. 936, 941 (M.D. La. 1981)
(declining to consider "whether the Constitution grants to the Congress the authority to
supercede state law in actions between private parties relating to discharges of sub-
stances into the ambient air in each and every part of the country"); Stewart, Pyramids
of Sacrifice, supra note 67, at 1225.
290 The commerce clause gives Congress the power "[tjo regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." U.S.
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In 1981 the Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association. 9 1 In Hodel an
association of local coal producers brought suit challenging the constitu-
tionality of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977,"' "a comprehensive statute designed to 'establish a nationwide
program to protect society and the environment from the adverse effects
of surface coal mining operations.' "29' The Act authorizes the Secre-
tary of the Interior to issue performance standards requiring coal pro-
ducers to restore land to its prior condition after mining, segregate and
preserve topsoil, minimize disturbances to the hydrologic balance, and
revegetate mined areas.2" 4 The coal producers' association asserted that
the Act exceeded Congress's authority under the commerce clause2 . be-
cause its principal goal was regulating the use of private lands within
the borders of the states, as opposed to regulating the effects of surface
coal mining on interstate commerce.
296
The Court upheld the statute against this challenge. The Court's
review was "influenced above all by the fact that the Commerce Clause
is a grant of plenary authority to Congress. 2 9 7 The Court concluded
that the fact that an activity is labeled "local" or "intrastate" does not
necessarily preclude Congress from regulating it under its commerce
clause authority.29 ' Congress set forth numerous findings, in both the
statute and its legislative history, detailing the effects of surface coal
mining on interstate commerce. Because the Court could not say that
these findings lacked a rational basis, it rejected the coal producers'
commerce clause argument.2 9
Congress has enunciated similar findings concerning the effects of
air and water pollution and hazardous waste disposal on interstate
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
291 452 U.S. 264 (1981); see also Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981) (uphold-
ing the constitutionality of the "prime farmland" provisions of the 1977 Surface Min-
ing Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982)).
292 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982).
293 Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 268 (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 1202(a)).
294 See id. at 269 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)).
295 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The association also argued that the Act violated
the tenth amendment and the due process, equal protection, and just compensation
guarantees of the fifth amendment. See Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 273. The
Court's treatment of the tenth amendment issues is considered infra note 318 and ac-
companying text.
298 See Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 275.
197 Id. at 276; see also Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 324 (1981) (" 'The power
of Congress to regulate interstate commerce is plenary and extends to all such com-
merce be it great or small.' ") (quoting NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 606 (1939)).
298 See Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 281.
299 See id. at 277-83.
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commerce. 300 In a series of lower court decisions, the courts have con-
cluded that the congressional findings provide ample basis for uphold-
ing the federal pollution control statutes as appropriate exercises of the
commerce clause power.30' In strongly worded dictum, the Supreme
Court in Hodel "agree[d] with [those] courts that have uniformly found
the power conferred by the Commerce Clause broad enough to permit
congressional regulation of activities causing air or water pollution, or
other environmental hazards that may have effects in more than one
State."30' 2 Since Congress can preempt state law in any area within the
scope of its power under the commerce clause,30 3 it can preempt state
common law in the areas of air, water, and hazardous waste pollution
control.
2. Tenth Amendment Limitations
Assuming that the federal pollution control statutes are authorized
by the commerce clause, it is also necessary to consider whether the
tenth amendment 0 " prohibits congressional preemption of state com-
300 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 6901(a)(4), (c)(3) (West 1983 & Supp. 1985)
(RCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(1), (a)(4) (Clean Air Act); H.R. REP. No. 1146, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5356,
5371 (Clean Air Act).
301 See, e.g., Dressman v. Costle, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1707, 1714 (6th Cir.
1985) (congressional regulation of air pollution authorized by commerce clause); Sierra
Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114, 1139-40 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (upholding validity of EPA
regulations issued under Clean Air Act provisions designed to prevent the significant
deterioration of air quality in areas with clean air), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 959 (1977);
United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1320 (6th Cir. 1974)
(upholding 1972 amendments to the Clean Air Act under the commerce clause); South
Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 677-78 (1st Cir. 1974) (Congress has the au-
thority under the commerce clause to regulate local transportation activities that gener-
ate air pollution.); cf. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 471 F.
Supp. 985, 994-95 (D. Hawaii 1979) (holding that neither the tenth nor eleventh
amendments restrict enforcement of the Endangered Species Act because Congress has
the power to implement valid treaties, regulate commerce, and to abrogate state
immunity).
302 452 U.S. at 282 (citing United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204, 1209-10 (7th
Cir. 1979); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Train, 544 F.2d 657, 663 (3d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 975 (1977); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 988 (1975),
vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99
(1977); Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246, 259 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v.
Bishop Processing Co., 287 F. Supp. 624 (D. Md. 1968), affid, 423 F.2d 469 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 904 (1970)); see also F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER &
A. TARLOCK, supra note 60, at 347 (federal water pollution control legislation author-
ized by Congress's broad power to regulate interstate commerce); Stewart, Pyramids of
Sacrifice, supra note 67, at 1226-28 (recognizing the power of Congress to regulate
environmental hazards).
303 See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 759-60 (1982).
o The tenth amendment provides that the "powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
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mon-law remedies for harms caused by pollution.8"5 In its 1976 deci-
sion in National League of Cities v. Usury,306 the Court struck down a
federal statute extending federal minimum wage and hour regulations
to state and local government employees.307 The Court held that the
statute violated the tenth amendment by impermissibly infringing upon
state sovereignty.308 In a series of subsequent cases, 09 however, the
Court increasingly narrowed the scope of the National League of Cities
limitations on Congress's commerce clause authority. Finally, in early
1985, the Court overruled National League of Cities in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.3 10 At least temporarily, the
Court appears to have removed in large part whatever affirmative limi-
tations on federal commerce clause authority have been derived from
the tenth amendment.
The Court in Garcia revisited the issue of "the manner in which
the Constitution insulates States from the reach of Congress's power
under the Commerce Clause. ' 31 The Court declared that it had "no
license to employ freestanding conceptions of state sovereignty when
measuring congressional authority under the Commerce Clause." '12
According to the Court, any restraints imposed on federal power over
the states are "inhere[nt] principally in the workings of the National
Government itself, rather than in discrete limitations on the objects of
federal authority. State sovereign interests, then, are more properly
respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
"I The Supreme Court has not decided whether the Clean Air or Water Acts,
RCRA, or CERCLA are invalid on tenth amendment grounds. See Note, Non-Statu-
tory Pollution Remedies in the Wake of City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 35 RUTGES L.
REV. 595, 625 (1983).
$06 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
307 See id. at 851.
301 See id. at 845-52. In subsequent tenth amendment cases the Court applied a
three-part test to determine whether the statute violated the tenth amendment: whether
the statute regulated the states as states; whether it regulated an attribute of state sover-
eignty; and whether it directly impaired the states' ability to structure integral opera-
tions in areas of traditional governmental functions. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 460
U.S. 226, 236-39 (1983); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 763 n.28, 769-70
(1982); United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678, 684 (1982); Hodel
v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981). Even
if a litigant satisfies all three parts of the test, a tenth amendment attack will not suc-
ceed if the nature of the federal interest advanced justifies state submission. EEOC v.
Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 238, 242 n.17.
809 See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S.
742 (1982); United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982); Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
310 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
31 Id. at 1016. Garcia involved the applicability of the minimum wage and over-
time requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982), to a
municipally owned and operated mass transit system.
312 Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1017.
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protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the fed-
eral system than by judicially created limitations on federal power." '13
The Constitution's "built-in restraints" on Congress's commerce clause
authority are provided through state participation in the process of en-
acting federal law; "[t]he political process ensures that laws that unduly
burden the States will not be promulgated."314 The Court refused to
identify or define any "affirmative [constitutional] limits" on the com-
merce clause authority. 5 It appears, however, that federal regulation
of the states would have to "'devour the essentials' ",316 or be "destruc-
tive of state sovereignty"31 " before it would violate the tenth
amendment.
It is difficult to imagine that the Court that decided Garcia would
find that a federal statute preempting state common-law remedies for
harm caused by pollution violated the tenth amendment. First, such a
statute would not even give rise to the concerns at issue in National
League of Cities and Garcia. Whatever tenth amendment constraints
on congressional commerce clause powers remain after Garcia do not
apply to congressional regulation of private activities affecting interstate
commerce.3 8 Eliminating a private person's right to seek redress for
harm caused by pollution through state common-law remedies would
impose a restraint primarily on private activity, and therefore would
not raise any tenth amendment concerns.3 9 Second, under the analysis
313 Id. at 1018; see also id. ("[T]he principal means chosen by the Framers to
ensure the role of the States in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal
Government itself."); id. at 1019 ("[T]he fundamental limitation that the constitutional
scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect the 'States as States' is one of
process rather than one of result.").
314 Id. at 1020.
315 See id.
316 Id. at 1016 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 205 (1968) (Douglas,
J., dissenting)).
317 Id. at 1020.
"I See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264
(1981):
We began [in National League of Cities] by drawing a sharp distinction
between congressional regulation of private persons and businesses "neces-
sarily subject to the dual sovereignty of the government of the Nation and
of the State in which they reside," [National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at
845], and federal regulation "directed, not to private citizens, but to the
States as States" [id.]. As to the former, we found no Tenth Amendment
impediment to congressional action.
Id. at 286; see also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 237 n.10 (1983) ("'A wealth of
precedent attests to congressional authority to displace or preempt State laws regulating
private activity affecting interstate commerce when the laws conflict with federal
law . . . .' ") (quoting Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 290).
19 Cf Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 84 n.27
(1978) (rejecting the claim that federal statutory limitation on the common-law liability
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pursued by the Garcia Court, even if an act preempting state common-
law remedies is viewed as federal regulation of the state judicial sys-
tem,320 the law would never have been enacted by Congress if it truly
imposed "undu[e] burden[s]" on the states. 21 Third, even if the tenth
amendment does impose affirmative substantive constraints on Con-
gress, the preemption of state common-law remedies in a limited area
would not appear sufficiently "destructive of state sovereignty" 322 to ex-
ceed those constraints. Although the states' control over the dockets of
their courts involves an attribute of state sovereignty, the preemption of
common-law remedies for harms caused by pollution is arguably less
intrusive on state sovereignty than statutes, already upheld by the
Court, that impose affirmative obligations on states to consider or ap-
ply federally prescribed standards. 2' The Court has stated that the fed-
eral government has the authority to enlist a branch of state govern-
ment, including the judiciary, to further federal ends. 2 ' A prohibition
of the private nuclear power industry impermissibly encroached on state government
interests). Congressional preemption of state common-law remedies could also be
viewed, however, as a restriction on the state judicial system, whereby Congress at-
tempts to restrict the judiciary's ability to provide relief for certain types of harm. In
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984), the Court, in deciding that the
Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2284 (1982), did not preempt the recovery of
punitive damages by a person injured through exposure to radioactive materials,
demonstrated a reluctance to conclude that state common-law remedies were pre-
empted. See 104 S. Ct. at 625-26. The Court's holding, however, was based on the
conclusion that Congress did not intend to preempt state court punitive damage awards,
not that it lacked the authority to do so. See id. at 621-26.
320 See supra note 319.
32I See Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1020.
322 Id. The provisions of the federal pollution control statutes requiring states ei-
ther to adopt certain regulatory programs (for example, the Clean Air Act's require-
ment that states adopt plans for achieving the national ambient air quality standards,
42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)), or have such programs imposed on their private citizens and
businesses by the federal EPA, seem to involve a more direct threat to "'the essentials
of state sovereignty,'" 105 S. Ct. at 1016 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183,
205 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting)), than would the preemption of state common-law
remedies for injured individuals. Even these provisions, however, have been able to
withstand tenth amendment attack. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Rec-
lamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 289 n.30 (1981); United States v. District of Columbia,
654 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir.) (A federal district court order selecting site for sewage treat-
ment plant and ordering county to budget funds to build the plant does not violate the
tenth amendment.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981); Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d
1114, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (EPA regulations under the Clean Air Act compelling
states to modify their implementation plans to prevent significant deterioration of air
quality in areas with clean air do not violate the tenth amendment.), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 959 (1977). For an analysis of Congress's ability in light of National League of
Cities to conscript state resources for implementation of federal environmental policy,
see generally Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice, supra note 67.
323 See, e.g., FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765 (1982).
22, See id. at 762; see also Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (upholding federal
statute that created treble damages action for violation of federal price control regula-
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on the state judiciary's authority to hear a limited class of cases, if ra-
tionally related to the goal of regulating interstate commerce,325 there-
fore would not appear to be "destructive of state sovereignty. '3 2  That
state courts have traditionally provided remedies for injured individuals
in common-law tort cases does not in itself restrict Congress's com-
merce clause power to preempt state common law. 2" "[lilt has always
been the law that state legislative and judicial decisionmakers must
give preclusive effect to federal enactments concerning nongovernmental
activity, no matter what the strength of the competing local
interests." 32 8
3. Due Process Limitations
The due process clause of the fifth amendment might present a
more formidable obstacle to congressional preemption of all state com-
mon-law remedies for harms caused by pollution than would the tenth
amendment.329 The federal pollution control statutes do not include a
mechanism for private recovery of compensatory damages.3 If Con-
gress preempted all private damage recoveries under both federal and
state common law, then a person whose property has been damaged or
whose health has been impaired as a result of exposure to pollutant
discharges would have no forum in which to seek compensation from
the responsible polluter.3 "' The elimination of all avenues of monetary
redress might constitute a deprivation of liberty or property in violation
tions and vested jurisdiction to hear such actions in state as well as federal courts).
"I See Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 291.
326 Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1020.
317 Cf FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 759 (1982) (Congress can displace
state regulation even though this serves to curtail or prohibit the states' prerogatives to
make legislative choices in areas the states consider important.); Virginia Surface Min-
ing, 452 U.S. at 291-92 (Congress does not invade areas reserved to the states simply
because it exercises its authority under the commerce clause in a manner that displaces
the exercise of state police powers.); id. at 292 (It would be a "radical departure" from
long-established precedent to hold that the tenth amendment prohibits Congress from
displacing state police power laws regulating private activity.).
3' FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 766 (1982) (emphasis added).
2I The fifth amendment provides, in part, that "[n]o person shall . . . be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private prop-
erty be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
"Io See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
3 A state could enact a statutory or administrative mechanism for private dam-
age recovery. A court construing the savings clauses of the statutory citizen suit provi-
sions as not preserving state common-law remedies, however, would have a difficult
time concluding that state statutory remedies for individual compensation survived en-
actment of the statutes. This Article contends that Congress intended to preempt
neither state common-law nor statutory remedies. See infra text accompanying notes
363-468 & 483-523.
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of the due process clause.
The Supreme Court rejected a similar contention in Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,3 2 in a challenge to the
constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act."' 3 The Act limits the liabil-
ity of privately owned nuclear power plants licensed by the federal gov-
ernment to $560 million in the event of a nuclear accident, such as a
core meltdown .3 " Residents close to a proposed nuclear plant con-
tended, and the trial court agreed, that the Act violated the due process
clause because the amount available for compensation of injured indi-
viduals is not rationally related to the potential losses from an acci-
dent,3" 5 and because those injured are not provided with a satisfactory
quid pro quo for the common-law rights of recovery abrogated by the
statute.33 6
The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that Congress could choose
to limit liability in order to encourage the private development of
atomic power.33 7 Although the Court stated that "it is not at all clear
that the Due Process Clause in fact requires that a legislatively enacted
compensation scheme either duplicate the recovery at common law or
-32 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
"s Pub. L. No. 85-256, § 4, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2210 (1982)).
'" The Act requires a licensee to purchase the maximum amount of available
privately underwritten public liability insurance (about $60 million at the time of en-
actment in 1957) and provides that, if damages from a nuclear disaster exceed the
amount of insurance coverage, the federal government will indemnify the licensee up to
an additional $500 million. See Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 64-65.
335 Carolina Envtl. Study Group v. United States, 431 F. Supp. 203, 221-22
(W.D.N.C. 1977), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl.
Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978). The Supreme Court applied the rational basis stan-
dard of judicial review normally applicable to economic regulations, since the Act was a
"classic example" of a legislative effort to structure and accommodate "'the burdens
and benefits of economic life.'" Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 83 (quoting Usery v.
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)). Accordingly, the Act was af-
forded a presumption of constitutionality. See id. at 83-84.
336 Carolina Envtl. Study Group v. United States, 431 F. Supp. 203, 221-22
(W.D.N.C. 1977), rev'd and remanded sub. nom. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl.
Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
337 See Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 88. The Court cited several cases for the
proposition that a person has no vested property interest in any rule of the common
law. See, e.g., Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929); Second Employers' Liability
Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 50 (1912). These cases, however, involved attacks on the constitu-
tionality of statutory schemes by the parties potentially subject to the new statutory
liabilities, not by persons whose common-law right to seek judicial damage awards
would be altered or replaced. Moreover, none of the acts in these cases totally cut off
the right to compensation of injured individuals. Rather, they limited the liability of
those responsible for the injuries, in return for which the statutes cut off certain de-
fenses (such as the fellow servant rule and assumption of risk) and established adminis-
trative mechanisms to facilitate individual recoveries.
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provide a reasonable substitute remedy," 38 it expressly left this ques-
tion unsettled 39 because it found that the Price-Anderson Act created
"a fair and reasonable substitute. 3 40 Absent the statutory limitation on
liability, recovery under state common law might be impossible, due to
the potential barriers created by state tort law. 4 ' The Court further
relied on a 1975 amendment to the statute, which explicitly provided
that in the event of a nuclear "'incident,' " Congress itself would
"'take whatever action is deemed necessary and appropriate to protect
the public from the consequences' " of the disaster.34 The Court thus
viewed the $560 million amount as a floor, not a ceiling, on recovery.
No such adequate substitute for state common-law compensatory
remedies exists in the federal air and water pollution and hazardous
waste disposal statutes. In fact, no substitute exists at all. Generally, a
person has no vested property interest in any particular common-law
rule,343 and the due process clause does not forbid the abolition of com-
mon-law rights to attain a permissible legislative goal.3 4'" Under the
Constitution, however, there may be certain "'core' common-law
rights, including rights against trespass," which the government is not
free to abrogate, "at least without a compelling showing of necessity or
a provision for a reasonable alternative remedy. ' 345 The Supreme
Court has recognized that
[t]he liberty preserved from deprivation without due process
included the right "generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit
"I Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 88.
339 See id. at 88-91.
3o Id. at 90-91.
4" See id. at 91-92. The Act was intended to provide a more efficient and certain
vehicle for assuring compensation in the event of a nuclear accident than was previ-
ously available under state common-law tort remedies. See id. at 89-90 (citing Hear-
ings on H.R. 8631 Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
69 (1975) (statement of William A. Anders, Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion)); ef. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615, 637 (1984) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) ("[Tlhe primary concern" in enacting the Price-Anderson Act "was to as-
sure compensation for persons who suffered loss.").
"I See Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 90-91 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e)).
3'3 See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877); see also cases cited supra
note 337 (concluding that by necessity any designated ceiling on liability will be
arbitrary).
3 1 See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 92 (1980) (Marshall,
J., concurring) (citing Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929)).
11 Id. at 94 (Marshall, J., concurring); see also Richards v. Washington Termi-
nal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 553 (1914) (stating "the true rule under the Fifth Amend-
ment ...to be that while the legislature may legalize what otherwise would be a
public nuisance it may not confer immunity from action for a private nuisance of such
a character as to amount to ...a taking of private property for public use").
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of happiness by free men." . ..Among the historic liberties
so protected was a right to be free from, and to obtain judi-
cial relief for, unjustified intrusions on personal security. 34
Thus, a congressional attempt to preempt state common-law damage
remedies for persons whose health is impaired by pollution, without
providing any substitute mechanism for compensation, might conflict
with the due process clause.3 47 Courts often construe statutes to avoid
difficult constitutional questions. The due process issues raised by the
preemption of state common-law compensatory remedies for harms
caused by pollution therefore might convince a court to construe any
ambiguities in the provisions of the Clean Air and Water Acts, RCRA,
and CERCLA against the preemption of those remedies. 8
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1976) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)) (emphasis added). If a private party invades another private
individual's common-law rights, due process may require that the victim be afforded a
hearing, which would typically take the form of a common-law action for damages by
the victim. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 66, at 1310 n.479. The government's
refusal to offer any such procedural protective mechanisms "raises the substantive due
process question of the legislature's authority to abolish common law entitlements." Id.;
see also id. at 1314 (The interest in bodily integrity is constitutionally entitled to gov-
ernment protection.). But cf. id. at 1311 (The government might "meet its due process
obligations by punishing or redressing violations of entitlements through criminal pros-
ecutions or other forms of public enforcement.").
34 See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 45 (Supp. 1979) (The
Price-Anderson Act's guarantee of further compensation if the $560 million were insuf-
ficient "becomes the only confident [basis] for the holding [in Duke Power] that the
victims of an accident [would] not [be] deprived of property, and the constitutionality of
the Act may well turn on that guarantee."); cf. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243
U.S. 188, 201 (1917) (stating that "it perhaps may be doubted whether the State could
abolish all rights of action [by injured employees against employers] on the one
hand ...without setting up something in their stead," but giving no opinion on the
issue since the question was not before the Court).
848 See, e.g., Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264 (D. Vt.
1985). In that case, the court analyzed three ways to interpret sections 505(e) and 510
of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(e), 1370, as they applied to the question
whether Congress intended to preempt state common-law remedies for interstate water
pollution. The court rejected the "most restrictive interpretation," 602 F. Supp. at 268,
which would preserve state remedies only for pollution of waters outside of the Act's
jurisdiction:
[U]nder this interpretation of the Act, a person injured by pollution of
"navigable waters" would be unable to recover damages from the polluter
since the Act does not provide a damage remedy for private actions. It is
simply inconceivable that Congress intended to deprive a party injured by
water pollution of all compensation for that injury.
Id. at 269 (citation omitted). The court also rejected a second alternative, which would
preserve common-law remedies only for injuries from in-state sources. See id. The
court concluded instead that "the Act authorizes actions to redress injury caused by
water pollution of interstate waters through the laws of the state in which the injury
occurred." Id.; see also White Lake Improvement Ass'n v. City of Whitehall, 22 Mich.
App. 262, 177 N.W.2d 473, 478 n.16 (1970) (state statute interpreted as preserving
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B. Principles of Federal Preemption
Even if Congress has the authority to preempt state common-law
remedies for environmental injury, the federal pollution control statutes
do not displace those remedies unless Congress intended to do so. In
addressing whether enactment of the Clean Water Act preempted fed-
eral common-law nuisance actions, the Court in Milwaukee II
"'start[ed] with the assumption'" that it is for Congress, not the fed-
eral courts, to articulate the governing standards of federal law.349 The
Court is less likely, however, to find federal preemption of state com-
mon law because it begins "with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the states were not to be superseded by [federal legislation]
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.1350 Regu-
lation of pollution-generating activities and the provision of tort reme-
dies to compensate for personal injuries both "clearly fall[ ] within the
exercise of even the most traditional concept of what is compendiously
known as the police power. 351 Absent a clear manifestation of congres-
sional intent to preempt state common-law remedies, the presumption
of continuing state authority cannot be rebutted, and the states, through
their judicial systems, will be free to regulate pollution emissions and to
provide compensatory remedies for harms caused by pollution. 52
The Supreme Court has recognized two general ways in which
Congress can preempt state law. First, Congress can occupy a given
field to the exclusion of any state law falling within that field.3"' The
courts have little difficulty finding preemption when Congress explicitly
manifests its intent to occupy a field, either in the statute or its legisla-
tive history. The courts have also recognized implicit congressional in-
tent to occupy a field. Such an intent arises (1) when the scheme of
federal regulation is so pervasive that a court can reasonably infer that
judicial remedies for injury caused by municipally discharged sewage to avoid the "seri-
ous issue" as to the constitutionality of the statute that would be presented by a con-
trary interpretation); Uric v. Franconia Paper Corp., 107 N.H. 131, 134, 218 A.2d
360, 362 (1966) (refusing to interpret state statute to bar equitable relief in a private
nuisance action against a paper manufacturer, because "such legislation would consti-
tute taking private property for a non-public purpose").
", 451 U.S. at 317 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947)).
S5o Id. at 316.
35' Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
351 See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960);
Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1542 (D.C. Cir.), cert.-denied, 105 S.
Ct. 545 (1984).
SSS See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960);
Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1542 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 545 (1984).
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Congress left no room for the states to supplement it;35' (2) when the
federal statute touches a field in which the federal interest is so domi-
nant that enforcement of state laws on the same subject must be as-
sumed to be precluded;.5 5 or (3) when the object sought to be obtained
by the federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it reveal
the purpose to preclude state law. 8" The burden of proving congres-
sional intent to preempt state law is on the party contending that state
law has been displaced, 5 ' an allocation that reflects the courts' reluc-
tance to preempt state law.
Second, when Congress has not occupied a particular field, state
law may be preempted to the extent that it "actually conflicts with
a . . . federal statute."3 8' The most obvious type of conflict arises
where it is physically impossible to comply with both the federal and
state regulations. 59 A conflict can also arise where the state law stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment of congressional objectives. 8 ' The
courts' reluctance to oust state jurisdiction is manifested in their refusal
to seek out conflicts between federal and state regulation when none
clearly exists.3 6 ' Rather than completely oust state law, they try to rec-
I" See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615, 621 (1984); Mil-
waukee II, 451 U.S. at 316 (citing Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157
(1978)).
355 "When the federal government occupies a given field or an identifiable portion
of it ...the test of preemption is whether 'the matter on which the State asserts the
right to act is in any way regulated by the federal government.'" Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04
(1983) (citing Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947)).
"I See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151,
157 (1978); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 488 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2686 (1985). The tests for finding implicit congressional intent
are more easily stated than applied. The courts consider the following factors, among
others, in determining whether Congress has occupied a given field to the exclusion of
the states: comprehensiveness of federal regulations; consideration of state police power;
congressional intent that there be collaborative federal/state efforts to act in the given
field; the need for uniform regulation; and the history of regulation of the subject mat-
ter. See id. at 486.
... See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615, 625 (1984).
'" Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978).
859 See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615, 621 (1984); Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190, 204 (1983); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978).
360 See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615, 621 (1984); Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204
(1983); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978); Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 495 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2686 (1985).
361 See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 446
(1960); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 499 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing
Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 130 (1978); Seagram & Sons v.
Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 45 (1966)), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2686 (1985).
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oncile the operation of the two statutory schemes.3"2
C. Preemption for Intrastate Purposes
The Supreme Court in Milwaukee II declined to decide whether
the enactment of the 1972 amendments to the Clean Water Act pre-
empted state common-law remedies for harm caused by pollution. 3 '
The Court indicated, however, that it would be far more reluctant to
conclude that the federal statute preempted state common law than that
it preempted federal common law.36 4 This section analyzes whether the
enactment of the Clean Air and Water Acts has preempted state com-
mon-law remedies for an individual injured in one state by pollutant
discharges originating in the same state. The next section considers the
same question when a person is injured by pollution from an out-of-
state source. The preemptive effects of RCRA and CERCLA in both
the intrastate and interstate contexts are analyzed in a subsequent
section. 6 5
The analysis of whether the Clean Air and Water Acts preclude
the states from regulating dischargers or compensating those injured by
"I See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 496 (9th Cir. 1984)
(citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 126 (1973)),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2686 (1985); see also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 S.
Ct. 615, 626 (1984) (noting that state law is preempted only to the extent that it actu-
ally conflicts with federal law, and finding, therefore, that state-imposed punitive dam-
ages were not preempted by a potential federal fine).
363 See 451 U.S. at 310 n.4. The district court had ruled that Illinois was entitled
to injunctive relief under both federal and state common law. The court of appeals
refused to address Illinois' state common-law allegations, since "it is federal common
law and not state statutory or common law that controls in this case." Id. (citing Illi-
nois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 155, 177 n.53 (7th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S.
304 (1981)). Illinois filed a separate petition for certiorari on the state common-law
preemption issue. See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 310 n.4. The Court denied that peti-
tion after its decision in Milwaukee II.
3" See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 316; see also supra text accompanying notes
350-52 (explaining that the Court assumes that Congress did not intend to preempt
state law absent a showing of a clear intent to do so).
8I The preemptive effect of RCRA and CERCLA on remedies for injuries ema-
nating from the handling, treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous wastes is dis-
cussed in section E of this Part. See infra notes 483-523 and accompanying text. The
analysis of the preemptive effect of these two laws differs from the Clean Air and
Water Acts analysis for three reasons. First, Congress has delegated to the federal
courts the authority to create a body of federal common law concerning certain hazard-
ous waste issues. Second, CERCLA contains a provision expressly preempting certain
state common-law remedies for interstate harms. Third, Congress has expressed partic-
ular concern over the need for uniformity in the hazardous waste area. Nevertheless, in
most cases the result is the same under the hazardous waste disposal acts as under the
air and water pollution statutes. Congress did not intend to preempt state common-law
regulatory or compensatory remedies, except for certain remedies for harm caused by
interstate activities covered by CERCLA.
19851
186 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
pollution should begin with the statutory language. Neither Act ex-
pressly preempts state common-law remedies. In fact, it appears that
the statutes expressly preserve such remedies. The savings clause of the
citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act provides that "[n]othing
in this section shall restrict any right which any person . . .may have
under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent
standard or limitation or to seek any other relief." 8' In a
pre-Milwaukee II decision, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
concluded that this provision "recognize[s] the continuing validity of
state common law nuisance actions.
'3 67
The provisions of the savings clause are not necessarily dispositive,
however, on the preemption issue. Under the theory espoused by the
Court in Milwaukee II, the savings clause takes no position on the con-
tinuing availability of state common-law remedies. It simply states that
"[n]othing in this section"-that is, the citizen suit provisions of the
statute-restricts state common-law rights, whereas the rest of the stat-
ute might preempt these rights. 6 ' Yet this contention is inconsistent
with the legislative history of the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provi-
sion. According to a Senate Committee Report, the citizen suit provi-
sion "would specifically preserve any rights or remedies under any
other law." 69 This statement reflects more than a congressional refusal
366 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (emphasis added). The language of the Clean Air Act's
citizen suit provision is similar. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300j-
8(e) (1982) (the Safe Drinking Water Act).
'17 Committee for the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006, 1009 n.9
(4th Cir. 1976). In the National Sea Clammers case, the Supreme Court indicated that
the phrase "any effluent standard or limitation" in the Clean Water Act's savings
clause could include state "'effluent limitations' imposed as a result of court decrees
under the common law of nuisance." 453 U.S. at 16 n.26. In Milwaukee II, the Court
rejected the assertion that this savings clause refers to "the more limited federal com-
mon law as opposed to the more routine state common law." 451 U.S. at 329 (citing
Committee for Jones Falls, 539 F.2d 1006, 1009 n.9 (4th Cir. 1976)). This statement,
especially its citation (with apparent approval) of footnote nine of the Committee for
Jones Falls case, seems to reflect the Court's view that the savings clause of the Clean
Water Act's citizen suit provision expressly preserves state common-law remedies. But
see Comment, supra note 90, at 393 (The Court's recognition of state common law
resulted from its efforts to construe "common law" to exclude federal common law and
did not constitute an affirmative recognition of state common-law relief.).
368 Cf Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 329 (The citizen-suit savings clause "means
only that the provision of such suit does not revoke other remedies.").
389 S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3668, 3746. The Senate Committee stated further that "if
damages could be shown, other remedies would remain available." Id., quoted in Ouel-
lette v. International Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264, 269 (D. Vt. 1985); ef. H.R. REP.
No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 69 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 6238, 6308 (construing RCRA's citizen suit provision); H.R.
REP. No. 361, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1971) (Common-law rights are not "in any
way restrict[ed] or supersede[d]" by passage of the Marine Protection, Research, and
[Vol. 134:121
FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND POLLUTION
to take a position on the state common-law preemption issue; it is an
affirmative recognition that state common-law rights and remedies were
meant to survive enactment of the federal statute.
Other statutory provisions support this interpretation of the citizen
suit provision's savings clause. Section 510 of the Clean Water Act, for
example, provides that nothing in the Act "shall . . . preclude or deny
the right of any state . . . to adopt or enforce (A) any standard or
limitation respecting discharges of pollutants, or (B) any requirement
respecting control or abatement of pollution," provided that the state
standards or requirements are at least as stringent as any applicable
Sanctuaries Act of 1971.); S. REP. No. 451, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (1971), re-
printed in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4234, 4248; H.R. REP. No. 1783,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5356, 5388 (Common-law rights are "not affected" by the enactment of the Clean Air
Act.).
The argument that the legislative history of the citizen suit provisions reflects Con-
gress's intent to preserve state common-law remedies is not a complete answer to the
interpretation of those provisions set forth in Milwaukee II. The savings clause in the
Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision draws no distinction between state and federal
common law, see supra note 133, nor does the legislative history. See, e.g., S. REP. No.
414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3668, 3747. Accordingly, if the clause is construed to preserve state common law,
then it should also preserve federal common law. It is precisely this contention, of
course, that the majority of the Court rejected in Milwaukee II. These apparently con-
flicting interpretations of the savings clause, however, can be reconciled by taking into
account the assumptions with which the Court begins its preemption analysis. The
Court assumes that federal law is pronounced by Congress rather than the courts.
Therefore, the citizen suit provision, whose language is unclear, is interpreted as taking
no position on the continuing availability of federal common law. The Court then ana-
lyzes the rest of the statute to support its conclusion that the statute's comprehensive
nature displaces federal common law. When the issue involves preemption of state com-
mon law, the Court assumes that the lawmaking authority of the states was not super-
seded. See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 316. Given this presumption, the ambiguous
statutory language should be construed in favor of retaining state law. Thus, the sav-
ings clause preserves state common law, a result that is fortified by S. REP. No. 414,
supra. See Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264, 268-70 (D. Vt.
1985); see also Chappell v. SCA Serv., 540 F. Supp. 1087, 1100 (C.D. Ill. 1982)
(holding that the savings provision of the Toxic Substances Control Act's citizen suit
provision, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(c)(3) (1982), preserves state common-law nuisance actions
for damages); Ginn v. Consolidation Coal Co., 107 Ill. App. 3d 564, 437 N.E.2d 793,
796 (1982) (citing Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 328, for the proposition that the savings
clause in the citizen suit provision of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(e) (1982), "is an express indication that [the statute] should
not be read as limiting other remedies which might exist"); New York v. Monarch
Chems., Inc., 111 Misc. 2d 343, 349, 443 N.Y.S.2d 967, 969 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (no clear
intent in Safe Drinking Water Act, Toxic Substances Control Act, or RCRA to pre-
empt state regulation of drinking water or toxic chemicals), modified, 90 App. Div. 2d
907, 456 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1982); cf Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403, 414
(7th Cir. 1984) (The savings clause in section 505(e) of the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1365(e), "may well preserve a right under statutes or the common law of the
state within which a discharge occurs" to enforce its own law.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
979 (1985).
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federal requirement.3 70 The Supreme Court suggested in Milwaukee II
that this provision may authorize state courts to establish more strin-
gent standards through state nuisance laws.37
If the statutory language is ambiguous and neither expressly pre-
serves nor preempts state common-law remedies, one must determine
whether Congress implicitly occupied the fields of air and water pollu-
tion to the exclusion of the states. A finding that Congress implicitly
occupied the field is directly contradicted by provisions of the federal
pollution statutes that authorize state standards more stringent than
those in the federal regulations.372 Several courts have held that the
federal statutes establish only a minimum federal.level of pollution con-
trol, which the states may exceed by establishing more stringent con-
trols on sources located within their borders.3 73 Implicit occupation of
3 0 33 U.S.C. § 1370(1). Other federal statutes contain similar provisions con-
cerning state authority. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(e) (1982) (Safe Drinking Water
Act); 42 U.S.C.A. § 6929 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985) (RCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 7416
(Clean Air Act); 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a) (CERCLA). If section 510 of the Clean Water
Act covers more stringent state common law as well as statutory standards, see infra
text accompanying note 371, then the statutory reference to "requirement[s] respecting
control or abatement of pollution" would permit a court to issue an injunction limiting
or prohibiting discharges, even if those discharges comply with a permit issued under
federal law. See S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 81, reprinted in 1972 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3668, 3746-47 ("Compliance with requirements under this
Act would not be a defense to a common law action for pollution damages.").
371 See 451 U.S. at 328; see also Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403, 413
n.6 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting the Court's suggestion in Milwaukee 11 that section 510 of
the Clean Water Act "may refer to effluent limitations imposed as a result of court
decrees under the common law of nuisance"), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 979 (1985).
712 See supra notes 370-71 and accompanying text. The statutes also contain a
series of policy pronouncements indicating congressional intent to "recognize, preserve,
and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and
eliminate pollution." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (Clean Water Act), cited in Ouellette v.
International Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264, 268 (D. Vt. 1985); see also 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 6901(a)(4), 6902(8) (West 1983 & Supp. 1985) (RCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3)
(Clean Air Act); cf. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (requiring that discharges from point
sources comply with state effluent limitations that are more stringent than the federal
limitations).
373 See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 1984) (dictum),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 979 (1985); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483,
489 (9th Cir. 1984) (When Congress enacted the Clean Water Act, it encouraged a
federal-state partnership for the control of water pollution with respect to waters
within the states' jurisdiction.) (citing Pacific Legal Found. v. Costle, 586 F.2d 650,
657 (9th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 445 U.S. 198 (1980)), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 2686 (1985). In Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 545 (1984), the circuit court stated that federal legislation concern-
ing control of hazards created by production and use of pesticides
has traditionally occupied a limited role as thefloor of safe conduct; before
transforming such legislation into a ceiling on the ability of states to pro-
tect their citizens, and thereby radically adjusting the historic federal-state
balance, United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971), courts should
wait for a clear statement of congressional intent to work such an altera-
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the field of intrastate air and water pollution, moreover, cannot be
based on a dominant federal interest that precludes enforcement of state
laws on the same subject. The air and water pollution control statutes
recognize the "primary responsibilities and rights of the states" to con-
trol and prevent pollution. 7 4 Congress authorized the states to adopt
and enforce standards more stringent than those set by the EPA.37 5 In
accordance with these provisions, the courts have held that there is no
compelling need for federal uniformity in the control of intrastate air
and water pollution.
7 6
Preemption of state law, however, need not be based on occupation
of the relevant field. State law is also preempted if it conflicts with
federal law. But the displacement of state common-law remedies for
intrastate harms caused by air and water pollution is no more sup-
ported by the conflict branch of preemption analysis than it is by the
occupation branch. It is not physically impossible to comply with both
the EPA's regulations setting air or water pollutant minimum stan-
dards and a state court's decree specifying different standards or shut-
ting down a pollutant source. The polluter need only comply with the
more stringent of the two sets of standards, and it will also be in com-
pliance with the more lenient controls. 377 Nor is it impossible to adhere
tion. The Supreme Court has often counselled such hesitance.
Id. at 1543; see also People ex rel. Scott v. United States Steel Corp., 40 Ill. App. 3d
607, 611, 352 N.E.2d 225, 228-29 (1976) (States may impose pollution controls that
exceed federal standards.); Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. v. United States Steel Corp., 30
IIl. App. 3d 360, 371, 332 N.E.2d 426, 434 (1975) (The language in the Clean Water
Act explicitly allows states to enforce controls more stringent than the federal stan-
dards.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976).
'74 See supra note 372.
375 See supra notes 370-71 and accompanying text.
378 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 491 (9th Cir.
1984) ("[T]here is no compelling need for uniformity in the regulation of pollutant
discharges . . . [and] there is a positive value in encouraging the development of local
pollution control standards stricter than the federal minimums."), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 2686 (1985); id. at 495 ("Congress did not implicitly intend to occupy the field of
regulating discharges of pollutants from tankers into a state's territorial waters."); Mc-
Castle v. Rollins Envtl. Serv., 514 F. Supp. 936, 941 (M.D. La. 1981) (Congress has
not concluded that there is an overriding federal concern in the area of air pollution.);
see also Committee for the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006, 1009 (4th
Cir. 1976) ("IT]he Federal Water Pollution Control Act was designed to enlist the aid
of the states . . ... "). But cf. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615, 633
(1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (Congress intended to prohibit a state court from
enjoining the operation of a nuclear power plant on the ground that it is unsafe.);
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461
U.S. 190, 212-13 (1983) (Congress has occupied the entire field of regulating nuclear
radiation hazards.).
, This statement is valid at least where the standards merely set a maximum
level of pollutant emissions, rather than specifying the manner in which those emission
limitations are to be achieved. If the federal and state regulations required the installa-
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to federal standards and pay damages to those injured by the pollu-
tion. 78 In addition, the availability of state common-law remedies for
intrastate harms does not pose an obstacle to the full accomplishment of
congressional objectives, since Congress has encouraged the states to ex-
ceed minimum federal standards.8 79 In fact, by supplementing the efflu-
ent limitations promulgated under the federal statutes with state com-
mon-law remedies, the state courts would further the statutory goals of
restoring or maintaining the integrity of the nation's environment.38 0
tion of two different types of pollution control equipment, then a conflict could arise.
With certain limited exceptions, the Clean Air and Water Acts specify only the level of
emissions permitted, and do not require the installation of particular control technolo-
gies to achieve those emission reductions.
378 See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1541 (D.C. Cir.) ("Chev-
ron can comply with both federal and state law by continuing to use the EPA-approved
label [under EPA regulations issued pursuant to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act [FIFRA], 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-13 6y (1982)] and by simultaneously pay-
ing damages to successful tort plaintiffs . . ... "), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 545 (1984);
Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264, 271 (D. Vt. 1985) ("[T]he
discharger remains free to operate [under a NPDES permit] so long as it pays for the
injury it causes.").
379 See supra notes 370-73 and accompanying text; Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Ham-
mond, 726 F.2d 483, 489 (9th Cir. 1984) (Congress sought to encourage a federal-state
partnership for the control of water pollution.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2686 (1985);
see also Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1541 (D.C. Cir.) (The federal
statute governing the use of pesticides permits state imposition of more stringent con-
straints on pesticide use than those imposed by the EPA.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 545
(1984).
In certain limited situations, the specific application of state common-law stan-
dards that are more stringent than the federal standards may conflict with the accom-
plishment of congressional objectives. Congress may decide, for example, that the feder-
ally specified level of emission control represents the maximum that a particular
industry is economically capable of achieving and that the industry should not be bur-
dened by more stringent controls. In such a situation, the application of state common-
law standards more stringent than the federal controls might frustrate congressional
objectives by threatening the viability of the defendant discharger. Where Congress has
decided to specify a maximum level of emission control, however, it has barred explic-
itly the application of more stringent state standards. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1322(0(1)
(1982) (barring states from adopting controls on the use of marine sanitation devices on
vessels); 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (barring states from adopting or enforcing standards relat-
ing to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or motor vehicle engines); id.
§ 7545(c)(4) (prohibiting states from prescribing controls on the use of fuels or fuel
additives in motor vehicles or motor vehicle engines); id. § 7573 (prohibiting states
from adopting or enforcing emission standards for aircraft or aircraft engines unless
those standards are identical to federal standards). In light of these express prohibitions
on state formulation of emission controls in certain areas, the courts should be reluctant
to infer conflicts between the accomplishment of congressional objectives and the appli-
cation of state common-law standards not explicitly prohibited by the statutes.
380 See Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264, 271 (D. Vt. 1985)
(citing S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3668, 3678); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (purpose of Clean
Water Act is restoration and maintenance of the "integrity of the Nation's Waters.");
42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (purpose of Clean Air Act is protection of the quality of na-
tional air resources); id. § 7470 (purpose of preventing significant deterioration of
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The conclusion that state common-law compensatory remedies for
intrastate injuries do not conflict with the federal statutes is reinforced
by the courts' reluctance to preempt state tort liability. "The provision
of tort remedies to compensate for personal injuries 'is a subject matter
of the kind [the Supreme] Court has traditionally regarded as properly
within the scope of state superintendence.' "8" The courts will not find
federal preemption of such traditional state concerns absent a "'clear
and manifest'" demonstration of congressional intent to preempt.
38 2
The Supreme Court, for example, recently refused to find that state
common-law punitive damage awards for exposure to radioactive sub-
stances were preempted in the absence of "an irreconcilable conflict be-
tween the federal and state standards."3 8 The Court in Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp.3 4 was especially reluctant to find preemption of
state common-law damage remedies because no such federal remedies
existed for persons injured by exposure to radioactive materials.38 5 Fol-
Clean Air Act standards is protection of public from effects of pollution); Hazardous
and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, § 101(b), 98 Stat. 3221,
3224 (national policy is expeditious reduction of hazardous waste).
8I Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1542 (D.C. Cir.) (quoting
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 144 (1963)), cert. de-
nied, 105 S. Ct. 545 (1984); see also Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d
1314, 1325 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Ensuring the availability of compensation for injured
plaintiffs is predominantly a matter of state concern .... "); Ginn v. Consolidation
Coal Co., 107 I1. App. 3d 564, 566, 437 N.E.2d 793, 795 (1982) ("Tort liability is
traditionally a function of state common law . . ... ") (citing United Constr. Workers
v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 663-64 (1954)).
"2 Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1542 (D.C. Cir.) (quoting
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
545 (1984); see also Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264, 269 (D.
Vt. 1985) (refusing to find preemption without demonstration of congressional intent).
383 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615, 626 (1984). An award of
punitive damages can be viewed as regulatory rather than compensatory in nature. See
id. at 628-30 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Viewed in this light, the Silkwood decision
reflects the Court's reluctance to preempt state common-law regulatory as well as com-
pensatory relief in areas of traditional state concern.
84 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984).
385 See id. at 623 ("It is difficult to believe that Congress would, without com-
ment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct."); id.
at 629 n.7 ("It is inconceivable that Congress intended to leave victims with no remedy
at all . . . .The absence of federal regulation governing the compensation of victims of
nuclear accidents is strong evidence that Congress intended the matter to be left to the
State."); see also Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264, 269 (D. Vt.
1985) (holding that Congress did not intend to preempt state common-law compensa-
tory remedies for interstate water pollution when it enacted the Clean Water Act);
Chappell v. SCA Serv., Inc., 540 F. Supp. 1088, 1100 (C.D. Ill. 1982) (holding that
the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982), does not preempt
state common-law nuisance actions for damages, in part because such actions "may be
the only way plaintiffs can recover any damages which may have accrued to them"); cf
Comment, supra note 90, at 394-95 (In cases of interstate pollution, the case for the
preservation of common-law damage remedies is stronger than that for injunctive
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lowing the Court's decisions in Milwaukee II and National Sea Clam-
mers, no federal damage remedy appears to be available for injuries
caused by air or water pollution,"s and thus, it seems likely that the
Court would refuse to preempt state common law.
A consideration of the four values affected by Congress's choice of
private remedies lends more support for the position that Congress did
not intend to preempt state common-law remedies to redress intrastate
harms. Two of these values, individual liberty and efficiency, support
the preservation of state common-law remedies. In addition, the conclu-
sion that the Clean Air and Water Acts do not preempt these remedies
may promote legitimacy.
In one respect the preemption of state common-law remedies ap-
pears consistent with the Milwaukee II Court's desire to promote legit-
imacy. In Milwaukee II the Court deemed the invocation of federal
common-law remedies in the area of water pollution control "peculiarly
inappropriate" in light of the arcane and technically complex nature of
the subject matter.38 7 Presumably state judges have no greater scientific
and technological expertise in pollution control matters than federal
judges. Accordingly, confining the authority to formulate standards of
conduct to the expert administrative agency, the EPA, may promote the
legitimacy of the pollution control program. The judiciary's role would
be limited to determining whether the agency's standard is consistent
with the statute and whether, as a factual matter, a particular polluter
has violated the standards adopted by the agency. This argument is less
than compelling, however, since for centuries state and English com-
mon-law courts have resolved complex pollution controversies by adopt-
ing their own common-law standards in nuisance, trespass, and other
cases. Moreover, the Milwaukee II majority's denigration of the capac-
ity of the judiciary to resolve pollution control controversies is difficult
relief.).
386 Unless Congress amends the current statutes, no federal damage remedy is
available, except perhaps if the courts find that the federal statutes do not preempt a
particular area of federal common law-for example, injury caused by acid rain pollu-
tion-and that damage remedies are available to private plaintiffs in a federal common-
law cause of action. See supra notes 198, 269-74 and accompanying text.
Many courts, both state and federal, in opinions issued after the Milwaukee II
decision, have permitted private or governmental litigants in pollution cases to proceed
under state common-law tort theories, without explicitly addressing the preemption is-
sue. See, e.g., United States v. Hooker Chem. Plastics Corp., 607 F. Supp. 1052, 1055
n.3 (W.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Allied Chem. Corp., 587 F. Supp. 1205, 1208-
09 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 144, 154
(E.D. Pa. 1984); Carriker Ford, Inc. v. Clow Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1419,
1422 (S.D. Iowa 1984); Birchwood Lakes Colony Club, Inc. v. Borough of Medford
Lakes, 90 N.J. 582, 591-96, 449 A.2d 472, 477-79 (1982).
"'7 See 451 U.S. at 325.
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to take at face value in light of the Court's subsequent decision in
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo.38 8
Legitimacy may be promoted by confining the ability to adopt pol-
lution control standards to the legislative branch, which presumably
represents the views of the electorate, and the administrative agencies,
which are subject to legislative oversight. Professors Stewart and Sun-
stein contend, however, that "the link between electoral representation
and administrative decision is too weak" to support such a contention,
thereby "undermin[ing] the claim that judicial creation of additional
remedies would circumvent political controls on administration. Indeed,
such remedies may help promote agency fidelity to statutory pur-
poses."" 9 Moreover, the availability of state common-law remedies in-
creases public participation in the process of regulating pollution. This
ability to participate may heighten the perception that important social
and economic decisions are being made through open and democratic
processes.390
The extent to which the preservation of state common-law reme-
dies for intrastate harms promotes individual liberty is far less equivo-
cal. Supplemental state common-law remedies foster individual liberty
in at least three ways. First, the availability of judicial remedies to pro-
tect persons or property harmed by polluters acting in compliance with
388 456 U.S. 306 (1982). For a discussion of the Court's willingness to allow
judges to exercise their discretion in this area, see supra text accompanying notes 99-
100. The preemption of state common law, however, may promote legitimacy by pro-
viding greater certainty and consistency of obligations on the part of dischargers. See
Zerbe, Optimal Environmental Jurisdictions, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 193, 211 (1974). One
court, however, concluded that Congress did not intend that the issuance of a NPDES
permit under the Clean Water Act would
confer an absolute right to discharge to the extent allowed by the permit.
Since compliance with the Act does not constitute a defense to a common
law action for damages, Congress must have recognized that some uncer-
tainty would result to dischargers of pollutants. The goal of the [Clean
Water Act] is not finality; rather, it is the elimination of the discharge of
pollutants.
Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264, 271 (D. Vt. 1985) (citations
omitted).
3' Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 66, at 1200.
390 See id. Professor Michelman contends that the availability of supplemental
common-law remedies against polluters complying with a centralized regulatory system
of controls may serve at least three other functions. First, private suits might be justi-
fied by their ability to "backstop[ I or fill[ ] in" the regulatory system's deterrent pur-
poses. Michelman, supra note 41, at 676. Second, supplemental common-law remedies
may serve a "guidance function, bringing to our attention that the collective controls are
generally weaker than they 'ought' to be." Id. at 676-77. Third, common-law remedies
might "substitute for derelict officialdom in the enforcement of collective standards."
Id. at 678. These three functions appear to enhance the legitimacy of the statutory
program for controlling pollution.
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the federal statutes serves "an important separation-of-powers function
that is not automatically displaced by-the legislature's creation of ad-
ministrative agencies. '  Second, the retention of state authority to
adopt pollution standards more stringent than federal controls promotes
non-centralized decisionmaking and state self-governance concerning
important social and economic choices. 92 The Supreme Court reaf-
firmed in Milwaukee H that its preemption analysis "has included 'due
regard for . . . the principle of diffusion of power . . . as a promoter
of democracy.' "-"I' Third, preserving state common-law remedies en-
hances individuals' ability, with governmental assistance, to protect
against intrusions upon their health, safety, and property by other pri-
vate entities. Indeed, the preservation of these remedies may even be
mandated by the due process clause's guarantees against governmental
deprivation of liberty and property. 94
Finally, preserving supplemental state common-law remedies may
foster economic efficiency. A state court award of compensatory dam-
ages may promote efficiency by forcing the discharger to internalize the
costs it imposes on -others. 9 ' Those internalized costs will then be re-
flected in the prices of the discharger's products, sending consumers a
more accurate signal of the costs of the discharger's operations. Since
consumers will be confronted with the opportunity costs of devoting so-
ciety's resources to the production of the discharger's products, they will
be able to make purchasing decisions that accurately reflect their value
preferences. The resulting forces of supply and demand will maximize
the value of production, as measured by consumers' willingness to pay
for the various products at their disposal. 9 '
IB" Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 66, at 1199. "In an administrative era, courts
should generally assume, unless the legislature provides otherwise, that they may con-
tinue to serve that function by protecting private interests through the creation of reme-
dies for deficient agency performance." Id. at 1119-20.
"I See Sunstein, supra note 66, at 422 (arguing that federal statutes should not
lightly be interpreted to extinguish state common-law remedies because of their impor-
tance to a state's ability to protect its own citizens from injury).
393 451 U.S. at 316 (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359
U.S. 236, 243 (1959)).
I" See supra notes 329-48 and accompanying text. Some writers have contended
that the common-law system creates rules of entitlement to the protection of bodily
integrity and private property. See, e.g., Furrow, supra note 109, at 1429; Stewart &
Sunstein, supra note 66, at 1233.
895 See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 66, at 1297. See generally Note, The Cost-
Internalization Case for Class Actions, 21 STAN. L. REV. 383 (1969). An award of
injunctive relief, on the other hand, may lead to an inefficient result if the costs of
complying with the injunction exceed the benefits of such compliance. See Michelman,
supra note 41, at 667-68 (In a particular case, the polluter may not be the cheapest
cost avoider.).
I" See Michelman, supra note 41, at 676 (A mixed regulatory and common-law
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The preservation of state common-law remedies raises the possibil-
ity of a conflict between federal and state interests. The fourth value,
accommodation, may be served by preempting state law and insuring
the application of uniform federal standards. 97 The instances in which
federal-state conflicts will develop, however, will be rare.398 For the
most part, Congress has decided not to insist on federal uniformity of
pollution control, but rather to permit the states to adopt their own,
more stringent standards."' 9
D. Preemption for Interstate Purposes
The preemption issue is more difficult to resolve where the pol-
luter and the person injured by its discharges are located in two differ-
ent states. A court would be justified in finding that common-law reme-
dies have been preempted if Congress has occupied the field of
interstate pollution control 00 or if the application of state remedies
would conflict with the achievement of federal objectives. The factor
that distinguishes the application of state common-law remedies in an
interstate dispute from its use in an intrastate suit is the attempt by one
state to apply its law to a polluter located in another state. This at-
tempt may impair the legitimacy of pollution control efforts by creating
the possibility of discriminatory applications of the forum state's law to
out-of-state polluters. It may also undercut individual liberty by in-
fringing upon the sovereignty of the state where the polluter is located,
and it may provoke interstate disputes and, therefore, be inconsistent
with the accommodation value. This section explores whether any of
these difficulties justify the conclusion that Congress intended to pre-
empt the application of state common-law remedies to interstate pollu-
tion disputes.
system for controlling pollution, even though it may impose "double-payments" on
some polluters, "might lead to less misallocation than entirely foregoing the nuisance
judgment's capacity to bring special local costs to bear on [the] cheapest avoiders.").
397 Cf Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 333 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("In decid-
ing whether federal law pre-empts state law, the Court must be sensitive to the poten-
tial frustration of national purposes if the States are permitted to control conduct that is
the subject of federal regulation.").
SS8 See supra note 379.
1'9 See supra notes 370-73 and accompanying text.
400 For a discussion of the various means by which the federal and state govern-
ments attempt to deal with interstate environmental problems, see generally Lutz, In-
terstate Environmental Law: Federalism Bordering on Neglect?, 13 S.W.U.L. REv.
571 (1983).
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1. The Nature of the Dispute
In analyzing the preemption issue, a hypothetical example of an
interstate pollution dispute will be employed to explore whether apply-
ing state common-law remedies in the interstate context is consistent
with the values of legitimacy, individual liberty, and accommodation.4°'
Suppose that company A, located in state A, discharges effluents into a
river, which carries the effluents into state B. The company's dis-
charges are in full compliance not only with federally issued effluent
limitations under the Clean Water Act, but also with state A's pollution
control standards. A citizen in state B brings suit against the company
in state B, alleging that the company's discharges create a nuisance and
impose substantial harm on the state B citizen. After comparing the
utility of the defendant's conduct with the gravity of the harm to the
plaintiff,0 2 the state B court rules in favor of the plaintiff and requires
the company to reduce its discharges to the extent necessary to avoid
further harm. Assuming that compliance with the court decree will re-
quire the company either to spend more to install additional pollution
control equipment or to reduce the scope of its operations, the com-
pany's profitability will be reduced.40 3
2. Discovery of Congressional Intent
a. Explicit Preemption
The plaintiff in the preceding hypothetical lawsuit will be barred
from resorting to state B's common-law remedies only if Congress in-
tended to preempt these remedies when it enacted the federal water
pollution control legislation.' 0 ' That intent can be manifested expressly
401 The economic efficiency of applying state common-law remedies should be the
same whether the dispute is intrastate or interstate. Thus, the application of state com-
mon-law remedies in the interstate context arguably promotes economic efficiency. See
supra notes 395-96 and accompanying text.
02 Courts in nuisance cases often engage in such a balancing of factors to deter-
mine whether an actionable nuisance exists. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 826 (1979).
408 For a comparable fact situation, see State v. Champion Int'l Corp., 22 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1338 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985); see also Ouellette v. International Pa-
per Co., 602 F. Supp. 264 (D. Vt. 1985) (Under the Clean Water Act savings clause
and state authority provisions, Vermont landowners could sue a New York polluter for
damages under the common law of Vermont, the state where the pollution-caused in-
jury occurred.).
404 The court in Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264 (D. Vt.
1985), stated that Milwaukee I and II "stand for the proposition that attempts by one
state to halt discharge into interstate waters emanating from another state implicate
uniquely federal concerns." Id. at 268. According to the court, the issue, therefore, is
not whether federal legislation has preempted state law, since federal law has always
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or implicitly in the design of the statutory program or in its legislative
history. Congress did not preempt state common-law remedies for in-
terstate harms by expressly occupying the field of interstate pollution
through the enactment of the Clean Air and Water Acts. The savings
clauses of the citizen suit provisions of these two Acts deny any intent
to restrict a person's right to seek relief "under any . . . common
law."405 These clauses draw no distinction between interstate and in-
trastate disputes in describing the right to seek common-law relief. Sim-
ilarly, the federal statutes do not distinguish in-state sources from out-
of-state sources in the provisions permitting states to adopt or enforce
pollution control standards more stringent than the federal
requirements. 0 8
governed interstate water pollution disputes; "[riather, the controlling question is the
extent to which Congress authorized, either expressly or implicitly, resort to state com-
mon law in a situation such as this." Id.
Whether the issue is framed in terms of congressional preemption or authoriza-
tion, the analysis will involve an inquiry into legislative intent, as reflected in the statu-
tory language and legislative history. A court may be more reluctant to conclude that
state law applies under a congressional authorization analysis than under a preemption
analysis, since under the former analysis, the traditional "presumption" against displac-
ing state law may not apply. See supra notes 349-52 and accompanying text. The court
in Ouellette had little difficulty concluding, however, that Congress intended to author-
ize the use of the common law of the state in which injury occurs in an interstate
pollution dispute. See 602 F. Supp. at 266-72.
405 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (Clean Air
Act); see also Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264, 270 (D. Vt.
1985) ("It . . . seems inescapable that Congress, by passage of the [Clean Water Act's]
saving clause [33 U.S.C. § 1365(e)] and state authority provisions [id. § 1370(2)], in-
tended to preserve" state common-law actions for interstate pollution in the state where
injury occurs); State v. Champion Int'l Corp., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1338, 1342
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1985) ("Section 1365(e) [of the Clean Water Act] is dear" and pre-
serves state common-law remedies in interstate disputes). But see Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 979 (1985), in
which the court interpreted section 505(e) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(e), to exclude the preservation of state common-law remedies for interstate
harms: "[I]t seems implausible that Congress meant to preserve or confer any right of
the state claiming injury (State II) or its citizens to seek enforcement of limitations on
discharges in State I by applying the statutes or common law of State II." Id. at 414
(emphasis added).
4 See 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (Clean Air Act).
But see Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403, 413 (7th Cir. 1984) (interpreting
section 510 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1370, to refer "to the right of a state
with respect to discharges within that state, and not to any right of a state to impose
more stringent limitations upon discharges in another state"), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
979 (1985). The two courts that have disagreed with the Seventh Circuit's decision
relied on section 510(2) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1370(2), to reach the
contrary result. This subsection states that nothing in the Act shall "be construed as
impairing or in any manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States with respect
to the waters (including boundary waters) of such States." See Ouellette v. Interna-
tional Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264, 267-70 (D. Vt. 1985); State v. Champion Int'l
Corp., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1338, 1342 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).
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The application of state B's common-law remedies to a state A
polluter would not actually conflict with federal law in the sense that it
would be physically impossible to comply with both sets of standards.
By complying with the most stringent requirement-either federal or
state-company A also complies with the more lenient controls.40
7
b. Implicit Preemption
If Congress wished to preempt state common-law remedies for in-
terstate harms, it could do so implicitly. Implicit occupation of the field
of interstate pollution control could be based on the creation of a perva-
sive scheme of federal regulation, the need for federal uniformity, or the
need to insure the achievement of dominant federal interests or objec-
tives. 08 Similarly, an implicit conflict between state and federal law
would arise if the application of state common-law remedies to out-of-
state sources presented an obstacle to the accomplishment of federal
objectives. 09
(i) Pervasive Federal Regulation
Consider again a source located in one state, such as company A in
our hypothetical example, whose emissions cause injury in another
state, state B. The federal statutes do not regulate company A so perva-
sively that the application of supplemental state B common law has
been implicitly precluded. 1 ' The Clean Water Act provides no more
extensive federal control mechanisms in the interstate discharge context
than it does with respect to discharges whose effects are confined to one
state. Indeed, the Act has been criticized on the ground that its inter-
state discharge control mechanisms are virtually nonexistent,"1" at least
"I See supra notes 377-78 and accompanying text. If state B's courts assess dam-
ages against company A, even though the company is in full compliance with federal
standards, the company can comply with both federal and state B's laws by limiting
discharges in accordance with the federal standards and compensating, in accordance
with the state B court decree, those injured by the discharges. See Ouellette v. Interna-
tional Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264, 271 (D. Vt. 1985).
408 See supra notes 354-56 and accompanying text.
409 See supra text accompanying notes 358-60.
410 The federal air and water pollution control statutes expressly permit the appli-
cation of more stringent state standards to dischargers, reflecting Congress's desire to
implement a federal-state partnership in the control of pollution. See supra notes 372-
75 and accompanying text. The authority to impose more stringent state controls is not
expressly limited to dischargers that are located in the state imposing the controls. See
Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264, 269 (D. Vt. 1985); see also
supra text accompanying notes 405-06 (noting that the language of the Clean Air and
Water Acts concerning more stringent state standards draws no distinction between in-
state and out-of-state polluters).
411 For a comprehensive explanation of the gaps and shortcomings of the Clean
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where a state with controls more stringent than the minimum federal
requirements tries to enforce those controls against an out-of-state
source.412 While the Clean Air Act does have several techniques for
handling interstate pollution problems,"1" these cumbersome mecha-
nisms hardly provide a "pervasive" and comprehensive means of resolv-
ing these problems,"1" especially in the area of long-range transport and
acid deposition.415 The EPA has taken the position that the Act's pro-
cedures for resolving interstate pollution disputes do not even apply to
sulfates, a principal form of acid precipitation, because no national am-
Water Act in the interstate context, see generally Comment, supra note 90 (contending
that because the Act focuses on the behavior of dischargers rather than the cleanup of a
water body itself, nuisances that endanger the health and welfare of citizens may occur
even when dischargers comply with federal regulatory requirements; a state is free to
adopt more stringent state emissions controls, but the Act provides no forum for enforc-
ing those controls against a source located in another state). See also Stewart, Interstate
Resource Conflicts: The Role of Federal Courts, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 241, 260-
61 (1982) (The Clean Water Act is unlikely to meet the receiving state's concerns
because minimum nationally uniform levels of pollution control do not ensure adequate
water quality in the receiving state. "Moreover, the Environmental Protection Agency,
like other federal agencies, is reluctant to take on heated interstate controversies.")
(footnote omitted).
12 Although the plain language of the statute appears to authorize the receiving
state to impose more stringent controls on out-of-state dischargers, at least one court
has concluded that the receiving state may not do so. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,
731 F.2d 403, 410-11, 413 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[E]quitable reconcilidtion of competing
uses of an interstate body of water" precluded Illinois from imposing its more stringent
discharge limitations on out-of-state sources.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 979 (1985). But
see Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264, 272 (D. Vt. 1985) (The
passage of the 1972 amendments to the Clean Water Act indicates Congress's view that
pollution is no longer a legitimate competing use of water resources.); State v. Cham-
pion Int'l Corp., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1338, 1342 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985) (The
savings clause of the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e), by
preserving "any right . . . under any statute or common law," invites states to adopt
more stringent water quality standards than those set by the federal government.).
1 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(E), 7426.
414 To date no state has successfully invoked the section 126 petition procedure to
abate pollution generated in another state. But cf New York v. Thomas, 613 F. Supp.
1472 (D.D.C. 1985) (compelling the EPA to require several midwestern states to revise
their state implementation plans (SIP's) pursuant to section 115 of the Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. § 7415, to eliminate danger to Canadian health or welfare caused by acid
deposition originating from midwestern emission sources).
411 See, e.g., F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A. TARLOCK, supra note 60, at
310 (The problem of interstate pollution "severely . . . tests" the Clean Air Act, yet
that problem is "minor compared with the problem of controlling acid precipitation and
deposition."); see also Ostrov, Interboundary Stationary Source Pollution-Clean Air
Act Section 126 and Beyond, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL L. 37, 80-93 (1982) (arguing that
the Clean Air Act does not deal adequately with transboundary pollution, and sug-
gesting a two-pronged approach to the problem with stronger administrative control
and tougher legislative standards); Comment, Jefferson County's Lament: Clean Air
Act Offers No Relieffor Interstate Pollution, 14 ENvTL. L. REP. 10,298 (1984) (The
EPA, using only air quality modeling of dubious accuracy and ignoring interstate ineq-
uities, refused to tighten the sulfur dioxide control requirement on an Indiana power
plant polluting the air of a Kentucky county.); Note, supra note 198, at 158-78.
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bient air quality standard has been enacted for that pollutant. 4 6 A
finding of implicit federal preemption of state common-law remedies,
therefore, must be based on something other than the pervasive nature
of the federal statutory programs for controlling interstate pollution.
(ii) The Need for Uniformity and the Protection of Dominant Federal
Interests
Implicit occupation of the field of interstate pollution could be
based on a congressional determination that a uniform set of pollution
controls, enacted at the federal level, is necessary in the interstate pollu-
tion context. On remand from the Supreme Court's decision in Mil-
waukee II, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held in Illi-
nois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee 111)'17 that Illinois could not
seek injunctive relief against out-of-state dischargers under Illinois state
common law. The court characterized the pollution of interstate waters
as "a problem of uniquely federal dimensions requiring the application
of uniform federal standards.
'418
The fact that interstate pollution disputes "implicate uniquely fed-
eral concerns," however, does not necessarily reflect a congressional de-
termination that a uniform level of environmental quality, in and of
itself, is necessary. 4 9 Both the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act
expressly authorize the states to develop and apply their own emission
limitations, provided those limitations are at least as stringent as the
federal controls.42" The only uniformity required by the statutes is ad-
herence to the minimum federal standards found necessary by Congress
and the EPA to protect health and the environment. 421 Nor do the stat-
utes mandate that all fifty states strike a uniform balance between the
goal of environmental protection and the desire to avoid unduly stifling
economic growth and productivity. Because the states can apply more
stringent emission limitations, at least on sources located within their
own boundaries, they can impose greater economic burdens on selected
industries, many of which will be engaged in interstate commerce, than
416 See supra text accompanying note 271.
417 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 979 (1985).
418 Id. at 410; see also Committee for the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539
F.2d 1006, 1014 (4th Cir. 1976) (Butzner, J., dissenting) (Shuffling between federal
and state courts "would provoke diversity, rather than achieve uniformity, in the law
governing the abatement of nuisances in the navigable waters of the United States.");
cf Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 492 n.12 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[A]s
to environmental regulation of deep ocean waters, the federal interest in uniformity is
paramount."), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2686 (1985).
41 See Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264, 268 (D. Vt. 1985).
420 See supra notes 370-71, 375-76 and accompanying text.
421 See Bleiweiss, supra note 274, at 61.
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the federal standards alone impose.4 2
A factor unique to the interstate pollution dispute, however, could
form the basis for a legislative determination that the states should be
precluded from resorting to standards that differ from those promul-
gated by the EPA under the Clean Air and Water Acts in resolving an
interstate pollution dispute. Invoking state common-law remedies to re-
solve an interstate pollution dispute may involve a state's application of
its own laws to residents of another state. This extraterritorial applica-
tion of the forum state's common law might be viewed as a threat to the
values of legitimacy, individual liberty, and accommodation, which this
Article has described as either congressional objectives underlying the
federal pollution control statutes or values derived from the
Constitution.
The potential problems created by the use of state common law to
resolve an interstate pollution dispute are illustrated by the water pol-
lution example set forth above. If the injured state B plaintiffs bring
suit in a state B court, and seek to invoke state B common law, there is
a danger that the state B court will discriminate, or at least be per-
ceived by the state A defendant as discriminating, against the out-of-
state defendant. The court in state B may be more concerned with pro-
tecting the health and property of state B residents than with safe-
guarding the vitality of state A's industries. State B residents, moreover,
may not be directly affected by the reduced profitability of a state A
company. The state B court, therefore, may be more inclined to rule in
favor of the plaintiffs and impose harsh remedies on the defendant than
it would be if the polluter were also a state B resident. Since nuisance
cases are fact-specific and involve a rather amorphous balancing of the
interests of the plaintiff, the defendant, and society as a whole,423 it
would be difficult to prove that the court is affording less favorable
treatment to out-of-state polluters than it is to state B companies that
injure state B residents, even if it were in fact true. Nevertheless, the
mere perception of discriminatory application of state B's laws may de-
tract from the legitimacy of a system that permits state B plaintiffs to
invoke common-law remedies to control the harms generated by com-
pany A's activities.424
422 Cf Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1542 (D.C. Cir.) (p ermit-
ting state compensatory actions because Congress intended to allow states to strike the
balance between the costs and benefits of pollution regulation differently than Congress
did), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 545 (1984).
423 See supra note 402 and accompanying text.
424 See Bleiweiss, supra note 274, at 45 n.36, 60; Stafford, supra note 260, at
10,104. An analogous problem could result if the injured state B plaintiffs sued in a
state A court, invoking state A's common law. The state A court may treat, or be
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The possibility of discrimination, and the decline in certainty gen-
erated by the supplementation of federal statutory standards with state
common-law remedies,425 arguably support the preemption of state
law. Although preemption of common-law remedies eliminates one fo-
rum for public participation, 4 6 this threat to legitimacy may be out-
weighed by the impairment to legitimacy caused by a system perceived
as unfair. Regardless of the merits of this argument as a matter of pol-
icy, however, preemption remains a matter of congressional intent. The
Court of Appeals in Milwaukee III, which held that the enactment of
the Clean Water Act has preempted state common-law remedies in an
interstate pollution dispute, pointed to no evidence in the legislative his-
tory that Congress considered, much less found persuasive, the possibil-
ity of discrimination against out-of-state parties.427
The argument that Congress implicitly intended to preempt state
common-law remedies would be strengthened if the failure to preempt
would threaten not only legitimacy, but also individual liberty and ac-
commodation.428 One of the components of the value of individual lib-
erty described in this Article is the protection of each state's sover-
eignty. Intruding upon the integrity of a state's sovereignty may
threaten the ability of the individual to participate in the development
of local social, economic, and other policy choices.429 The court in Mil-
waukee III concluded that the attempt by Illinois-which allegedly suf-
fered injury from pollution generated in Wisconsin-to impose its com-
mon law on a Wisconsin polluter would impermissibly infringe upon
perceived as treating, the state B plaintiffs less favorably than it would state A residents
who bring a nuisance action against a state A polluter.
42 See supra note 388; see also Milwaukee III, 731 F.2d at 414 (If state common-
law remedies were available in interstate pollution disputes, "[ilt would be virtually
impossible to predict the standard for a lawful discharge into an interstate body of
water. Any permit issued under the [Clean Water] Act would be rendered meaning-
less."). But see Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264, 271 (D. Vt.
1985) (Congress subordinated finality to the goal of eliminating the discharge of
pollutants).
428 See supra note 390 and accompanying text.
427 See Milwaukee III, 731 F.2d at 414 ("In our opinion Congress could not have
intended" to permit the supplementation of federal standards with state common-law
remedies.); ef. Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264, 269 (D. Vt.
1985) ("[Tlhere is simply nothing in the [Clean Water] Act which suggests that Con-
gress intended to impose . . . limitations on the use of state law" in interstate pollution
disputes).
428 If the preservation of state common-law remedies would impair all three of
these values, some of which have constitutional implications, with no or few counter-
vailing advantages, it would be reasonable to conclude that Congress could not have
intended to preserve state common-law remedies, even if the legislative history of the
federal statute is totally uninformative.
429 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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the latter state's sovereignty.4' 0 The court concluded that the contro-
versy was one "of federal dimensions, implicating the conflicting rights
of states and inappropriate for state law resolution."' The court,
therefore, ruled that Congress must have intended to preempt state
common law in interstate pollution controversies to prevent an affront
to the interests of the state of the pollution's origin,'43 2 even though the
Act is silent on the 'issue.
The circuit court's analysis is valid, as far as it goes.43 Returning
to the hypothetical interstate water pollution controversy, the fact that
state B's (judicially imposed) pollution control standards are more
stringent than those of state A reflects a different balancing of economic
and social policy considerations on the parts of the two state govern-
ments.43 4 The imposition of state B's standards on a company located in
state A would disrupt the balance struck by state A. By imposing its
own policy determinations on state A with respect to the appropriate
use of the common resource, the interstate river, state B appears to be
infringing upon state A's ability to make policy determinations free
from the interference of other states.'3 5 The preemption of state com-
mon-law remedies would avoid such an intrusion upon the sovereignty
of state A. Accordingly, federal occupation of the field of interstate pol-
410 See 731 F.2d at 414. The court stated that Congress intended to preclude the
application of Illinois common law to out-of-state dischargers because the competition
for the use of an interstate body of water is a matter of "special federal concern and the
subject of federal law." Id. at 410; cf. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 105 ("The question of
apportionment of interstate waters is a question of 'federal common law' upon which
state statutes or decisions are not conclusive."). But c. Ouellette v. International Paper
Co., 602 F. Supp. 264, 271 (D. Vt. 1985) (When the interstate pollution dispute is
between private parties, "[tlhere is little or no possibility that [the] litigation will esca-
late into a conflict between different state entities.") (footnote omitted).
431 Milwaukee III, 731 F.2d at 414; see also City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liq-
uid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008, 1018 n.30 (7th Cir. 1979) ("[T]he laws of one state
cannot control the use of the [interstate] river by citizens of other states."), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1025 (1980).
"' See Milwaukee III, 731 F.2d at 414.
3 A federal district court in Vermont labeled the Milwaukee III decision "an
admirable attempt to deal with the difficult issues concerning the role of state law in
controlling the pollution of interstate waters." Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 602
F. Supp. 264, 268 (D. Vt. 1985). The court in Ouellette nevertheless found that its
analysis of the statute and legislative history "inevitably" led to a conclusion contrary to
that of the Seventh Circuit in Milwaukee III. See id. at 272.
4" State A's policymakers may not have considered the harm to state B's residents
caused by the company's discharges in determining the appropriate level of effluent
limitations, since that harm represents costs not imposed upon, and external to, state
A's residents. Conversely, the court in state B may be more concerned with protecting
against the risk of harm to the health of state B residents than it is with the economic
burdens that stringent pollution control requirements will impose on state A's
industries.
435 See Note, supra note 192, at 526-27.
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lution could be justified as a means of protecting basic interests of
federalism.
The analysis in Milwaukee III, however, is incomplete. The result
in that case protects the sovereign interests of the state from which the
pollution emanates, state A, while at the same time infringing upon the
sovereignty of the state of the injured party, state B. In such a case, the
benefit to individual liberty provided by protecting the sovereignty of
the state of the pollution's origin is cancelled by the infringement on
state B's sovereignty.4 8 Indeed, the preemption of state B's more strin-
gent common-law standards may result in a net loss of individual lib-
erty in light of the Supreme Court's recognition of the fundamental
importance to a state's sovereignty of its ability to protect its environ-
ment from externally imposed harm.437
The Supreme Court began the development of a federal environ-
mental common law early in the twentieth century when it recognized
a state's right to insist that its environment not be polluted "by the act
of persons beyond its control."4 " The Court was aware that the impo-
sition by the receiving state of its own stringent emission controls on a
source located outside the state could have adverse economic conse-
quences.4 9 Nevertheless, the Court stated that "[tihe possible disaster
to those outside the State must be accepted as a consequence of [the
receiving state's] standing upon her extreme rights."44 The Court also
indicated that a federal forum must be made available to the receiving
state so that it could enforce its rights without resorting to force.441 If,
therefore, the preemption of state common-law remedies leaves the in-
jured state, state B, with no alternative means of adequately protecting
itself against the improper impairment of its environment by an out-of-
state polluter, the preemption constitutes a serious and impermissible
438 Cf. Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264, 268 (D. Vt. 1985)
(viewing interstate water pollution disputes as "a problem of equitable apportionment"
involving "the competing and conflicting interests of states and their citizens for limited
quantities of interstate water").
487 See supra notes 148-61 and accompanying text.
438 Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238 (1907).
48 The Court addressed the possibility that Georgia, the state seeking to enjoin
extraterritorial emissions, might adversely affect its own citizens by a refusal to com-
promise with Tennessee, the state in which the emissions originated. See id. at 239.
The Court was obviously also aware of the impact of an injunctive decree on the emis-
sions source and the state in which it was located. See id. at 238 (discussing the "ca-
lamity of a possible stop to the defendants' business" and the "commercial possibility or
impossibility" of reducing the copper company's sulfur dioxide emissions).
440 Id. at 239; see also Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 240 (10th Cir. 1971)
(discussing the states' "quasi-sovereign ecological rights").
44 See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237; see also Missouri v.
Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901) (The federal government has a duty to provide a
remedy for the receiving state.).
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infringement upon state B's sovereignty.
State B has several potential alternative means for protecting itself.
A federal regulatory forum for protecting state B's waters from impair-
ment by company A's discharges is one possibility. State B could par-
ticipate in company A's permit proceedings in an attempt to persuade
the EPA to impose effluent limitations sufficiently stringent to protect
the health of state B's residents and its environment.442 State B has a
right to participate in the permit proceeding even if the permit-issuing
authority is state A, rather than the EPA.44 The Court in Milwau-
kee H characterized these opportunities as "ample" ones to protect the
receiving state's interests.444
Some have argued, however, that the Clean Water Act fails to
protect state B from outside emissions when it desires to exclude dis-
charges at levels that are more stringent than those contained in the
minimum federal requirements.44' The Act may fail to provide this
protection even though company A's discharge of emissions (which is in
compliance with federal requirements) causes injury to persons or re-
sources in state B.44' The Clean Air Act's protections against outside
emissions (including acid rain transported from stationary sources sev-
eral states away) appear even less adequate, in part because the Act
does not currently cover sulfate or nitrate deposition.4 The permit is-
suance process, therefore, fails to protect state B's "quasi-sovereign eco-
logical rights. 448
Alternatively, state B, or injured state B residents, can seek relief
through the courts. State B can initiate a citizen suit against company A
in federal district court. It is not dear, however, whether the citizen
suit provisions encompass the enforcement against out-of-state sources
of effluent limitations that are more stringent than those provided by
federal requirements.449 If state B is unable to use the citizen suit pro-
visions to protect its citizens and resources, an injured state B resident
might seek compensation for harms caused by the company's dis-
charges. But no right to damages exists under the federal statutes, and
442 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(3), (b)(5).
443 See id. § 1342(b)(5).
444 See 451 U.S. at 326.
"' See supra notes 410-12 and accompanying text. But see 33 U.S.C.
§ 1341(a)(2) (provision for hearing in which the receiving state can present objections
to the issuance of a permit allowing out-of-state discharges that violate the water qual-
ity requirements of the receiving state).
446 See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 411, at 260-61; Comment, supra note 90, at
334-64.
447 See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
448 Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 240 (10th Cir. 1971).
449 See supra note 412.
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a damage remedy would also be unavailable under federal common
law. Accordingly, the injured individual must resort to state common-
law remedies. Assuming that the decision in Milwaukee III is followed,
the only common law available is that of state A.45 If the injured state
B resident brings suit in state A's courts, she will be faced with a po-
tentially hostile forum. The plaintiff can also seek relief in state B's
courts by requesting the application of state A's common law, but if
that law is not as stringent as state B's law it will not provide the same
degree of protection to the plaintiff. By forcing the injured state B
plaintiff to sue in a hostile state forum or to resort to state A's laws, the
Milwaukee III decision creates the same threats to legitimacy and in-
trusions upon state sovereignty that the decision was meant to avoid. 51
Finally, state B can create a statutory or administrative compensa-
tion scheme, funded by state B's tax revenues, to insure that its resi-
dents are compensated for harms originating outside the state. Forcing
state B's residents to pay for harms caused by companies in state A,
however, affronts state B's sovereignty-and its decision to protect its
residents' health and property by adopting pollution controls more
stringent than the minimum federal standards-as much as the appli-
cation of state B's law to a source in state A impinges upon state A's
sovereignty.
In short, the preemption of state common-law remedies in the in-
terstate context may leave state B without an adequate means of pro-
tecting its resources from external harm. The decision in Milwau-
kee III, then, poses at least as great a threat to state sovereignty and
individual liberty as it was designed to avoid. The preemption of state
450 The common law of state A has not been preempted with respect to discharges
originating in state A. See supra notes 363-86 and accompanying text; see also Mil-
waukee III, 731 F.2d at 414 (Section 505(e) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.c.
§ 1365(e), "may well preserve a right under statutes or the common law of the state
within which a discharge occurs . . ., and we see no reason why such a right could not
be asserted by an out-of-state plaintiff injured as a result of the violation.").
451 See supra notes 434-35 and accompanying text. The infringement on state B's
sovereignty caused by forcing state B and its residents to seek redress for environmental
harms in a nonneutral forum could be lessened if the choice of law rules of state A
pointed to state B as the source of the applicable substantive law. Cf infra note 452.
However, the court in Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264 (D. Vt.
1985), criticized the decision in Milwaukee III for creating "a choice-of-law rule that
deviates, without legislative authorization, from well-settled choice of law principles."
Id. at 270. According to the court in Ouellette, the Milwaukee III analysis would re-
quire a federal court to resolve an interstate pollution dispute by resort to the law of
the state from which the pollution emanates, regardless of the forum state's choice-of-
law principles. See id. "Yet the [Clean Water Act] provides no support for this devia-
tion from the rule that, in a diversity case, a federal court must apply choice of law
principles of the state in which the court sits." Id. (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec.
Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941)).
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common law may in fact be more intrusive on state sovereignty.452 The
Supreme Court has expressly recognized the "quasi-sovereign" right of
a state to protect its resources from external impairment. 3 In Milwau-
kee I, the Court concluded that "a state with high water-quality stan-
411 If a plaintiff injured in state B, the receiving state, sued the polluter, company
A, in a state B court, any infringement on the sovereignty of state A could be mitigated
by several factors. The suit could not proceed against company A unless the court could
exercise personal jurisdiction over that defendant consistent with the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Company A might also be able to remove the case to
federal court on diversity of citizenship grounds. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441 (1982).
Removal might at least provide the defendant with a more neutral forum. Finally, the
court, whether state or federal, would have to apply choice of law rules from the forum
state, state B, to determine the source of the applicable substantive law. See Klaxon Co.
v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). It is conceivable that those rules would
point to the substantive law of state A. Cf. Chance v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co.,
371 F. Supp. 439, 444, 446 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (recognizing that, in a personal injury
action, the law of the state where the accident occurred will not always be controlling
and that the interest of the state in which the defendant is located should sometimes be
considered when determining which state has the greatest concern with the specific
issue raised in the litigation); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 6(2)(c) (1971) (Absent a statutory directive from the forum state, the policies of other
interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of particu-
lar issues should assist the forum state in resolving choice of law questions.).
Moreover, even if a state B court applies state B law to resolve the dispute, the
impact on state A's sovereign interests could be further reduced by limiting the state B
plaintiff to damages for past injury and by refusing to issue injunctive relief directly
requiring the polluter to limit its emissions to levels below those permitted by federal
and state A law. See Weinstein, The Reemergence of Nuisance Law in Environmental
Litigation, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Mar. 1984, at 3, 6. But see Ouellette v.
International Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264 (D. Vt. 1985) (citing Watson v. Employers
Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); Bowles v. Zimmer Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d
868, 872-77 (7th Cir. 1960)). The district court in Ouellette found that if a state court
issued an injunction abating pollution by a private polluter of another state,
any intrusion on the sovereignty of the polluter state is purely incidental.
A state's nuisance law develops not to regulate the activity of neighboring
states but to protect the health, welfare, and property rights of its own
residents. The application of state law in this situation is no more intru-
sive on the sovereignty of foreign states than the application of one state's
product liability law to a manufacturer located in another state.
602 F. Supp. at 271-72. By limiting the available relief to damage awards, the courts
could also avoid potential difficulties under the full faith and credit clause. U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the ...judicial
Proceedings of every other State."). It is not clear whether this clause would require
state A to enforce an equitable decree issued by a state B court. See Comment, supra
note 90, at 397 n.474.
413 See Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 104 (citing Georgia v. Tennessee Copper, 206
U.S. 230, 237 (1907)); see also supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text (Protecting
a sovereign state's self-determination and citizen participation in government promotes
the value of individual liberty.); Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 99-100, 107 n.9 (Where one
state changes its method of draining surface water, thereby increasing the flow of an
interstate stream to the detriment of farms in another state, that second state, having a
quasi-sovereign interest in the welfare of its farmowners, may bring an action for in-
junctive relief against the state causing injury) (citing Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236,
241-42 (10th Cir. 1971); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 374 (1923)).
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dards may well ask that its strict standards be honored and that it not
be compelled to lower itself to the more degrading standards of a neigh-
bor."24 54 A decision barring state B from applying its common law to a
state A polluter prevents the former from insisting that its strict stan-
dards be honored by polluters in state A.
Even if the threat to state B's sovereignty resulting from the deci-
sion in Milwaukee III is no greater than the infringement on state A's
sovereignty caused by the application of state B's common law, the
other components of the value of individual liberty justify the preserva-
tion of state common-law remedies. Applying state common law to an
interstate dispute furthers the principle of separation of powers4 55 and
protects the integrity of the individual from external harms456 to the
same extent as it does in an intrastate dispute. Accordingly, the preser-
vation of state B's common-law remedies will promote individual lib-
erty to a greater degree than the preemption of those remedies.
The final value, that of accommodation, supports the preemption
of state common-law remedies in an interstate dispute. The court in
Milwaukee III concluded that the preemption of state common-law
remedies was dictated by the need to accommodate conflicting federal
and state interests through the application of a uniform set of federal
standards.457 Congress, however, did not insist upon uniformity for its
own sake; it expressly authorized the states to adopt standards more
stringent than the minimum federal standards. It is the potential for
conflict among states with differing plans for resource exploitation that
supports the application of uniform federal rules.458 Thus, the Milwau-
kee III decision is most convincing in its determination to avoid a "cha-
otic confrontation between sovereign states" 459 by insuring that an in-
terstate discharger cannot be forced to comply with the emission
4'4 406 U.S. at 107; cf. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907) ("Each State
stands on the same level with all the rest. It can impose its own legislation on no one of
the others, and is bound to yield its own to none.").
455 See supra note 391 and accompanying text.
456 See supra note 394 and accompanying text.
411 See 731 F.2d at 410, 414.
45 See id. at 410 ("When this competition for the use of an interstate body of
water involves the interests of different states, apportionment among users is a matter
of special federal concern and the subject of federal law.") (citations omitted).
459 Id. at 414; see also Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 107 n.9 (As the states' concerns
over external impairment of their resources grow, "'conflicting disputes'" and "'pro-
liferating contentions'" appear inevitable. Only federal law can provide an adequate
means for dealing with these conflicting claims.) (quoting Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d
236, 241-42 (10th Cir. 1971)); Milwaukee I1, 731 F.2d at 410 ("This is a controversy
of federal dimensions, implicating the conflicting rights of states and inappropriate for
state law resolution."); cf Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice, supra note 67, at 1229 n.129
(Only "significant spillovers" that "might provoke confrontation between sovereign
states" justify federal intervention.).
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standards of more than one state.4 0 Even this rationale is unsatisfying,
however, because the accommodation of conflicting state interests is
achieved by totally sacrificing the interests of the injured state to those
of the polluter state. As a federal district court recently pointed out in
response to Milwaukee III, there is no evidence to support the conclu-
sion that Congress chose to resolve the conflicting interests of the two
states by subordinating the interests of the receiving state to those of the
state from which the pollution emanates.4 " Indeed, the court main-
tained that if the legislature's intent concerning the appropriate means
of apportioning the right to use interstate resources is not clear, then
any doubts should be resolved by emphasizing the primary objective of
the Clean Water Act-the elimination of pollutant discharges.
462
In attempting to resolve the ambiguities of the preemption ques-
tion, the courts should rule in favor of preserving state common law for
three reasons. First, the Supreme Court has enunciated a presumption
against the federal statutory preemption of state law. Because both pre-
emption and preservation will threaten significant values, and because
Congress has not made a clear choice among these values, the evidence
is not sufficiently compelling to overcome the presumption against pre-
emption.4 63 Second, the Supreme Court has indicated that federal
460 See R. STEWART & J. KRIER, supra note 78, at 365 (suggesting that ambient
air quality standards "should be established by the federal government because it is best
equipped to assess the interdependent needs of the entire nation with respect to air
quality, and also most able to avoid parochialism, interstate conflict, and pressure from
polluter interests"). But cf Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 487 (9th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2686 (1985). According to the Ninth Circuit,
"[w]hen the emphasis is to protect and strengthen national power, 'occupation' and
'conflict' are easily found while not so easily found when the emphasis is to promote
federalism." Id. Furthermore, in areas such as consumer protection, "'the emphasis
understandably is upon the state's interest particularly and the imperatives of federal-
ism generally.' " Id. at 488 (quoting Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972, 977 (9th Cir.
1980)).
481 See Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264, 271-72 (D. Vt.
1985).
462 See id. at 271.
463 There is evidence, however, that Congress believed that injuries caused by in-
terstate water pollution could be redressed in state common-law actions with a minimal
intrusion on the sovereignty of the state where the pollution originates, and that the
Clean Water Act was meant to preserve the availability of those actions. In 1985, the
Senate passed a bill to amend the Clean Water Act. See S. 1128, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.,
131 CONG. REc. S8126-40 (daily ed. June 13, 1985). Section 119(a) of this bill would
add a new subsection (e)(3) to the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1365(e), which would read in relevant part as follows:
In any case involving the application of State common . . . law to an
instance where a discharge of pollutants arising in another State is alleged
to have an adverse effect on the public health or welfare or the attainment
of any water quality requirements of such State . . ., a State or munici-
pality shall be considered a citizen of such State for the purpose of filing
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courts should be especially wary of preempting state law in matters
traditionally regulated under the state's police powers, such as the pro-
tection of public health and safety.4 4 In the absence of a "'clear and
manifest' " congressional purpose to preempt state law in interstate pol-
lution controversies, the courts should adhere to the assumption that the
historic police powers of the states have not been superseded.465 Both of
these reasons reflect a healthy respect for the preservation of decentral-
ized decisionmaking and local self-determination as a means of promot-
ing individual liberty.4 6 Finally, the courts should rule in favor of pre-
serving common-law remedies in order to avoid the due process
questions that would be raised by a contrary holding.46 7 This approach
seeks to avoid leaving individuals without any mechanism for re-
dressing an invasion of personal health or property rights by another,
and is thus consistent with the constitutional recognition in the due pro-
cess clause of the primacy of individual liberty.
4 8
3. Commerce Clause Limitations on State Power
Once a court concludes that Congress did not intend to preempt
state common law in interstate pollution disputes, it must then decide
an action in, or seeking removal to, a Federal district court ....
S. 1128, supra, § 119(a), 131 CONG. REc. at S8135 (daily ed. June 13, 1985). The
Senate Report on S. 1128 indicates that the suit may be brought in the federal district
court of the state bringing suit or of the state where the cause of action arose, thereby
"provid[ing] access to a neutral forum, the Federal courts, for resolution of interstate
disputes" for situations not now covered by the diversity of citizenship statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (1982). See S. REP. No. 50, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1985). The Re-
port stresses that the amendment does not create new substantive rights, but simply
"preserve[s] legal rights which exist by virtue of State statute or common law." Id.
Thus, the Senate Report on S. 1128 supports the proposition that under the current
statute a state or municipality can resort to its own common law as the basis for a
nuisance action in federal district court; it indicates that the new section merely "places
a State or municipality in the same position as one of its citizens for the purpose of
gaining access to Federal court under the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction." Id. Al-
though the meaning of this statement is not entirely clear, it appears to indicate that a
private citizen injured by an out-of-state polluter is not precluded by the current Clean
Water Act from suing the out-of-state polluter in a common-law action in federal dis-
trict court in the plaintiff's state. In such a suit, the normal choice of law principles
would apply in determining the applicable substantive law. See id.
"4 See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443
(1960) (" 'The intent to supersede the exercise by the State of its police power as to
matters not covered by the Federal legislation is not to be inferred from the mere fact
that Congress has seen fit to circumscribe its regulation and to occupy a limited
field.'") (quoting Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912)).
"85 See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 316 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
466 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
467 See supra notes 329-48 and accompanying text.
"'8 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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whether the federal Constitution prohibits a state from applying its
own law to an extraterritorial polluter. The commerce clause 9 con-
tains "an implied limitation on the power of the States to interfere with
or impose burdens on interstate commerce."4 " If a state law " 'regu-
lates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and
its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits.' ",471 A state's application of its
common law to prevent or compensate for harm caused by an out-of-
state polluter is an attempt to serve a legitimate local public interest. A
state law "designed to free [the state's environment] from pollu-
tion . ..clearly falls within the exercise of even the most traditional
concept of what is compendiously known as the police power. "472 The
inquiries into the discriminatory nature of the state's common law and
its effects on interstate commerce, however, would be more difficult to
resolve.
If a state explicitly applied more stringent standards to out-of-state
industries than it applied to local polluters, it would violate the com-
merce clause. 43 Absent such facially discriminatory rules, however, it
will be difficult to prove that the state's courts are treating out-of-state
companies less advantageously than state residents. The fact-specific
nature of nuisance cases will permit the state's courts to distinguish
almost any case from any other one. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
has been reluctant, absent-facially discriminatory measures, to invali-
date state laws under the commerce clause. 74
Absent a showing that the state's common law discriminates
469 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 3.
470 Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 389
(1983) (footnote omitted).
47, Id. at 393-94 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970));
see also Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960) (By
granting to Congress the authority to regulate commerce, the Constitution never in-
tended to prevent states from legislating on matters relating to welfare of their citizens,
although such legislation might affect commerce indirectly.).
472 Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960).
473 For example, a state might balance the equities in a nuisance action brought
against local defendants but refuse to do so if an out-of-state company were the
defendant.
47' See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 126 (1978) ("The fact that
the burden of a state regulation falls on some interstate companies does not, by itself,
establish a claim of discrimination against interstate commerce.") (footnote omitted); see
also Stewart, supra note 411, at 255 (noting that the Supreme Court refuses to apply
"undue burden" analysis to disputes over natural resources); cf City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (invalidating a facially discriminatory New Jersey
statute prohibiting the importation of wastes originating outside the state, while permit-
ting the disposal of wastes generated in the state).
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against out-of-state dischargers, the controlling question is likely to be
whether the burden imposed on interstate commerce is excessive in re-
lation to the benefits it provides to the forum state.475 If the effect of
applying state B's common law, for example, is merely to force a state
A company to install pollution control technology that it is economically
and technically capable of installing, the court may well characterize
the resulting "burden" on interstate commerce as incidental.47 6 Even if
the burden on the polluting state is a significant one, the burden may
not be excessive in light of the injured state's substantial interest in
protecting its environment from harm, whether that harm originates
within its own state or not.47 7 Only if the burden imposed by state law
on interstate commerce "clearly outweighs the State's legitimate pur-
pose does such a regulation violate the Commerce Clause.
47
1
Although the question might be a close one in some cases, the
courts will probably be reluctant to find that the application of state
common-law remedies to an out-of-state polluter impermissibly bur-
dens interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has indicated that the
delegation to Congress of the authority to regulate interstate commerce
was "never intended to cut the States off from legislating on all subjects
relating to the health, life, and safety of their citizens. '47 9 When a state
tries to regulate in these areas concurrently with the federal govern-
ment, the Court inquires whether uniformity of regulation is neces-
sary.48 ° In both the air and water pollution areas, Congress has con-
cluded that uniformity of regulation is not required. The two statutes
specify only a uniform minimum level of environmental protection,
4" See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 472 (1981).
476 See, e.g., id. at 472 ("[S]ince most dairies package their products in more than
one type of container[ ], the inconvenience of having to conform to different packaging
requirements . . . should be slight.").
477 See id. at 473 (Minnesota had a substantial interest in promoting conservation
of natural resources and easing solid waste disposal problems.).
471 Id. at 474; see also L. TRIBE, supra note 286, § 6-12, at 340 ("State regula-
tions seemingly aimed at furthering public health or safety . . . are less likely to be
perceived as 'undue burdens on interstate commerce' than are state regulations evi-
dently seeking to maximize the profits of local businesses.").
47' Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)
(citations omitted); see also H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 531-32
(1949) (recognizing a "broad power in the State to protect its inhabitants against perils
to health or safety, . . . even by use of measures which bear adversely upon interstate
commerce," so long as the state does not "promote its own economic advantages by
curtailment or burdening of interstate commerce"); Stewart, supra note 411, at 255
("The Supreme Court's refusal to apply undue burden analysis to natural resource
controversies means that state measures to prohibit, regulate, or tax the use of natural
resources will generally survive attack in court so long as [those] measures are not on
their face discriminatory.").
480 See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 444 (1960).
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while expressly authorizing the states to adopt and enforce more strin-
gent standards.481 If uniform federal regulation is required, it must be
attributed to the national interest in avoiding disputes between two or
more states with conflicting desires to use the same resource. This na-
tional interest, however, is unlikely to be strong enough to overcome the
states' recognized sovereign interest in protecting their environment
from outside impairment. 8 2
E. Preemption for Hazardous Waste Disposal Purposes
The framework for analyzing the preemption of state common-law
remedies is to a large extent the same under RCRA and CERCLA as
it is under the Clean Air and Water Acts. Three factors, however, jus-
tify a separate discussion of hazardous waste preemption issues. First,
the courts have continued to apply federal common law in resolving
certain issues of liability under the two statutes. Second, CERCLA
contains a provision that, by negative implication, appears to preempt
common-law remedies for interstate harms. Third, the courts have rec-
ognized a particularly strong federal interest in the abatement of toxic
waste hazards. Despite these factors, it appears that state common-law
remedies for intrastate harms are preserved by both statutes. Further-
more, the preemption of state remedies for interstate harms under
CERCLA may not apply to actions seeking compensation for personal
injury or property damage.
The Supreme Court stated in Milwaukee II that "if federal com-
mon law exists, it is because state law cannot be used." 83 Several fed-
eral courts have held that federal common-law rules govern the disposi-
tion of suits under the imminent hazard provisions of RCRA and
CERCLA.84s These provisions authorize the EPA to bring suit in fed-
481 See supra notes 372-76 and accompanying text.
482 The Court has indicated that in defining the limits implicitly imposed on the
states by the commerce clause, the courts should strive to reconcile state and national
power "'only by some appraisal and accommodation of the competing demands of the
state and national interests involved.'" Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 390 (1983) (quoting Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel.
Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945)); see also Stewart, supra note 411, at 254 (support-
ing "a general rule of deference to state environmental measures").
483 451 U.S. at 313 n.7; see also Fort, supra note 160, at 134 n.18 ("The dis-
placement of state law as the rule of decision is a concomitant feature of federal com-
mon law.").
484 See supra note 277. But see United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 837 n.13 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (Because RCRA and CER-
CLA preempted federal common law, it cannot be used to determine liability under the
imminent hazard provisions of the two statutes.) (citing Milwaukee I1, 451 U.S. at 317-
32).
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eral court to enjoin activities that may present an imminent and sub-
stantial endangerment to persons' health or the environment. 48 5 The
courts have also begun to fashion a body of federal common law to
determine whether parties obliged under CERCLA to reimburse the
government for costs incurred in response to releases of hazardous sub-
stances488 from abandoned or inactive waste disposal sites are jointly
and severally liable.48 7 This body of federal common law might thus
preempt state common-law remedies in cases involving either intrastate
or interstate harms caused by exposure to hazardous wastes.
This conclusion is, however, unwarranted because the courts ap-
plying federal common law in cases initiated under RCRA and CER-
CLA are not resorting to federal common law as an independent source
of liability. Defendant liability does not result from conduct the courts
characterize as nuisances under federal common law; rather, the defen-
dant is liable because its activities subject it to a special form of liability
created by Congress.48 For example, a defendant whose activities are
enjoined under section 7003 of RCRA489 is liable because it engaged in
conduct prohibited by Congress-the management of hazardous waste
in a manner that may present an imminent and substantial endanger-
ment to health or the environment. Congress has simply authorized the
federal district courts to determine on a case-by-case basis what consti-
tutes such an endangerment. Similarly, Congress in section
485 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 6973(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1985); 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).
488 A "release" of a hazardous substance under CERCLA includes "any spilling,
leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leach-
ing, dumping, or disposing into the environment." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22).
4 7 See supra note 277. Section 107(a) of CERCLA imposes liability on several
categories of persons for certain "costs of removal or remedial action" incurred by the
federal or state governments. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). For definitions of the terms "re-
moval" and "remedial," see id. § 9601(23)-(24).
'" See, e.g., United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 167 (4th Cir.
1984) (concluding that the imminent hazard provision of RCRA is a congressional
mandate for the courts' resort to concepts derived from "the former common law of
nuisance" in applying the provisions of the statute). According to the court in Waste
Industries, the Milwaukee 11 decision precluded "the courts' use of federal common law
as a source for setting regulatory standards independent of those established by a com-
prehensive statutory scheme[, but not] Congress' prerogative to empower the courts to
apply common-law principles as part of an ongoing regulatory scheme." Id.; see also
Hinds, supra note 263, at 2 ("Though the Supreme Court's decision . . . [in Milwau-
kee I1] appears to remove the federal common law as an independent basis of liability
in hazardous waste cases, common law concepts will continue to guide federal courts in
fashioning a body of law under the 'imminent hazard' provisions in RCRA and
Superfund.") (footnotes omitted). But see Fort, supra note 160, at 167 & n.207 (argu-
ing that when courts construe a federal statute or fill gaps in legislation, they are mak-
ing law, and that this lawmaking is one of the "classic illustrations" of federal common
law).
48' 42 U.S.C.A. § 6973 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985).
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107(a)(1)(A) of CERCLA490 requires the owner of any site from which
hazardous substances are released to reimburse the EPA for response
costs. The courts, pursuant to congressional authorization, determine
whether all of the EPA's costs are attributable to the site owner's activ-
ities or whether the owner is responsible for only an identifiable por-
tion of the agency's costs. Thus, the courts in these cases merely inter-
pret and apply provisions of the federal statutes that Congress left
vague.491 Any federal "common law" referred to in these cases is part
and parcel of the statutory provisions authorizing its application. There
is no independent body of federal common law that automatically
preempts state common-law remedies for harms caused by exposure to
hazardous waste.
If state common-law remedies in this area have been displaced,
they have been preempted by RCRA and CERCLA, rather than auto-
matically obliterated by the creation of an independent body of federal
common law. To determine whether these two statutes have preempted
state common-law remedies, the courts must engage in the normal pre-
emption analysis applied to all federal statutes.492
490 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)(A).
491 See, e.g., United States v. Stringfellow, 20 Env't Rep. Gas. (BNA) 1905, 1909
(C.D. Cal. 1984) (stating that courts have imposed joint and several liability under
CERCLA and the oil spill provisions of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321, "by
invoking common law principles in interpreting" the statutory language); United States
v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1753, 1759
n.8 (D.S.C. 1984) (Evolving principles of federal common law were intended by Con-
gress to "guide the courts in fleshing out CERCLA's liability provisions."). The Su-
preme Court has drawn the same distinction with respect to other statutory programs:
"In almost any statutory scheme, there may be a need for judicial interpretation of
ambiguous or incomplete provisions. But the authority to construe a statute is funda-
mentally different from the authority to fashion a new rule or to provide a new remedy
which Congress has decided not to adopt." Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers,
451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981), quoted in Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451
U.S. 630, 646 (1981); cf. Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 642 (In the absence of the
congressional creation of a right of contribution among private party defendants in a
civil antitrust suit, the action does not implicate such uniquely federal interests that the
courts are required to formulate federal common law to create a right of contribution.).
492 See supra notes 349-62 and accompanying text. This conclusion is supported
by the refusal of several courts to authorize the use of federal common law as an inde-
pendent basis of federal liability for damages in hazardous waste disposal suits on the
ground that RCRA and CERCLA provide the exclusive source of that liability. See
Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1146-48 (E.D. Pa. 1982);
United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1069 (D.N.J. 1981), affid, 688 F.2d 204
(3d Cir. 1982).
Even if the federal courts' use of federal common law under the imminent hazard
and response cost recovery provisions of RCRA and CERCLA automatically displaced
state law, it would still be necessary to determine the extent of the displacement. That
inquiry would be analogous to the identification of the scope of the field occupied by a
federal statute. It is at least arguable that the "field" occupied by the use of federal
common law under the imminent hazard and response cost recovery provisions of
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The first inquiry under this analysis is whether the statutes ex-
plicitly preclude the application of state common-law remedies. RCRA
does not do so, either for intrastate or interstate harms. The citizen suit
provision of RCRA contains a savings clause virtually identical to those
in the Clean Air and Water Acts.493 On its face, this clause appears to
preserve state common-law remedies for both intrastate and interstate
harms. Assuming that the savings clause is construed as taking no posi-
tion on the preemption issue, then the courts must determine whether
Congress implicitly precluded the states from applying their own com-
mon-law remedies.49
CERCLA, on the other hand, can be interpreted as expressly pre-
empting state common-law remedies for certain interstate harms. Sec-
tion 114 provides that "[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed or
interpreted as preempting any State from imposing any additional lia-
bility or requirements with respect to the release of hazardous sub-
stances within such State."49 This provision is distinguishable from the
savings clauses of the Clean Air and Water Acts and RCRA in at least
two ways. First, section 114 provides that nothing in the "chapter"
preempts state law. Thus, Justice Rehnquist's argument in Milwau-
kee IH-that although the citizen suit provision itself does not preempt
federal common law, the rest of the statute doeso'-is not available.
Second, the effect of the CERCLA savings clause is limited to supple-
mental common-law remedies for releases "within [the] State." Thus, if
a waste disposal site in state B leaks, causing injury in state B, state B's
common-law remedies remain available to redress the harm . 97 If the
leak occurs in state A, however, state B common-law remedies are not
preserved by CERCLA, since the release did not occur "within such
State," that is, state B. This negative implication of section 114 sup-
RCRA and CERCLA does not encompass private individuals' rights to seek compensa-
tion for personal injury or private property damage resulting from exposure to improp-
erly disposed of hazardous wastes. Cf infra text accompanying notes 498-500 (sug-
gesting that CERCLA does not address and therefore does not preempt state remedies
for personal injuries and property damage).
498 See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(0 (1982).
4" The Court's analysis in Milwaukee II discloses that although nothing in the
citizen suit provision of RCRA preempts state common law, the rest of the statute may
implicitly suggest otherwise. See supra notes 223-24, 368 and accompanying text.
495 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a) (emphasis added).
496 See 451 U.S. at 329-32.
4- Cf 42 U.S.C. § 96070):
Nothing in . . . [section 9607, concerning liability for response costs]
shall affect or modify in any way the obligations or liability of any person
under any other provision of State or Federal law, including common law,
for damages, injury, or loss resulting from a release of any hazardous
substance ....
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ports the conclusion that Congress intended to preempt state common-
law remedies for interstate harms.
The next question is the scope of the field occupied exclusively by
the federal government through CEROLA. The statute authorizes fed-
eral and state governments to recover both the costs incurred in re-
sponding to releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances
from hazardous waste facilities and compensatory damages for harm to
government-owned natural resources.498 Private persons can also seek
reimbursement for response costs."9 CERCLA, however, does not cre-
ate any federal statutory mechanisms for private individuals to seek
compensation for personal injuries or property damage. 500 Arguably,
the scope of section 114's preemptive effect extends no further than the
matters addressed in CERCLA itself. Under this analysis, the statute
preempts supplemental state common-law remedies only for the reim-
bursement of response costs and natural resource damages where the
release and harm occur in different states, but not for personal injuries
or property damage.
State common-law remedies not expressly preempted or preserved
by RCRA and CERCLA may be implicitly preempted by congres-
sional occupation of the hazardous waste disposal field or by the exis-
tence of federal objectives that will be frustrated by the use of state
common-law remedies. Unfortunately, the legislative histories of the
two statutes are just as uninformative as those of the Clean Air and
Water Acts.
The courts, however, have implicitly attributed to Congress the
desire to achieve objectives that reflect one or more of the four values
described in this Article.50 1 The preemption of state common-law reme-
dies for intrastate and interstate harms caused by hazardous waste dis-
posal would affect these values in the same ways as the preemption of
state law under the Clean Air and Water Acts,502 with one possible
exception. The courts that have resorted to federal common law to de-
termine whether parties are jointly and severally liable for response
costs under section 107(a) of CERCLA50 3 have recognized that the im-
498 See id. § 9607(a)(1-4)(A), (C).
499 See id. § 9607(a)(1-4)(B).
500 Provisions that would have authorized such compensation were deleted from
the Senate bill prior to CEROLA's enactment. See Grad, Remedies for Injuries
Caused by Hazardous Waste: The Report and Recommendations of the Superfund
301(e) Study Group, 14 ENvrL. L. REP,. 10,105, 10,105 (1984).
501 See, e.g., United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1255
(S.D. Ill. 1984).
80' See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 387-99 & 424-68.
80 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
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proper disposal or release of hazardous substances is "an enormous and
complex problem of national magnitude involving uniquely federal in-
terests."5 4 To the extent that state law differs from federal controls
and remedies concerning hazardous waste disposal, a conflict between
federal and state interests might develop. If the achievement of federal
interests requires uniform regulation, the accommodation value sup-
ports the subordination of state to federal interests through the preemp-
tion of state common-law remedies.
505
This argument appears to support the preemption of state com-
mon-law injunctive relief in either an intrastate or an interstate dispute.
It is less tenable, however, with respect to state compensatory remedies
for personal injury or property damage. In United States v. A & F
Materials Co., 50 6 a federal district court listed four reasons for develop-
ing a uniform federal common law to govern liability in cases involving
the recovery of government response costs under section 107(a) of
CERCLA. 507 Three of these reasons, which could also apply to the
control of hazardous waste disposal under RCRA, do not dictate the
preemption of all state compensatory remedies. First, CERCLA and
RCRA represent "a substantial special federal interest in the abate-
ment of toxic waste hazards. '50 8 Only standards that are more lenient
than the federal standards for hazardous waste treatment, storage, or
disposal threaten the goal of abatement.509 An award of damages to an
individual injured by waste disposal activities does not conflict with any
federal interest in abating the hazard,510 unless the responsible party is
5" United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1983);
see also United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1255 (S.D. Ill.
1984) (emphasizing the need for uniform standards governing hazardous waste disposal
and enforcement of those standards); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1338
(E.D. Pa. 1983) (discussing the states' inadequate efforts to deal with the problem of
hazardous waste disposal).
505 See United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1255 (S.D. Ill.
1984).
506 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Ill. 1984).
5- 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
508 A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. at 1255 (emphasis added).
509 Cf Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1794 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
1984). The New Jersey Court stated that CERCLA
preempts state taxation of the hazardous waste industry only when the
state fund created thereby is used to compensate clean up activities already
compensated by Superfund ....
• . . Given the national interest in cleaning up and removing hazard-
ous waste from our environment, we would be hard pressed to interpret
the legislation as prohibiting states from supplementing the federal move-
ment to combat this problem.
Id. at 1801-02.
5'0 See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1542-43 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 545 (1984).
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unable to pay for cleanup after satisfying a judgment in a state com-
mon-law action.511 Second, the court indicated that a uniform federal
common law was needed to implement and interpret CERCLA's provi-
sions creating liability for government response costs. 512 The availabil-
ity of state common-law remedies for the compensation of personal in-
juries and property damage, areas not covered by CERCLA, would not
interfere significantly with the implementation of the Act.51 3 Third, the
court noted the federal government's interest in preserving the integrity
of the Superfund.51' An award of damages to an injured individual
could jeopardize the integrity of the Fund, since payment of a state tort
claim might leave the responsible party financially incapable of reim-
bursing the government for cleanup costs.
The court's final explanation for the development of uniform fed-
eral common law was the desire to prevent excessive dumping in states
with more lenient laws.515 This federal interest might be impaired by
the development of different state standards for injunctive relief and
liability. A disproportionate amount of hazardous waste disposal might
occur in states whose courts make injunctive relief or damage recoveries
more difficult for injured plaintiffs to obtain.51 6
Companies engaged in the management of waste, however, will
continue to be subject to a uniform federal standard of liability for the
reimbursement of response costs incurred by the EPA in cleaning up
waste sites, regardless of their locations.51 7 The magnitude of section
107(a) response cost liability can be staggering, where, for example,
chemical wastes leak from a disposal site into a source of drinking
water. Companies may decide that shopping around for a state with
favorable common-law standards will not reduce their risk of liability
sufficiently to be worth the effort. Furthermore, a company will have to
511 In that event, the EPA could rely on money from the Superfund if the site
were on the National Priorities List. See 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a).
512 See A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. at 1255.
511 It is again possible that after paying a personal injury award, the owner of a
disposal facility or other responsible person would lack the funds to reimburse the gov-
ernment for its response costs.
514 See A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. at 1255.
5 See id.; see also United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 807
(S.D. Ohio 1983) ("'To insure the development of a uniform rule of law, and to dis-
courage business dealing in hazardous substances from locating primarily in States with
more lenient laws, the bill will encourage the further development of a Federal com-
mon law in this area.' ") (quoting 126 CONG. REc. HI 1,787 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980)
(statement of Rep. Florio)).
516 State courts can develop different rules, for example, concerning the propriety
of strict or joint and several liability. A state that adopts substantive or procedural rules
advantageous to a person whose disposal activities cause harm could attract a dispro-
portionately high level of disposal.
517 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
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consider whether it is willing to incur the costs and run the risks of the
interstate and, in some cases, long-range transport of wastes. If an acci-
dent in transit results in a release, the company that arranged the
transport may be exposed to significant additional liabilities under both
federal and state law. The possibility that the state of disposal will ap-
ply a common-law standard more favorable to the defendant in a negli-
gence, nuisance, or other common-law action may be outweighed by
these additional costs and risks.
The argument that state common-law remedies might conflict with
a need for national uniformity, even if otherwise persuasive, goes too
far. If the application of varying state common-law injunctive or com-
pensatory relief conflicts with federal abatement efforts by draining the
financial resources of responsible parties or by encouraging dumping in
states with lenient standards, these adverse consequences would result
whether the harm were intrastate or interstate in character. The finan-
cial solvency of a dump-site owner, for example, would be threatened
just as much by a large award of compensatory damages to a plaintiff
located in the same state as it would by a judgment for an injured party
residing in another state. But Congress preserved state tort remedies for
intrastate harms under CERCLA, 51  and apparently also did so under
RCRA.51 9 Congress, therefore, could not have concluded that the need
for national uniformity mandates the preemption of all supplemental
state common-law remedies. Since intrastate remedies are preserved,
any concern for national uniformity must be based on a desire to pre-
"' See id. § 9614(a); cf. supra notes 495-97 and accompanying text (discussing
the savings clause of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9614).
"I See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(0 (1982); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 6929 (West 1983 &
Supp. 1985) (A state may impose, and by implication, enforce, requirements for haz-
ardous wastes that are more stringent than those set forth by the federal government.).
Several courts have permitted plaintiffs to seek both injunctive and compensatory reme-
dies on state common-law theories in hazardous waste disposal cases, although these
courts have not analyzed the preemption issue in depth. See, e.g., United States v.
Allied Chem. Corp., 587 F. Supp. 1205, 1209 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (In complaining of a
release of hazardous substances, plaintiff sufficiently stated a cause of action in nui-
sance and trespass under state common law.); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc.,
587 F. Supp. 144 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (finding that continuing nuisance was grounds for
damages as well as injunctive relief); United States v. Stringfellow, 20 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1905, 1912 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (Under California law of nuisance, a plaintiff can
recover against any defendant that does not show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that its liability should be limited.). Engaging in a more extensive treatment of the
issue, the Supreme Court of West Virginia concluded that RCRA does not preempt
state common-law public nuisance actions. See Sharon Steel Corp. v. Fairmont, 22
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1983 (1985). For various arguments supporting the availability
of state common-law remedies for persons harmed by exposure to hazardous wastes, see
generally Note, Hazardous Wastes: Preserving the Nuisance Remedy, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 675 (1981); Note, Hazardous Waste Disposal: Is There Still a Role for Common
Law?, 18 TULSA L.J. 448 (1983).
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vent confrontations between the states, the same component of the ac-
commodation value used to support preemption of state common-law
remedies in Milwaukee Ill.
Both RCRA and CERCLA appear to preserve state common-law
remedies for intrastate harms. Even if congressional intent on the pre-
emption issue is not explicitly reflected in the language of the statutes,
there is no basis for concluding that Congress implicitly preempted the
field of hazardous waste disposal. The values of legitimacy, efficiency,
and especially individual liberty support preserving state remedies for
intrastate harms,520 and the legislative history does not reveal any con-
gressional determination that other values would be impaired by pre-
serving state law. CERCLA's preemption of state common-law 'reme-
dies for interstate harm arguably applies only to the recovery of
response costs. Although the values of legitimacy and accommodation
may support the preemption of other state remedies,521 the values of
individual liberty and efficiency appear to support their preservation.5 2
Because of the presumption against federal preemption of state law, the
courts' reluctance to preempt state efforts to protect public health and
safety, and the due process difficulties presented by the preclusion of
state common-law compensatory remedies, 523 the courts should con-
clude that Congress has not implicitly preempted these state remedies
for interstate harm by enacting RCRA and CERCLA.
F. Re-creation of Private Federal Remedies
Since the application of common-law remedies to an intrastate dis-
pute is supported by at least three of the four values described in this
Article-legitimacy, individual liberty, and efficiency-Congress need
not take any action concerning these remedies.524 Invoking state com-
mon-law remedies in an interstate dispute, however, raises serious con-
siderations of legitimacy and accommodation. Congress can eliminate
these difficulties by amending each of the four statutes to do one of two
things. First, Congress could reverse Milwaukee II and restore a modi-
fied form of federal common law in the area of pollution control, which
would authorize the federal courts to award damages to victorious pri-
vate plaintiffs. Second, Congress could create a statutory private right
520 See supra notes 387-99 and accompanying text.
521 See supra notes 423-26, 457-60 and accompanying text.
522 See supra notes 429-56 and accompanying text.
523 See supra notes 329-48 and accompanying text.
524 Congress could adopt a clarifying amendment affirmatively stating that state
common-law remedies for intrastate harms have survived the enactment of the four
federal statutes.
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of action for persons harmed by air or water pollution or by exposure
to hazardous wastes.
The adoption of either one of these alternatives would avoid the
problems raised by using state common law to resolve an interstate dis-
pute. These proposals would eliminate any perception of unfairness
caused by discriminatory application of one state's law to out-of-state
sources because interstate disputes could be resolved in a neutral forum
using federal law. The potential for interstate conflict could also be
minimized by dictating a single body of federal rules applicable to com-
panies whose discharges cross state lines.52 5 Thus, the creation of fed-
eral remedies would foster the values of both legitimacy and
accommodation.
At the same time, the revival of federal common law or the crea-
tion of a private federal damage action would overcome the current dis-
advantages arising from the preemption of state common-law remedies
in interstate disputes. The availability of a federal judicial forum to
injured persons furthers legitimacy by adding an opportunity for public
participation in formulating pollution control standards and remedies.
A federal action, if accompanied by the preemption of state law in in-
terstate disputes, eliminates the possibility of one state intruding upon
the sovereignty of another, while preserving-in much the same way as
the Court did in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.526-a state's ability
to protect its environment from external impairment. Finally, either of
the amendments described above can provide a mechanism for individ-
ual compensation to substitute for any preempted state common-law
remedies, thereby avoiding the due process questions raised by preemp-
tion under the current statutes. 527 If Congress wants to avoid subjecting
a discharger to a multiplicity of ad hoc judicial standards of conduct, as
feared by the majority in the Milwaukee II case, it can limit federal
common-law or statutory remedies to compensatory rather than injunc-
tive relief.
CONCLUSION
In the Milwaukee II and National Sea Clammers cases, the Su-
preme Court held that Congress intended to eliminate from the arsenal
of an individual injured by pollution all means of seeking compensation
526 See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 334 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (recognizing
"the unique role federal common law plays in resolving disputes between one State and
the citizens or government of another").
526 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
5217 See supra text accompanying notes 329-48 (discussing due process questions
raised by the preemption of state remedies).
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under federal law. The evidence supplied by the Court in support of its
decisions is less than overwhelming.
The Court has not yet decided whether state common-law injunc-
tive or compensatory remedies have survived the enactment of the
Clean Air and Water Acts, RCRA, and CERCLA. With the exception
of CERCLA's provision precluding interstate actions for response cost
reimbursement, none of these statutes expressly preempts state com-
mon-law remedies. Indeed, to the extent the statutes address the issue,
they appear to preserve all state common-law remedies.
If the statutory language is not dispositive, one must determine
whether Congress has implicitly preempted state common-law remedies
for harm caused by pollution. There is no evidence that Congress in-
tended to do so where the injury occurs in the same state in which the
pollution is generated. The preservation of state common-law remedies
in this context is consistent with the values of legitimacy, individual
liberty, and efficiency reflected in the enactment of the four federal pol-
lution control statutes or in applicable constitutional provisions.
If the pollution originates in a state other than the state of injury,
the arguments in support of preemption are stronger. The application
of one state's common law to a polluter in another state may create
perceptions of or actually result in discrimination against out-of-state
polluters. It would also infringe upon the sovereignty of the polluter's
home state, if that state's pollution control standards are not as strin-
gent as those formulated by the court in the plaintiff's state. On the
other hand, the preemption of state common-law compensatory reme-
dies in such a dispute would undermine individual liberty and might
violate the due process clause. On balance, the evidence is not suffi-
ciently compelling to overcome the Supreme Court's presumption
against preemption in areas of traditional state concern, such as the
protection of health and safety. If Congress believes that the disadvan-
tages of applying state common law in an interstate dispute outweigh
the advantages, it should create a substitute federal compensatory rem-
edy before preempting state law.
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